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This report is the result of four years of collaboration 
between Oxfam GB, the Institute of Development 
Studies and qualitative and quantitative researchers 
in ten countries. It builds on a prior IDS-Oxfam study 
into the effects of the global food crisis on the lives 
of people on low and uncertain incomes, which 
ran between 2009 and 2011 in four countries. The 
longitudinal study synthesised here was carried out 
between 2012 and 2015 and involved annual visits 
to communities in rural, urban and peri-urban sites, 
along with commissioned reviews of national-level 
prices and policies over the period. With the help of 
the research partners and of Oxfam offices around 
the world, the findings have already begun to be 
disseminated and discussed with communities, 
government representatives and members of civil 
society at multiple levels. The research was funded by 
the UK Department for International Development, 
Irish Aid and Oxfam.
IDS_Master Logo
PL_OuterCovers_FINAL.indd   1 25/08/2016   13:24
Kami, Cochabamba Valley, is a former mining town 
160km from Cochabamba. The expansion of the urban 
periphery is very noticeable in Kami, where new 
developments abound. Many in Kami are involved in 
the construction sector as site workers, welders or 
quarry workers.
Pirhuas
Pirhuas is a village in the Cochabamba Valley, 
2,500m above sea level. Reverse migration and new 
infrastructure have transformed the area in the past 
15 years. Most people are farmers, including some 
successful dairy producers.
Kalyanpur Notun Bazaar, Dhaka 
Kalyanpur Notun Bazaar is a slum area in Dhaka. 
Most people in Kalyanpur are migrants from rural 
areas who have suffered from climate-related land 
erosion. They are small traders, rickshaw drivers, waste 
recyclers, general daily-wage workers, or workers in 
garment factories. 
Koyra, Khulna District 
Koyra, in the southern district of Khulna, was hit by 
Cyclone Aila in 2009. Agricultural lands in this region 
were flooded by the tidal wave and many labourers 
turned to fishing in the Sundarban forest, even though 
attacks from tigers and pirates were genuine threats. The 
area did not recover its pre-disaster land and livelihood 
patterns; instead, shrimp cultivation gained increasing 
importance, as did out-migration. 
Dhamurhat, Naogaon District 
Dhamurhat, in Naogaon District, on the north-west 
border with West Bengal (India), is located in one of 
the poorest parts of the country. Agriculture is the 
main livelihood, with land 
ownership concentrated in a 
few hands. Some residents 
work in brick production, 
others migrate for seasonal 
work outside the district. 
Some make a living from 
cross-border smuggling. 
Bangladesh
Bolivia
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Kaya, Sanmatenga province 
Situated 100km north-east of the 
capital, Ouagadougou, in the north-
central region of the country, Kaya is 
the seventh largest town in Burkina 
Faso, with about 55,000 inhabitants. 
It is known as the last town before 
the Sahara Desert. The residents are 
mostly involved in agriculture and raising livestock, along with small 
businesses and crafts. 
Nessemtenga, Sanmatenga 
Located approximately 14km away from Kaya, Nessemtenga in 
Boussouma municipality is an agricultural community of more than 
5,000 people. Many of the young men from Nessemtenga have 
gone to look for gold in one of the many non-industrial mines in the 
country, leaving farming behind. The gold rush has brought about 
noticeable social changes. The population is now predominantly 
female (55 per cent) and young (45 per cent are under 14). The 
village market, which is held every three days, brings in traders from 
surrounding towns and villages.
The municipality of Santo Tomás Chichicastenango is a large 
indigenous Mayan K’iche’ mountain town, part of the tourist circuit 
across the Guatemalan highlands. Chichicastenango lies 145km north-
west of Guatemala City, and most people are involved in the town’s 
market and tourism-related industries, or in unskilled agricultural 
wage labour. 
Chugüexá Primero, in the rural and mountainous western region 
of Guatemala, is a settlement of just over 1,000 people. The 
community comprises a close-knit group of K’iche’ speakers. While 
the inhabitants grow maize and beans for their own consumption, it 
is not enough to last the whole year. 
For the past 30 years, men have mainly 
worked as tailors. 
In addition to their domestic work, 
many of the women in Chugüexá 
Primero weave, take in laundry, and 
prepare food for sale on market days.
Kolfe sub-city, in the western part of Addis Ababa, is a mixed urban 
neighbourhood, with white-collar professionals living alongside 
shopkeepers, grain dealers, small traders and vendors. 
The local administration has been providing credit and training to 
support poor people working in various sectors, including carpentry, 
metalwork, construction, tailoring, agriculture and food processing. 
Many people rely on remittances from abroad. 
Consumers’ Associations provide subsidised food, including meat, for 
local residents. 
Many women from Kolfe who have returned from the Gulf countries 
have set up small food stalls, selling samosas or French fries.
Adami Tullu, Oromia
While some 95 per cent of people in the kebele (village) at Adami 
Tullu in Oromia region are farmers, only 30 per cent have access 
to irrigation. The expansion of the irrigation system has brought 
considerable change to the kebele, in this dry area that lies on 
the main road 170km south of Addis Ababa. Producers who have 
irrigation are prospering and are considered model farmers. They 
grow onions and tomatoes which they sell from roadside stalls. 
Given that there has been no new land distribution since the 1980s, 
younger people share land with their parents or inherit smaller 
pieces of agricultural land. There are no alternative jobs for young 
people, despite rising levels of education.
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Guatemala
Ethiopia
Burkina Faso
PRECARIOUS LIVES : FOOD, WORK AND CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
 Acknowledgements
Our thanks to all the householders and key informants who 
welcomed us and made this work possible.
And to the lead researchers who adapted the design and 
led the qualitative and quantitative research in ten countries: 
Gabriela Alcaraz, Mysbah Balagamwala, José Luis Barroso, 
Azmat Budhani, Marie-Jo Cortijo, Nhat Nguyen Duc, Rizki 
Fillaili, Carolyne Gatimu, Haris Gazdar, Ferdous Jahan, Ludovic 
Ouhonyioué Kibora, Richard King, Rosario Léon, Alma Lucrecia 
Olivet López, Grace Lubaale, Mwila Mulumbi, Hussain Bux Mallah, 
Ayesha Mysorewala, Rachma Indah Nurbani, Mamun-ur-Rashid, 
Asif Mohammad Shahan, Yisak Tafere, Tran Cong Thang, Vu Huy 
Phuc, Sharif Abdi Wahab and Tassew Woldehanna.
And to all the research assistants who so patiently listened and 
recorded material from householders and key informers each 
year, most recently in Bangladesh: Raju Ahammed, Irteza Ahmed, 
Meraz Ahmed, Md. Akteruzzaman, Muhd. Naimul Amin, Nahid 
Hasan, Md. Mahbub Hasan, Muhammad Hedayet Hussain, 
Sanjida Hossain, Md. Ali Newez Khan, Shameem Reza Khan, Md. 
Moniruzzaman, Omar Faruq Siddique, Sharif A. Wahab; in Bolivia: 
Pedro Badran, Jean Paul Benavides, Eduarda Cabrera, Jauregui 
Gilda, Blanca León; in Burkina Faso: Bambara Awa Carole, 
Dayamba K. Francis, Mando Guibril, Ouedraogo Honorine, 
Ouédraogo Soulheiman, Sawadogo Marie, Segda Ablassé; in 
Ethiopia: Workneh Abebe, Abraham Alemu, Kiros Berhanu, 
Asmeret Gebrehiwet, Tefera Goshu; in Guatemala: Ingrid Bocel, 
Jennifer López, Jerson Estuardo López, Marvin Lotzoj, Fernando 
Coc Macú, Cruz Elena Morales, René Morales, Tomasa Eugenia 
Morales, Mishelle Olivet, Margarita Ramirez, Micaela Sut, María 
Jacinta Xon; in Indonesia: Nur Aini, Hafiz Arfyanto, Mariatul 
Asiah, Rahmat Juhandi, Mayang Rizky, Mella Roosdinar, Mayang 
Rizky, Hariyanti Sadaly, Abdani Solihin, Bambang Sulaksono; also 
for advice and support, Herry Widjanarko, Arran McMahon, 
Asri Yusrina; in Kenya: Carolyne Cherop, Nathaniel Kabala, Peter 
Kimani, Keziah Mumbi, Diana Ndung’u; in Pakistan: Hassan Zaib 
Abbasi, Saba Aslam, Ilma Ghouse, Abdul Haseeb; in Vietnam: 
Dinh Bao Linh, Vu Huy Phuc, Pham Thi Hong Van; and in 
Zambia: Kabuswe Chikoti, Joseph Chikwanda, Gift Mataa, 
Regina Mubanga, Harold Mukupa, Estone Phiri.
And to those in Oxfam country offices, including Md. Badi 
Akhter and Monisha Biswas in Bangladesh, Carlos Aguilar in 
Bolivia, Issaka Ouandaogo and Omer Kabore in Burkina Faso, 
Ayman Omer in Ethiopia, Md. Qazilbash in Pakistan, Sumananjali 
Mohanty in Kenya, Bui Phuong Lan and Vu Thi Quynh Hoa 
in Oxfam Vietnam, Dini Widiastuti in Oxfam Indonesia, Aída 
Pesquera and Luis Paiz-Becker in Oxfam Guatemala, and 
Dailes Judge in Zambia, who supported the research and its 
dissemination; and in Oxfam GB special thanks to Richard King 
(now at Chatham House), Duncan Green, Deborah Hardoon, 
John Magrath and Anna Coryndon.
Also to: Budhi Adrianto, Mbak Dini, Jamie Evans, Stephen 
Grischik, Novita Maizir Mukti Mulyana, Dyah Prastiningtyas, 
Bambang Samekto (Indonesia).
And to IDS administration staff without whom the partnerships 
could not have been so productive, including Nadine Beard, Talia 
Jenkin, Katy Miller, Dick Douglas and Mustafa Roberts and to the 
communications staff including Carol Smithyes, Emilie Wilson and 
Beth Richard. 
And to our funding partners in UK Aid, Irish Aid and Oxfam.  
IDS Production Editor Beth Richard 
Copy-editor Kathryn O’Neill 
Designer Lance Bellers
Proofreader Paula McDiarmid
Printer Gemini Digital Print
Citation Scott-Villiers, P.; Chisholm, N.; Wanjiku Kelbert, A. and 
Hossain, N. (2016) Precarious Lives: Food, Work and Care after the 
Global Food Crisis, Brighton: IDS and Oxfam International 
Authors Patta Scott-Villiers, Nick Chisholm, Alexandra Wanjiku 
Kelbert and Naomi Hossain
Published September 2016 
Disclaimers The Institute of Development Studies and Authors 
cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences 
arising from the use of information contained in this report. 
The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect 
those of the IDS and Authors. 
Oxfam supports the publication of this report in order to share 
research results, to contribute to public debate and to invite 
feedback. It does not necessarily reflect Oxfam policy positions. 
The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of Oxfam. 
The results reported represent the views of the authors and not 
necessarily those of DFID or the Government of Ireland. 
Copyright © Institute of Development Studies and Oxfam 
International, 2016. 
ISBN 978-1-78118-325-0
This is an Open Access report distributed under 
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors 
and source are credited. 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode 
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE UK 
www.ids.ac.uk 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered 
in England (No 877338).
Front cover
People bought broken eggs when they couldn’t afford whole ones, Dhaka.
Photographer credits
Front cover: Mamun-ur-Rashid; p.1 (clockwise from top left): (1) Mamun-ur-Rashid, (2) Md. Asaduzzaman, (3) Bayazid Hasan, (4) Blanca León, (5) Rosario Léon; p.2 (clockwise from top 
left): (1) Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert, (2) Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert, (3) Alma Olivet, (4) Alma Olivet, (5) Workneh Abebe, (6) Asmeret Gebrehiwet; p.8: Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert; 
p.9: Marvin Lotzoj; p.10: Alassane Pafadnam; p.12: Collective for Social Science Research; p.15: Herry Widjanarko; p.19: Ludovic Kibora; p.20: Collective for Social Science Research; 
p.23: Mwila Mulumbi; p.25: Pham Thi Hong Van; p.26 (top to bottom): (1) Oxfam/Sam Tarling, (2) Grace Lubaale, (3) Oxfam/Jennifer Huxta; p.27 (top to bottom): (1) Herry Widjanarko, 
(2) Bambang Sulaksono, (3) Bambang Sulaksono; p.28: Yisak Tafere; p.29: Nguyen My Y; p.30: Asmeret Gebrehiwet; p.32: Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert; p.33: Carolyne Gatimu; p.34: José 
Luis Barroso; p.35: Blanca León; p.36: Alma Olivet; p.37: Rachma Nurbani; p.38 (top to bottom): (1) Patta Scott-Villiers, (2) Mwila Mulumbi, (3) Mwila Mulumbi; p.39 (clockwise): 
(1) Nguyen My Y, (2) Pham Thi Hong Van, (3) Nguyen My Y; p.40: Dora Kakomwe; p.41: Rachma Nurbani; p.42: Collective for Social Science Research; p.43: Mwila Mulumbi; p.44: 
Herry Widjanarko; p.46: Carolyne Cherop; p.47: Humphrey Kimani; p.48 (top to bottom): (1) Alma Olivet, (2) Alma Olivet, (3) Jennifer López; p.49 (top to bottom): (1) Shameem Reza Khan, 
(2) Raju Ahmed, (3) Jankie (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/); p.50: Shameem Reza Khan; p.51: Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert; p.52: Oxfam/Jennifer Huxta; p.53: Collective 
for Social Science Research; p.54: Raju Ahammed; p.55: Pham Thi Hong Van; p.74 (clockwise): (1) Herry Widjanarko, (2) Arran McMahon, (3) Rahmat Juhandi, (4) Oxfam/Jennifer Huxta, 
(5) Carolyne Gatimu; p.75 (clockwise): (1) Naila Mehmood, (2) Naila Mehmood, (3) IPSARD/Nguyen My Y, (4) Mwila Mulumbi, (5) Mwila Mulumbi, (6) Quach Dai Vuong.
PRECARIOUS LIVES : FOOD, WORK AND CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS CONTENTS
5
 Contents
 Foreword 7
1 Introduction 9
 Background and objectives 10
 The context: the global food crisis and its aftermath 13
 Research rationale and design 16
2 Food prices and wages 20
 Global price movements 20
 National prices and wages 21
Real lives 26
3 Adjusting to higher food prices 28
 Earning more 29
 Squeezing more 34
Real lives 38
4 Aggregate effects 40
 Transformational mechanisms 40
 Precariousness 42
 Commoditisation of food 43
 The effect on social reproduction 44
 Political subjectivity and rights 45
Real lives 48
5 Conclusions and implications 50
 Another ‘Great Transformation’ 50
 Social protection reconceptualised for a time of food crisis 5 1
 Struggles to protect the social: food sovereignty, fair prices and basic incomes 53
 What we need to know 54
6 National food prices and wages 55
 The ‘exporting stabiliser’: Vietnam 55
 The ‘importers’: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya and Pakistan 56
 The ‘isolated’: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Zambia 64
 Notes 67
 References 68
PRECARIOUS LIVES : FOOD, WORK AND CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS CONTENTS
6
Boxes
Box 1 Agricultural change in coastal Bangladesh 24
Box 2 The gold rush in Burkina Faso 31
Figures
Figure 1 Food and cereal price indices, nominal and real 2000–2016 (2002–2004=100) 13
Figure 2 Research components and the analytical framework 17
Figure 3  World food prices 1990–2014 18
Figure 4 Cumulative impact of main staple food prices on cost of food basket 2013–2015 19
Figure 5 World market cereal prices, January 2000 – January 2016 21
Figure 6 Food and nutrition security in ten countries in 2012 21
Figure 7 Cereal import dependency ratios in the ten countries 22
Figure 8 Average annual cereal prices (2007=100) 23
Figure 9 Cellular subscriptions (per 100 of the population) 1980–2015 33
Figure 10 Rice, wholesale price, January 2008 – December 2015, An Giang 56
Figure 11  Wholesale coarse rice prices, July 1998 – January 2016, Dhaka 57
Figure 12  Retail prices of wheat flour (January 2004 – January 2016) and rice 
 (January 2006 – January 2016), Karachi 58
Figure 13  Wheat flour prices: (local wholesale, January 2006 – January 2016; imported wholesale 
 December 2010 – January 2016, retail, February 2009 – January 2016), La Paz 59
Figure 14  White maize wholesale price (January 2000 – January 2016), and maize tortilla retail price 
 (January 2001 – November 2015) 60
Figure 15  Indonesia food price trends, 2003–2011 61
Figure 16  Retail price of rice (February 2008 – January 2016) and wheat flour 
 (September 2010 – January 2016) 62
Figure 17 Wholesale price of maize (January 2006 – January 2016) and beans 
 (January 2006 – October 2015), Nairobi 63
Figure 18  Millet and imported rice wholesale prices, January 2006 – January 2016, Ouagadougou 64
Figure 19  Wholesale prices of teff, maize, wheat, January 2000 – January 2016, Addis Ababa 65
Figure 20 White maize retail price (January 2004 – January 2016) and breakfast maize meal retail price 
 (January 2006 – January 2016), Zambia 66
Tables
Table 1  Study countries by income and nutrition status 17
Table 2 Mean nominal monthly earnings of employees, Vietnam, 2007 and 2009–2013 (Vietnamese Dong) 56
Table 3 Average personal monthly income from work in Guatemala 60
7PRECARIOUS LIVES : FOOD, WORK AND CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS FOREWORD
 Foreword
Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility was a 
real-time investigation of the experiences of 
people on low and uncertain incomes as they 
made dramatic adjustments to their place in 
the global economy in the wake of the food 
and financial crises that began in 2007. We 
accompanied people in 23 sites in ten countries 
on these journeys of economic change, to make 
sense of the constrained agency with which they 
responded across diverse contexts. Specifically, we 
heard and saw what it meant when people’s best 
efforts at work and provisioning were delinked 
from the prospect of a decent living. 
This grounded perspective connected economic 
development to human wellbeing, and granted 
valuable insights into what global economic changes 
meant for people’s everyday lives. These included 
learning about labour, and in particular the growing 
precariousness in the types of work and returns to 
work; about the changing need for social protection, 
as people and societies rely more on markets that 
sometimes fail and seldom care; and about diets 
and nutrition – perpetual concerns for people on 
low incomes, but concerns that have risen up the 
international development policy agenda recently 
as governments come to recognise the public 
policy benefits of well-nourished populations. It is 
not coincidental that this recognition is coming at 
just the moment when many people are finding 
that good nourishment is out of reach through 
their own efforts in the market. 
The core finding was that sudden and sustained 
rises in the price of basic daily needs introduced 
change in patterns of everyday life via two 
universal mechanisms: (1) an immediate and 
sustained pressure to earn more cash to meet 
the rising costs of relatively inelastic needs, and 
(2) similar magnitudes of pressure to extract 
more value from whatever was consumed. Core 
components of these mechanisms were found 
to be common across a wide range of social and 
economic settings, even though their precise forms 
varied. Aspects of life that had not previously been 
mainly lived or governed through markets became 
more so, in a process of rapid commoditisation 
of provisioning and the work involved in enabling 
societies to reproduce themselves. People came to 
exchange a greater share of their work efforts for 
cash and to exchange a greater share of that cash 
for basic provisioning. 
The balance between subsistence and paid 
work – between the market economy of 
commodity and labour markets on the one hand, 
and the moral economy of social protection, 
income redistribution, and regulation, charity and 
community aid on the other – was thrown off-
kilter. The sudden rise in food prices meant that 
many more people suddenly sought higher cash 
incomes because this was the obvious pathway, 
the only one where the signposts were clearly 
marked. There was little sense in making demands 
on their state to subsidise those higher costs, 
because even when governments had claimed 
responsibility for protecting people against food 
crises, there was rarely much comprehensive 
action. And so people pushed out into markets 
for work that they had not undertaken before. 
The accelerated process of commoditisation that 
occurred in the years following 2007 marked a 
change in the relative value of labour compared 
to food. People were visibly working harder to 
stay fed. Close to a billion people were estimated 
to be hungry or undernourished 
worldwide around the time of the 
2008 food crisis (FAO 2008b). 
From what people told us and 
what we observed, the period 
after the food crisis was a time of 
great struggle to keep families fed; 
the strain on social reproduction, 
in other words, was intense. 
Even by working much harder, and even when 
wages started to rise, people could not feed their 
families well. So they tried to maximise the value 
they could extract from whatever they consumed. 
Much of what people did at the time of the 
price spikes was familiar crisis-coping behaviour: 
substituting less costly items, cutting out more 
expensive items and replacing them with filling 
foods, sacrificing safety, taste and familiarity 
for volume and price. Then many people 
moved towards more processed, packaged and 
purchased foods of different types. Why would 
people start to rely more on buying processed 
foods when times were hard? The answer lies 
in understanding the value of food as a complex 
not only of price, calories and other nutrients, 
but also of other variables. These variables include 
the important factor of time (typically discounted 
by policymakers because they have no grasp of 
People were visibly 
working harder 
to stay fed. Many 
began to rely more 
on purchased foods.
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the importance or magnitude of the unpaid care 
work of feeding). They also include availability, the 
desirability of customary food cultures versus the 
draw of novelty, the addictive nature (particularly 
for young people) of the high fat-sugar-salt 
content of many industrialised foods, and status – 
food being among the most important elements 
of people’s cultural and social identities, as well as 
significant aspects of our psychology. 
And so people facing changing relative prices 
for basic foods and experiencing great flux 
in their work lives often started buying foods 
as they moved around for 
work. The ‘mobile eating’ 
phenomenon appeared most 
common among men in 
growing economies, rural and 
urban – some because they had 
no family home to go to for 
meals, others because they could eat better out 
than at home, others still found community and 
camaraderie in the public restaurants and snack 
bars that formed part of their working day. In 
most sites, women were doing more paid work 
than in the past, and felt pressed to speed up the 
work of feeding the family; the growing availability 
of convenience foods, in particular ready-made 
sauces and quick-cook staples, were a source 
of anxious expediency. Meanwhile, children and 
young people were early and enthusiastic adopters 
of all manner of processed foods – cheap, tasty, 
fun, trendy, and typically habit-forming.
Entering the market is not a temporary situation. 
The changing relative price of food shifted the 
equation between work and provisioning in 
the short term, but even after the price spikes 
flattened out, food prices stayed high. The 
strategies people adopted were distinctive as 
comparatively compressed processes of change 
in the relationship between people and markets. 
Some of these groups were already highly 
marketised – particularly urban people and people 
in the more developed agrarian economies of 
middle-income countries such as Vietnam, Bolivia 
and Indonesia. But many more were less involved 
in markets for everyday matters, and several 
of the groups we are talking about here have 
been hurtled – or have thrust themselves – into 
provisioning via the market at such a rapid pace 
that human relations, ideas about the way the 
world works, and everyday emotions seem to 
have struggled to catch up. 
This seemed to be particularly true in some of the 
communities that had been strongly subsistence-
oriented and in which integration into markets was 
not central to the patterns of everyday life prior to 
the food crisis. There, the urgent push to earn cash 
in whatever way the market made possible felt 
new and disturbing; similarly, the changes people 
felt pushed to make in terms of what they eat 
were different, sometimes unwelcome changes 
to the daily matter of diet. Anxieties about what 
they were eating, as well as the work they were 
having to do to afford that food, were common. 
In rural communities in the more insulated local 
economies, these changes amounted to (and were 
experienced as) new ways of organising life. 
We do not think that the food crisis or the 
period of high and more volatile food prices 
that followed caused all these changes. But we 
do think, and believe we show here, that these 
events and changing relative prices acted as 
accelerants and catalysts, pushing more people 
faster down pathways that were already available, 
and which quickly became familiar and well-
trodden routes to development and marketised, 
modern life. The crises of basic subsistence 
mutated into increased precariousness of labour, 
squeezing out care and changing food habits; yet 
the costs of resilience to food price volatility have, 
so far, gone uncounted. This report is a reminder 
of the particular risks that globalisation poses to 
the relationship between labour and food, and 
raises questions about our choices as to how 
to respond. It calls for a broad and confident 
approach to social protection that protects labour 
against exploitation and high risk, and protects 
subsistence, so that bad food, dangerous and 
demeaning occupations, and strained care are no 
longer necessary elements of resilience in the 
face of global economic development.
Women doing more 
paid work felt pressed 
to speed up the work 
of feeding the family.
 Locally grown 
vegetables 
were the main 
ingredients in 
everyday meals 
in Kaya, but 
flavouring was 
now more likely 
to be stock 
cubes than meat.
1  Introduction
 Paying more for 
food, education, 
clothes and rent 
generated a need 
to earn more cash 
and squeeze more 
value, Chugüexá 
Primero.
Life was never quite the same for many millions 
of people on low and precarious incomes after 
the food crisis of 2008–11. In food policy circles, 
the sense of crisis died down when the spike 
in international prices flattened after 2012; the 
threat of destabilising food riots – embarrassing 
to political elites – had receded. But there was 
no quick return to the status quo ante: global 
prices remained stickily high (FAO 2011; Naylor 
and Falcon 2010; Dawe et al. 2015; Moore 2014). 
Prices in many national retail markets dropped 
slightly from their peak or otherwise plateaued 
or continued to climb. Food prices stopped 
making headlines, and even for people who 
were already on low incomes, the sense of shock 
turned into a sense of squeeze (Hossain, King 
and Kelbert 2013). People for whom securing 
food had already absorbed a large share of 
their resources and energies before the food 
crisis came under intense pressure to alter their 
relationship to food and thus to the economy 
– to spend more time earning more money to 
cover basic provisioning, and to extract more 
value from whatever they consumed. 
This report documents how people across a 
variety of contexts have responded en masse to 
these common pressures, changing the work 
they do and the food they eat. The actions they 
took depended on how they were already living, 
the price hikes they faced, their resources and 
capacities, and the wider opportunities and 
constraints of their context. The multitude of 
individual responses consolidated new norms 
and influenced institutions and politics. Just as 
the price changes turned out to be longer-term 
adjustments rather than short 
sharp shocks, the changes in 
work and food signalled the 
transformation of economies 
and societies. Although these 
collective and institutional 
adjustments are still working 
themselves out, the implications for each society, 
economy and polity are potentially vast. Powerful 
shifts towards commoditisation at the nexus of 
food, care and the informal economy – already 
underway in most countries – appear to have 
been given a significant boost by rising food prices. 
The changes in work 
and food signalled 
the transformation 
of economies.
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The social, economic and political adjustments 
made by people in developing countries in the 
wake of the global food crisis are the focus of 
this report. The analysis combines perspectives 
and insights from the sociology of globalisation, 
the economics of food price changes and wage 
adjustments, resilience thinking from complex 
systems analysis, agri-food systems and food 
regime analysis, the feminist economics of unpaid 
work, and the social history of subsistence crises. 
Drawing on several years of multi-scale, multi-
sited, qualitative, integrated and comparative 
research and analysis, the report examines the 
mechanisms of adjustment to the globalisation 
of food. It finds that these operated in the period 
following the food crisis through an immediate 
and sustained pressure on people on low incomes 
to: (a) increase cash incomes and therefore 
engage in the market economy on whatever 
terms it offered, and (b) extract more value from 
consumption under conditions where both supply 
and demand were shifting fast, also in part due to 
changing relative prices. In sum, the mechanisms 
of adjustment after the global food crisis 
concerned the value relations between the labour 
and food necessary for individuals and societies to 
continue to reproduce themselves (Araghi 2003). 
Background and objectives 
Why is it important to understand how people 
adjust to higher food prices? Global food prices 
have been more stable since 2012 than in the 
previous five years (FAO 2014). While nutrition 
remains a major policy preoccupation (Haddad 
et al. 2015), and climate change and conflict 
continue to interact with food insecurity (Carty 
and Magrath 2013), these problems pre- and 
post-date the global food crisis. In any case, world 
poverty levels appear to have been dropping 
since the crisis (Ravallion and Chen 2012; Ferreira 
et al. 2015). To some extent, this may be precisely 
because food prices are high, as in the long run 
this has helped push up agricultural and other 
unskilled wages – typically the wages of the 
poorest (Ivanic and Martin 2014; Headey 2014; 
de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011). 
It is particularly noticeable that across Asia, rural 
wages have been rising relatively fast (Wiggins 
and Keats 2014). Debates about where the 
Lewis turning point has been reached (i.e. where 
‘surplus’ rural labour has been absorbed) in Asian 
countries are generating considerable excitement 
about development progress (Jacoby 2016; Cheng 
et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2013; Zhang, Yang and 
Wang 2011). Agrarian production processes have 
become more integrated in and moved further 
along global value chains (Reardon et al. 2014). 
One way of summarising this change might 
be to say that the global food crisis was itself 
a necessary adjustment to previous agricultural 
policies that had kept food prices lower than 
market forces would have permitted (Swinnen 
2011; Guariso, Squicciarini and Swinnen 2014). 
The long-term effects of the price rises (if not of 
the spikes) may be somewhere between benign 
and positive from the perspective of globalising 
economic development. If these assessments are 
a true reflection of people’s lives – and there is 
a substantial ‘if’ surrounding the global poverty 
estimates1 – it suggests that on average, people 
are ‘better off’ than they were before the food 
price rises. So what is interesting about how 
people have adjusted to the ‘new normal’ of 
higher food prices?
Comparatively little is known about the 
mechanisms of change between the two points 
in time and the meaning of that change. This is 
despite there being: (a) much information about 
how people were affected by food price shocks in 
the short run (see, for instance, Green et al. 2013); 
and (b) a growing body of evidence that higher 
food prices have driven reductions in poverty in the 
longer term (see above). What did people actually 
do to raise income-consumption levels? How did 
people move from short-term coping to longer-
term adaptation? What did it mean for their 
wages to ‘adjust’? How did a short-term crisis turn 
into an opportunity in the longer term, for whom, 
and under what conditions? And how do people 
interpret their adjustments to higher food prices, 
and the implications of those adjustments? 
Taking resilience to task
Answering these questions may help us 
understand the nature and quality of resilience 
and people’s adaptive capacity to global shocks 
and long-term stressors. Under the strains of 
recent crises, the idea of resilience has become 
a crucial part of the development vocabulary, 
 Food for 
a traditional 
wedding, Kaya.
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borrowing a concept from ecological systems to 
celebrate human ingenuity and resourcefulness. 
An alternative is that resilience is a desirable goal 
for development because it devolves onto those 
hardest hit: ‘crucified on the cross, carved up by 
the double-shift are “the poor”, now granted 
responsibility and capability for buffering the 
disruptions of the global economy’ (Reid 2013: 360). 
Regardless of whether or not resilience is a good 
idea, is it, in fact, what we are witnessing? Here, 
understanding how people adjusted to high food 
prices would help to explain the paradox of why 
global poverty figures improved at a time when 
net buyers of food – most people on low incomes 
– faced great hardship in the form of rising prices 
(Ravallion and Chen 2015). Recent estimates 
of rapid poverty reduction imply an impressive 
degree of resilience among people who were 
living in poverty before their costs of living rose 
so fast and so high (Cruz et al. 2015). But they 
reveal little about the ‘negative-value’ – any 
social, psychological, emotional, environmental 
or other consequences of actions taken to 
raise income-consumption levels – generated 
in the struggle for subsistence in a globalising 
system (Moore 2014). Drawing attention to 
those ‘externalities’ – in unpaid care work, social 
relations, the environment – challenges the main 
implication of the poverty figures that increased 
income-consumption is equivalent to improved 
human wellbeing (McGregor, Camfield and 
Woodcock 2009; Sumner and Mallett 2013). The 
research affords a closer examination of the scales 
at which resilience is expected to operate and its 
relations to agency and structure (Duit et al. 2010; 
Béné et al. 2012; Reid 2013; Heltberg, Hossain, 
Reva and Turk 2012). 
Examining these adjustments from the 
perspective of those making them also allows 
us to get inside the micro-mechanisms of 
change in the world food system, helping us to 
examine and evaluate the implications of adaptive 
strategies and their wider institutional effects for 
the relationship between people and food. This 
lets us make sense of how the relations of value 
connecting labour and the resources needed for 
social reproduction are changing in time- and 
location-specific ways. It is not enough to know 
that people have more income or that they 
consume more now; we need to understand how 
changes in the ways people work or eat affect 
their capacity to do so in the future – whether 
these strengthen or weaken their command 
over the resources they need (including their 
own labour and time) or their rights to food, as 
members of families, societies or nations. How do 
these adjustments alter their relationships to food 
or to the food system? Do they help them secure 
food and other essentials? Or (despite apparent 
higher income-consumption levels) are people 
being left more precariously positioned in relation 
to how their labour is able to generate the basics 
needed for a good life? 
This report addresses these and related themes 
by focusing on the adjustments people made 
after the food crisis. It concludes that it would 
be a stretch to aggregate these as evidence of 
resilience if, by that, we mean ‘the capacity of a 
social-ecological system to absorb disturbance 
and reorganise while undergoing change so as 
to retain essentially the same function, structure, 
identity and feedbacks’ (Leach 2008: 3). While 
there may be no return to the status quo ante 
precisely, to be meaningful, resilience must 
mean more than people still standing after the 
event. It implies that people 
are likely to still be standing 
after the next event, too, and 
that their foothold in the new 
or returned-to equilibrium 
situation is firm rather than 
fragile (Davoudi et al. 2012; Béné 
et al. 2012; Ericksen, Bohle and 
Stewart 2010). In relation to 
social-ecological systems, resilience also suggests 
the emergence of protective political-institutional 
regimes, such that the resilient stand arm-in-arm 
with others, collectively organised for cooperation 
and mutual support, in defence of shared values 
and ways of life (for instance, see Young et al. 
2006; Duit et al. 2010). Our focus is on whether 
these institutions have been influenced by the 
adjustments people have made to everyday life.
Precariousness and the patterns of 
everyday life 
Rather than resilience, the moment in history to 
which we refer – a time just after the ‘perfect 
storm’ (Beddington 2009) of food, fuel and 
financial crises – suggests a heightened degree of 
precariousness in the domains of work and food. 
Not all aspects of this precariousness are new; 
not all are solely the consequence of rising costs 
of living, nor are they uniformly negative in their 
implications for human and relational wellbeing. 
This report identifies continuities and multiple 
causal connections in prevailing work-life 
conditions, as well as the positive dimensions 
of change in the wake of the food crisis. 
But in counterpoint to what appears to be 
unwarranted aid industry optimism about recovery 
and progress, it also highlights heightened 
precariousness as directly connected to higher 
(and to a lesser extent, more volatile) food 
prices. Indeed, many of these new elements of 
precariousness have been causally connected 
to food price rises and volatilities by the people 
whose everyday lives we report here: the 
How did these 
adjustments alter 
people’s relationships 
to food or to the 
food system?
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interpretations offered are closely informed by 
their framings and concerns. (For a discussion 
of the importance of people’s own framings 
of resilience, see Leach 2008.) This new 
precariousness includes more dependence on: 
 • unreliable cash incomes and casualised, risky 
occupations – key characteristics of the 
‘precariat’ (Standing 2011);
 • increasingly integrated markets for finance, 
inputs, distribution networks and sales, 
particularly in the production of food;2  
 • purchased and processed (often industrial) 
foods and/or food perceived to be unsafe 
(‘foods from nowhere’ (McMichael 2009b; Le 
Heron and Lewis 2009)); 
 • more tenuous social networks and relations, 
featuring higher levels of mobility and social 
normative change – the ‘visible foot’ that 
pushes the ex-peasantry (Araghi 2009).
The economic psychology of the price–
precariousness nexus features lasting fear of food 
price rises, inflation and job losses, breeding a sense 
of uncertainty and of worsening 
conditions of life, whatever material 
improvements may occur. It is not 
surprising that people at risk of 
poverty dislike inflation more than 
richer people and associate it with 
increasing inequality, as high inflation 
tends to leave poorer people worse 
off (Easterly and Fischer 2001; Gandelman and 
Hernández-Murillo 2009); this is why collective 
memories of periods of high inflation tend to 
linger (Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2012). 
Together, these factors amount to a new 
precariousness that is not only characteristic of 
economic life but also of social relations and 
identities associated with that new mode of 
economy (Jørgensen 2015). It also points to 
collective and political implications for the moral 
and political economy, through its indication of a 
popular basis for mass grievances relating to higher 
and less reliable food costs, and therefore to the 
prospects for social mobilisation around matters of 
core subsistence (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011). 
Food price changes did not cause this shift 
towards greater precariousness in any simple 
sense. Many of the important drivers are longer-
term processes deriving from distinctly different 
sources, as part of the same global system. But 
while the differences among peoples and places 
generated varying degrees of resilience (Pritchard 
2014), a common thread of precariousness in the 
relationship between people and food unites the 
experiences of the aftermath of the food crisis. 
These experiences suggest that higher food prices 
have been pivotal in establishing new relations of 
value across the global system (McMichael 2009b; 
Moore 2014). 
The common sense of an increased precariousness 
is consistent with the idea that the food crisis 
marked the emergence of a new phase in current 
economic regimes towards a heightened degree 
of globalisation in market principles and practices, 
enfolding more and more people more quickly 
into a more industrialised and financialized world 
food system (McMichael 2009b; McMichael 
2009a; Araghi 2009; Phillips 2016). For a large 
proportion of the world’s population, command 
over basic food resources has been sharply 
commoditised. People now depend significantly 
more on the twin uncertainties of what cash they 
can earn in the current labour market and what 
that can buy in the current food market. 
A social history of economic adjustment
One reason why this research is important is 
that it provides a social history perspective on 
these larger debates about the relationship 
between food prices, globalisation, poverty and 
development, grounding them in place and time. 
It attempts to make sense of these changes 
as they unfold and as people develop a clearer 
understanding of them. It addresses the concerns 
of a wide swathe of people, the ‘masses’ or 
the popular classes, who struggled to secure a 
reasonable level of subsistence in this period of 
adjustment. It has observed that the powerful 
drivers of change were sweeping the majority of 
people in more precarious directions. By no means 
were all groups equally swept along, but being left 
behind may have been worse from a survival and 
subsistence standpoint, while being at the crest 
of the wave had many advantages. This report 
tries to offer a sense of what this adjustment felt 
like from the multitude of standpoints of people 
 Global food 
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in different places, united mainly in what their 
precarious position in the global economy meant 
for their security over the basics of life. 
The findings are not intended to prove a general 
point about how people adapt to food crises 
in some ahistorical permanent present, but to 
document and analyse a specific set of world-
historical events. And so the report is concretely 
historical in its scope, focusing on the particular 
actions (working and eating) of particular groups 
of people (in 23 communities in ten low- and 
lower-middle-income countries) at a particular 
moment in time (2012–15). This is an actor-
oriented document of social history, which puts 
people’s strategies for adjustment at the core of 
the analysis. The study makes a sustained effort to 
explore the implications of change in a complex 
globalised system, taking account of the effects of 
price movements, growth at home and abroad, 
climate change, changing food markets and social 
protection systems (Duit et al. 2010). 
How this report is organised
Section 1 sets out the problem the study aims 
to address, discussing how the global food crisis 
acted as a shock that accelerated the process of 
integration under the global food regime for 
many people in developing countries. It discusses 
the key empirical and conceptual debates the 
research engages with, and gives an account of 
the methodology used. Section 2 sets out the 
global and national price and wage trends (or 
‘situation mechanisms’) within which the post-
crisis adjustments took place. Section 3 narrows 
in on individual, household and community 
responses, presenting analysis of changes people 
reported in how they work and in what they eat 
(or ‘behaviour formation mechanisms’). Section 4 
widens the scope again, to examine the 
aggregate effects of these individual mechanisms 
of adjustment. This includes examining what 
appear to be ideational shifts in norms, as well 
as aspirations for social mobility, and political 
cultural principles about the roles of state and 
society in relation to the governance of food 
and subsistence crises. Section 5 concludes 
with reflections on the implications of the 
research findings. 
The context: the global food 
crisis and its aftermath 
This section sets out the context of the global 
food crisis and some of the debates it generated; 
it then describes the research undertaken to study 
how everyday lives changed in the wake of the 
food crisis.
The ‘global food crisis’ usually refers to the food 
price spike of 2008, when the international price 
of basic foodstuffs peaked at unprecedented 
levels. This spike was transmitted to a significant 
degree to national and local prices, and was 
associated with a wave of ‘food riots’ in low-
income countries. World food prices spiked 
dramatically in 2008 and again in 2011 (see 
Figure 1), more than doubling in nominal terms 
compared to prices earlier in the decade. Since 
2012, world prices have been on a downward 
trend and real prices are now only about 10 per 
cent above pre-crisis levels in 2002–04 (nominal 
prices are about 50 per cent higher). Higher food 
production levels, reductions in stock-holdings by 
some governments, significantly lower oil prices 
and the appreciation of the US dollar have all 
contributed to this trend (World Bank 2015). 
Figure 1 Food and cereal price indices, nominal and real 2000–2016 (2002–2004=100)
Source: Adapted from FAO Food Price Index: www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ (accessed 17 February 2016).
Note: Index based on average of five commodity group price indices: cereals, vegetable oils, dairy, meat and sugar. Real price data 
based on nominal data deflated by World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index.
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The rising prices had a considerable lead time; 
agricultural commodity prices had been climbing 
from the mid-2000s and corn prices had already 
risen sharply when the ‘tortilla riots’ erupted 
in Mexico in early 2007 (BBC News 2007). The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) food price index increased by 
53 per cent in the first three months of 2008 
alone, but it had already risen by 24 per cent in 
2007 (FAO 2008a), while domestic prices for 
staples (rice, maize and wheat) were up by over a 
quarter compared to 2007 (United Nations 2011). 
By 2008, the extent of the price hikes start to 
sound implausible, to say nothing of impossible 
to cope with – a doubling of wheat prices in 
the five years to 2008, followed by a trebling of 
rice prices in a matter of months (Headey 2011). 
News headlines screamed ‘Global Food Crisis’, 
raising widespread concerns 
about rising populations 
and growing scarcity to a 
degree not witnessed since 
the oil price spike-induced 
world food crisis of the 
early 1970s saw soaring 
food prices and famines in 
Africa and Asia. But even 
compared to the early 1970s, the 2008 food 
crisis was marked by an unprecedented degree 
of contagion. Nearly all the major food and feed 
commodities saw sharp price rises, and nearly all 
were expected to remain high; at the same time, 
while international market prices never transmit 
perfectly, a high proportion of the dramatic price 
increases in smaller countries and net importers 
were transmitted to national and local prices 
(Figure 1) (FAO 2008a; United Nations 2011; 
Baltzer 2013).3
It was undoubtedly experienced as a crisis by the 
many people who were already spending half or 
more of their earnings on food. Millions struggled 
to maintain basic consumption levels – cutting 
down and cutting out, replacing nutritionally 
richer foods with filling staples, borrowing food 
or cash, in some instances selling assets, migrating 
or breaking up families, and taking on more work 
where they could, including risky or undesirable 
jobs.4 By one World Bank estimate, as many 
as 105 million more people in the low-income 
population of 2.3 billion worldwide might have 
moved (temporarily) into poverty; this would have 
amounted to a ‘loss of almost seven years of 
poverty reduction’ (Ivanic and Martin 2008: 415). 
The episode was also experienced as a crisis by 
policy and political elites worldwide. It challenged 
the notion of shared progress, and in particular 
faith that cheap food could continue to underpin 
economic development as it had for at least the 
previous quarter century (Rosin, Campbell and 
Stock 2012). Around half the price rises were 
eventually attributed to the effects of government 
interventions, which encouraged speculation, 
hoarding or other inflationary effects (Pinstrup-
Andersen 2014). In some cases, subsidies benefited 
politically powerful large-scale farmers, millers or 
traders more so than low-income consumers; this 
appears to have been the case in Kenya and Zambia 
in the early part of the food crisis (Chapoto 2014; 
Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2015; Nzuma 2014). 
In popular discourse, unusual rises of this 
magnitude may suggest deliberate market 
manipulation – efforts to create artificial 
shortages, for instance; however, the idea that 
global market price movements were driving 
changes in local market prices was not widely 
believed. Whether or not people believed 
markets were being deliberately manipulated, 
relentlessly rising staple prices triggered a 
wave of so-called ‘food riots’, as (mainly) urban 
populations experiencing rapid increases in the 
cost of living protested against failures to stabilise 
prices and, in some cases, official efforts to 
withdraw consumer subsidies (Schneider 2008; 
Bohstedt 2014; Patel and McMichael 2009; 
Hossain et al. 2014; Berazneva and Lee 2013).
In terms of high and volatile prices, the 2008 
food crisis also had a long tail. Food prices 
dropped steeply in 2009, when the global 
financial crisis took the heat out of commodity 
markets. The problem of very high and volatile 
food prices continued, however, with first a 
Russian drought then a US drought driving up 
wheat prices again in early 2011 and 2012. It was 
estimated that as many as 44 million people may 
have been pushed into poverty (Ivanic, Martin and 
Zaman 2011). However, by 2011, the attention 
of global and national policy elites had moved 
on to concerns relating to the popular political 
backlash against austerity, as governments in the 
developed world (particularly Europe) attempted 
to adjust to the debts they had incurred from the 
global financial crisis. More subsistence protests (as 
opposed to ‘food riots’) followed, in the Middle 
East, Latin America and elsewhere (Bar-Yam, Lagi 
and Bar-Yam 2015; Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam 
2011). From 2010, there followed an even larger 
wave of popular protests in middle- and high-
income countries, which included the Occupy 
movement and other struggles over economic 
justice. These new kinds of ‘unruly politics’ had a 
particular charge because of declining real wages 
and reductions in welfare provision at a time of 
rapid rises in living costs and banker bailouts (Ortiz 
et al. 2013; Barnett 2011; Khanna 2012). 
There are many competing explanations of 
the causes of the 2008–12 food price crises or 
Explanations fall broadly 
into two camps: the 
market adjustment 
argument and the global 
regimes argument.
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volatilities, most with compelling supporting 
evidence. These explanations fall broadly into two 
camps: the market adjustment argument and the 
global regimes argument. Although some still 
hold out against the idea that financial speculation 
fuelled commodity price rises, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that financialization of the staple 
commodity trade is one of several immediate 
causes of the food price crisis (see Ghosh, Heintz 
and Pollin 2011; Ghosh 2010). A major trigger 
in 2008 was incentives for biofuel production; 
in addition, weather and harvest conditions in 
producer regions had a short-term impact, as did 
domestic (often protectionist) policy responses in 
larger countries, once the crisis was already in train 
(Baltzer 2013; Demeke, Pangrazio and Maetz 2009). 
Views on the weight of longer-term or more 
structural conditions underlying the crisis are 
more varied. These include: changing patterns of 
food demand among growing middle-income 
country populations; the effects of climate 
change on production patterns and outputs; ‘peak 
energy’ pushing use of food for fuel; lengthening 
and more interconnected commodity chains 
increasingly concentrated among a small number 
of vast suppliers; and declining public investment 
in smallholder agriculture (see, for instance, 
McMichael 2009b; Holt Giménez and Shattuck 
2011). One prominent view is that the crisis was 
the inevitable expression of contradictions in the 
world food system, or food regime:
Rising costs, related to peak oil and fuel crop 
substitutes, combine with monopoly pricing 
by agribusiness to inflate food prices, globally 
transmitted under the liberalized terms of 
finance, trade and food security arrangements 
associated with neoliberal policies.
(McMichael 2009b: 282)
In the period after the food crisis, domestic 
prices were generally considerably higher than 
before the crisis, but not as high as international 
prices, and not necessarily because of higher 
international prices in any direct way (Dawe et al. 
2015). A fairly standard view on the higher food 
prices in the aftermath of the global food crisis 
emphasises the role of market forces working as 
they should, arguing that the crisis was an overdue 
market correction that ‘overshot’ its equilibrium 
price, later dropping back down to the ‘right 
price’ (Headey 2011; Swinnen 2011). The virtues of 
functioning markets able to correct themselves 
in this way are clear: in the long run (one to five 
years), ‘higher food prices typically reduce poverty’, 
or in more specific historical context, estimates 
‘suggest that higher food prices from the mid-
2000s onward have reduced global poverty by 
somewhere between 87 to 127 million people’ 
(Headey 2014: 1). Jacoby notes that ‘[c]onsistent 
with the WTO [World Trade Organization]’s Doha 
agenda, my results imply that lowering barriers 
to trade in agricultural goods on the part of 
developed countries, if only by improving the lot 
of the rural poor in India, can make a significant 
dent in global poverty’ (Jacoby 2016: 173).
Three points are worth noting about the 
connection between higher prices and global 
poverty reduction: (1) the adjustments are 
time-lagged; (2) they mainly ‘benefit’ the very 
poorest while the less poor and the moderate 
urban poor do not appear to gain; and (3) they 
are never explicitly explained – economic theory 
is allowed to do much of the explanatory work. 
Headey notes that the adjustments ‘do not 
happen instantaneously’ (2014: 1), and that the 
poverty-reducing impacts are chiefly confined 
to the very poorest, those who were living 
under the (old) US$1.25 poverty line. The more 
moderately poor (living under 
US$2 a day) do not benefit 
from higher prices, partly 
because they are more often 
urban, and so would not see 
higher agricultural wages 
(Headey 2014). He notes 
that the causal connection 
between ‘higher food prices’ 
and ‘global poverty reduction’ is explained by the 
fact that higher food prices produce ‘substantial 
factor price adjustments… particularly wage 
adjustments’, at least in the long run. 
Ivanic and Martin’s simulations indicate that the 
higher the price shock, the higher the poverty 
reduction rate is likely to be (in the long run), 
based on assumptions about ‘wages responding’ 
and farmers adjusting production levels in 
response to the price changes (Ivanic and Martin 
2014). The mechanisms through which wages or 
production levels might adjust for people faced 
with low endowments of skills, assets, or access 
The more moderately 
poor (living on between 
US$1.25 and US$2 a 
day) do not benefit 
from higher prices.
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to credit, networks or other resources, are 
assumed. Wage-price elasticity is assumed to be 
the important factor, but the factors that might 
make wages more or less responsive to changes in 
agricultural products or consumer prices are not 
explored (see, for instance, Jacoby 2016). These 
analyses demonstrate great faith that the invisible 
hand will do the heavy lifting of wages for all.
An entirely different view of the significance of 
higher prices – one unleavened by good news 
on global poverty reduction – comes from 
the food regime school, the ideological polar 
opposite to research at the World Bank and 
CGIAR institutions briefly discussed above. Food 
regime theory takes a historical view of how 
food systems are organised 
and regulated to meet the 
needs of the world capitalist 
economy. A key explanation 
of the global food crisis is 
that it was the outcome of a 
series of contradictions and 
tensions, including around 
how the current corporate food regime has 
industrialised and financialized global food trade, 
leading to heavy energy reliance, speculative 
bubbles, and conversion of food commodities to 
biofuels. This school notes that the relationship 
between people and food had, since the previous 
food crisis of the 1970s, been marked by low 
food prices, and processes of ‘depeasantisation’ 
as smallholder food farmers were dispossessed 
by global market forces and industrial food 
production, which they could not compete with. 
After the food crisis of 2008, ‘agflation’ altered 
the relationship between people and food 
irrevocably. La Via Campesina, the international 
peasant movement for food sovereignty, took 
the position that the crisis was proof that having 
destroyed peasant agriculture through low 
prices, corporate interests were now gearing 
up to reap fat profits from captive markets: ‘in 
effect confirming the “inefficiency” of the small 
farmer in the corporate world market, the TNCs 
[transnational corporations] move on to capture 
profits through price inflation, at the expense of 
the waged consumer’ (McMichael 2009b: 282).
The high prices after the food crisis marked the 
end of cheap food subsidising waged workers 
and thereby export manufacturing, and shifted 
towards ‘combining the corporate food regime’s 
(subsidised) price assault on small farmers 
(predominantly women) with a (monopolized) 
price assault on vulnerable consumers of wage-
foods’ (McMichael 2009b: 282). A further feature 
of the current phase of the food regime is the 
discovery of ‘the nutrition crisis’, as impoverished 
diets based increasingly on industrialised food 
are found to be lacking in nutrients. The solution 
to this is (frequently subsidised) fortifications and 
additives, usually through the private sector: 
Because of associations with the field of 
medicine, although industrial chemistry is 
more appropriate, nutrition science continues 
to offer a moral economy cloak missing from 
the ‘free trade of food’, which is meeting stiff 
resistance from a broad church of national 
governments, social movements and food 
consumers. For this reason, nutrition value 
relations are likely to underpin global food 
system dynamics into the future.
(Dixon 2009: 331)
These rising tensions – and in particular the 
growing likelihood that labour will be unable to 
reproduce itself well (i.e. it is precarious rather than 
resilient) – signal an underlying source of instability 
in the global food regime. This may be exploited 
or deepened by progressive or radical social 
mobilisation agendas to do with food sovereignty, 
food and climate justice, peasants’ rights, or the 
right to food, among others (Friedmann 2009; 
Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011).
Both of these polar opposite perspectives on the 
significance of higher prices after the food crisis point 
to the need to ‘read’ the real adjustments people 
make. This is both to examine the mechanisms of 
change and to evaluate their implications, including 
in relation to the prospects for social mobilisation 
around justice in the world food system.
Research rationale and design
The research was designed to explore how high 
and unpredictable food prices (or food price 
volatility) affect wellbeing among people living 
on low or precarious incomes. To do this we 
studied: (1) how rapid and unexpected food price 
changes – most commonly sudden and sustained 
rises – affected the day-to-day work of keeping 
families fed and cared for in selected communities 
in low- and middle-income countries between 
2012 and 2015; and (2) the formal and informal 
resources and strategies that enabled people to 
cope with or adapt to these changes, and so 
shaped their resilience to them (or capacity to 
manage without long-term damage).
The project aimed to arrive at a clear and strong 
understanding of the mechanisms through which 
people’s wellbeing was affected by food price 
volatility. We wanted to ensure these could 
apply across clearly defined contexts. To make 
this possible, the research design was for a 
relatively large and diverse data collection exercise, 
combining qualitative and quantitative, longitudinal, 
in-depth topical and multi-site data collection 
activities. The core involved repeat rounds of 
Rising tensions signal 
an underlying source 
of instability in the 
global food regime.
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qualitative research in 23 communities across 
ten countries, led by experienced researchers in 
each country. This was supported by analysis of 
quantitative data and attempts at qualitative–
quantitative integrated analysis. This plural approach 
aimed to build explanations of change that were 
both mid-range theoretically and empirically 
strong enough to apply to a range of contexts and 
variables, and not merely describe the locations in 
which the qualitative work was based. 
We adopted a ‘mechanism-based approach’ 
drawing on the theoretical and methodological 
lessons of analytical sociology and middle range 
theory as a practical approach to explaining these 
complex social matters (for details see Hossain 
2015). By ‘mechanism-based’ explanations we 
mean reaching below the macro-movements of 
food prices to clarify in a careful, step-by-step way, 
how those movements changed the conditions 
of local and individual wellbeing (Figure 2). This 
approach had us drill down from the high-order 
global conditions of food price volatility (the main 
‘situational mechanisms’) into the highly localised 
individual and contextual responses it stimulated 
(the ‘action–formation mechanisms’). We could 
then build our understanding of the causes of 
change back up into a general understanding of 
how food price volatility was affecting wellbeing, 
through an understanding of how these 
mechanisms interacted with and changed each 
other (‘transformational mechanisms’).
The ten countries were chosen based on: national 
levels of undernourishment (according to FAO 
figures); where there were research teams in situ; 
and where Oxfam offices asked to be involved 
to improve their understanding of food price 
volatility impacts (Table 1). 
In each country, one urban 
or peri-urban location was 
selected and at least one rural 
food-producing area. Eight 
sites had been part of ongoing 
crisis impact monitoring 
research since 2009 and in 
those, exposure to the global 
economy was also a selection factor. The sites 
contained a mix of middle-income, low-income 
and extremely poor people. 
Each community case study collected data on the 
background and context, where possible from 
documentary sources. Ten or more household 
Figure 2 Research components and the analytical framework
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Table 1 Study countries by income and nutrition status
Low-income countries Lower-middle-income-countries
‘Severe’ 
undernourishment
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia 
and Kenya
Guatemala and Zambia
‘Moderate’ 
undernourishment
Bangladesh Bolivia, Indonesia, Pakistan 
and Vietnam
In each country, one 
urban or peri-urban 
location was selected 
and at least one rural 
food-producing area.
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case studies were conducted at each site, built 
up through interviews with different household 
members over three to six years. Focus groups 
were conducted with different occupational and/
or relevant social groups in each community, and 
key informant interviews were conducted with 
local administrative officials, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), religious or community 
leaders, local business people, and politicians; 
data on prices were collected at local markets. 
The community case studies were developed to 
fit local contexts, capacities and traditions of the 
researchers involved. All, however, addressed the 
same research questions, and while the forms in 
which data were collected varied, a great deal 
of the data generated can be subjected to direct 
comparative analysis across the sites. Interviews 
with more than 400 household members and 
key informants were undertaken, in addition to 
around 100 focus group discussions and further 
local data collection activities. Each year, around 
1,500 people participated in the research.5 
The overall methodology helps us make sense 
of the changes in people’s lives arising from 
global events and processes, not only at an 
individual level but also at more aggregated 
scales, and in ways that uncover how interactions 
between processes of change yield uncharted 
developments that affected how people lived. 
Because we start with individuals, we begin with 
subjective feeling – that is, how it felt to be living 
at this time when the world was adjusting to 
a major shock in its food and financial system. 
We can situate that feeling not only in time but 
also in space: we can say something about how 
it felt to be an elderly resident of Cochabamba, 
or a young woman in Nairobi, or a rice farmer 
in Vietnam at a time when food prices spiked 
or plummeted, or were unpredictable. It is from 
these subjective assessments and experiential 
findings that we start to build a larger picture 
of people in a myriad of settings being affected 
by – and in turn affecting – the processes of 
global economic adjustment. What is innovative 
here is that we build those individual changes up 
into a picture of global change that specifies not 
only what and how much, but also how and why 
people changed their behaviour. 
The longitudinal method generated data on 
how the relationship between people and the 
food they ate changed over a three- to six-year 
period. Not all the changes in the ways people 
were eating by 2014 were a direct reflection 
of changing food prices, or even the associated 
conditions of producer uncertainty or the squeeze 
on consumption. However, it was possible to 
detect at least three broad mechanisms through 
which higher and more volatile food prices set 
the stage for changes in how people related to 
food, care and work. First, absent other changes 
in the way people produced or consumed, global 
food price spikes or ‘situational mechanisms’ did 
transmit to a greater or lesser degree to local 
prices, leaving people on low or even average 
incomes at risk of hunger, even though the three 
years since the 2011 global food price peak were 
years of relative stability and moderate declines in 
staple prices (Figure 3).
By the end of the study period, world and local 
food prices were still historically high in nominal 
terms and real terms, and the rising cost of staples 
impacted on the cost of the basic food basket. 
Figure 3 World food prices 1990–2014
Source: Adapted from FAO Food Price Index, www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ (accessed 15 March 2016).
Real
(2002–2004=100)
Nominal
(2002–2004=100)
250
200
150
100
50
0
Ja
n 1
99
0
Ja
n 1
99
1
Ja
n 1
99
2
Ja
n 1
99
3
Ja
n 1
99
4
Ja
n 1
99
5
Ja
n 1
99
6
Ja
n 1
99
7
Ja
n 1
99
8
Ja
n 1
99
9
Ja
n 2
00
0
Ja
n 2
00
1
Ja
n 2
00
2
Ja
n 2
00
3
Ja
n 2
00
4
Ja
n 2
00
5
Ja
n 2
00
6
Ja
n 2
00
7
Ja
n 2
00
8
Ja
n 2
00
9
Ja
n 2
01
0
Ja
n 2
01
1
Ja
n 2
012
Ja
n 2
01
3
Ja
n 2
01
4
19
PRECARIOUS LIVES : FOOD, WORK AND CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS INTRODUCTION
The World Food Programme (WFP) Market 
Monitor compares the cost of a basic food basket 
in any given quarter to the average of the same 
quarter in the previous five years. It provides a 
quantitative picture of what people told us: that 
those who were already spending significant 
proportions of their income or work effort on 
basic food consumption had to grow or earn 
substantially more, or else significantly change what 
and how they ate in order to feed themselves. 
Figure 4 shows that increases in the price of a basic 
food basket continued to be severe even after the 
fall in global prices in eight out of ten of our focus 
countries, with absolute increases in prices probably 
more significant than increases in price volatility.  
The WFP Market Monitor of January 2016 shows 
that the cost of the food basket has continued to 
increase significantly in five of the study countries: 
Guatemala (+22 per cent), Zambia (+32 per cent), 
Ethiopia (+16 per cent), Kenya (+15 per cent) 
and Indonesia (+22 per cent). It remained stable 
in Burkina Faso, and reduced in four countries: 
Bolivia (-12 per cent), Bangladesh (-11 per cent), 
Pakistan (-5 per cent) and Vietnam (-12 per 
cent). This led us to ask what people in those 
countries did to stay fed, unpacking ‘work’ – the 
second broad mechanism through which people 
attempted to maintain levels and standards of 
provisioning. Here, we focused on how people 
understood their changing conditions of work to 
be related to food price rises and volatilities. We 
avoided assuming that all changes in conditions 
of work were connected to cost-of-living rises, 
and noted other important factors that were 
influencing those changes, such as new economic 
opportunities and constraints, official regulations 
and policies, and changing sociocultural norms. 
However, we were drawing directly on people’s 
explanations of how they had been coping with 
or adapting to changing costs of living. In other 
words, people interpreted their current strategies 
around work as at least partly to do with the 
effects of food price volatility, including consumer 
and producer input price rises. 
Finally, we looked at the transformational 
mechanisms and the net effects on social norms, 
institutions and practices of aggregate changes 
in social and economic behaviour, including how 
they interacted with each other. We focused on 
how changing patterns of work contributed to the 
development of new markets for packaged food 
and eating out and new cultures of eating. Taken 
together, these processes of change amounted to 
a significantly higher level of commoditisation in 
the relationship between people and food than in 
the recent past (i.e. prior to the food price spikes of 
2008 and 2010–11). This influenced understandings 
of the moral economy and the right to food, 
shaping the basis for popular subsistence politics in 
this era of adjustment to globalisation.
2013 
Q2
2013 
Q3
2013 
Q4
2014 
Q1
2014 
Q2
2014 
Q3
2014 
Q4
2015 
Q1
2015 
Q2
2015 
Q3
2015 
Q4
Bangladesh 5 9 13 13 25 22 17 7 -4 -8 -11
Burkina Faso 9 0 2 2 3 -3 2 -3 -3 0 0
Bolivia 8 17 20 18 41 24 9 2 -4 -3 -12
Ethiopia 16 15 25 20 38 38 39 32 19 20 16
Guatemala 17 17 17 11 24 26 29 24 24 22
Indonesia 20 18 17 16 24 20 21 24 23 22 22
Kenya 21 17 16 14 22 18 26 16 4 24 15
Pakistan 13 17 17 19 39 30 26 11 9 5 -5
Vietnam -4 11 -6 -9 -5 -13 -12
Zambia 13 19 14 16 35 34 17 33 34 28 32
Source: Based on the WFP Market Monitor www.wfp.org/content/market-monitor (accessed 15 March 2016).
Figure 4 Cumulative impact of main staple food prices on cost of food basket 2013–2015
 A local 
counsellor and 
a women’s 
leader were key 
informants in 
Nessemtenga.
2  Food prices and wages
 Grain makes 
up a large part 
of the diet of 
people on low 
incomes, Karachi.
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Global price movements
The global price shocks of 2008 and 2011 
interrupted a long period in which, for the most 
part, cereal prices had declined: for example, 
maize prices were 85 per cent lower in real 
terms in 2000 than they had been in 1950 
(Deverell and Yu 2011). Price shocks during 
this period included that of 1972/73, when 
a combination of weather-induced lower 
production, the quadrupling of oil prices, and 
reactive export restrictions by the US and other 
governments contributed to a ‘world food 
crisis’ (FAO 2009). Since 
then, cereal prices had been 
falling in real terms, ushering 
in an era of ‘cheap food’ 
and complacency about 
world food security. This 
was manifested in (among 
other policy orientations) neglect of developing 
country agriculture (World Bank 2007; Timmer 
2010) and a reduction in cereal stocks. In the 
context of ‘cheap food’, the 2008 price spike 
was a shock in many respects, and raised 
questions about whether this constituted a more 
fundamental change in the operation of food 
commodity markets.
Cereal prices of the main exporting countries 
reflected the average trends. Figure 5 shows 
trends in export prices of rice, yellow maize 
and wheat from major exporting countries 
for the period January 2000 to January 2016. 
Wheat and maize price trends clearly reflected 
the aggregate movement in the cereal price 
index. Rice price trends partially differed, 
reflecting the impact of domestic rice price 
policies in Thailand (in 2011, the Thai government 
introduced a rice price subsidy for farmers, which 
it expected to recoup through higher world 
prices). However, in 2012, the Indian government 
lifted a previous ban on rice exports, causing 
the world price to fall sharply, at a high cost 
(financial and, ultimately, political) to the Thai 
government. Nonetheless the underlying trend 
in rice prices has also been downwards, at least 
since late 2012. 
Maize prices were 
85 per cent lower in 
real terms in 2000 than 
they had been in 1950.
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Were these international trends mirrored in 
domestic food prices? If they were, it could 
be concluded that the food price crisis was 
over by 2012/13, and the shocks imposed at 
the time may have had relatively short-term 
consequences. However, a more detailed 
examination of national food price changes and 
other adjustments (e.g. in wages) indicates that 
the situation was more complex and diverse.
National prices and wages
This section gives an overview of the trends in 
national prices and wages. (Section 6 discusses 
in more detail the trends in domestic food prices 
for major staple crops, food and welfare policies 
and, where available, wage trends, in each of the 
countries studied.) Note that the countries were 
selected to provide a contrast between regions 
and levels of economic development and food 
security, and exposure to the global economy 
rather than for a strict comparative typology; all 
have relatively serious problems of food insecurity 
characterised by moderate-to-severe prevalence 
of undernourishment in the population as a whole, 
ranging from 9 per cent in Vietnam to almost 
half of the Zambian population (see Figure 6). The 
countries can also be grouped by region because, 
with the exception of Guatemala, all those with 
‘severe’ undernourishment problems were in sub-
Saharan Africa. Guatemala and Zambia stood out 
as countries in which economic development and 
basic food security did not move together – both 
are middle-income countries yet have the hunger 
problems of much poorer countries. Bangladesh 
was the only low-income country in the group 
to have relatively less bad nutrition figures, and 
it acquired middle-income status during the 
research period. 
To make sense of different price movements 
and their effects at national level, it is useful to 
use Baltzer’s (2013) classification of a country’s 
Figure 5 World market cereal prices, January 2000 – January 2016
Source: Adapted from FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/ (accessed 17 February 2016).
Figure 6 Food and nutrition security in ten countries in 2012
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO Food Security Indicator Data.
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exposure to the food crises, based on relative 
exposure to international prices and the potential 
impact of food price policies (Figure 7). None 
of these low-income or lower-middle-income 
countries were large, self-reliant food exporters 
with influence over regional or global market 
prices. Applying Baltzer’s schema to the ten 
countries, none also counted as ‘free traders’ 
– countries well integrated into global cereal 
markets and using few food price policies to 
influence prices. One (Vietnam) 
was an ‘exporting stabiliser’ 
– a net exporter of cereals 
(particularly rice) with strong 
food price policies. Six countries 
fell into the category of 
importers: Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya 
and Pakistan. The remaining countries (Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia and Zambia) all fell into the 
isolated category, all three having ‘severe’ levels 
of undernourishment. 
All ten countries experienced the food price shock 
in 2008 and most also experienced a similar or 
even more severe price shock in 2011. To that 
extent, all countries were clearly influenced by 
the global price shock, even if the transmission 
channels were indirect or muted. However, the 
steady decline in world cereal prices that took 
place after late 2012 was not mirrored in any 
uniform way in the ten countries, although there 
were some declines. Figure 8 shows trends in 
average annual prices (indexed, 2007=100) of 
major cereals in eight of the ten countries, using 
the average 2007 (pre-crisis) price as a base. If 
volatility had to some extent decreased, domestic 
prices tended to settle at a new ‘equilibrium’, 
which in most countries was considerably higher 
than the prices that prevailed before the 2008 
crisis. In terms of the impact on low-income 
households, absolute increases in prices were 
probably of more significance than increases in 
price volatility.
A range of factors influenced trends in prices of 
basic staples over this period. International price 
shocks were clearly transmitted to domestic 
prices in 2008 and, to some degree, in 2011; 
but in many countries, domestic and regional 
production conditions, and domestic food price 
and related policies (e.g. exchange rates) appear to 
have been at least as important as international 
prices in determining the prices that poor 
consumers actually faced (Dawe et al. 2015 draw 
similar conclusions). Many of the ten countries 
also faced frequent production shocks, probably 
linked to climate change, which resulted in prices 
increasing even when international prices were 
falling. By 2015/16, the food price crisis for many 
of the poor had not gone away.
Market power may also have resulted in ‘price 
transmission asymmetries’ (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel 2004) where domestic 
prices rose due to some exogenous factor (e.g. 
an increase in world prices) but did not adjust 
downwards to the same extent when the 
Food prices in most 
of the countries 
continued to rise after 
global prices fell.
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO Food Security Indicator data.
2000–02
2001–03
2002–04
2003–05
2004–06
2005–07
2006–08
2007–09
2008–10
2009–11
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
Ba
ng
lad
esh
Bu
rki
na
 Fa
so
Et
hio
pia
Gu
ate
ma
la
Ind
on
esi
a
Ke
nya
Pa
kis
tan
Vie
tna
m
Za
mb
ia
Bo
livi
a (
Plu
rin
ati
on
al 
Sta
te 
of)
Figure 7 Cereal import dependency ratios in the ten countries
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exogenous factor was no longer having an impact. 
The examples cited earlier of private ‘hoarding’ 
behaviour by traders in Zambia and ‘tacit 
agreements’ between wheat processors in Bolivia 
provide some evidence of these asymmetries.
There were variations in the effectiveness of 
policies used to try to ensure access to food and 
in the extent to which different governments 
systematically resorted to such policies. As noted 
by Timmer (2010), price shocks are to some 
extent short-term events that require short-term 
measures, and domestic price stabilisation may 
be a legitimate instrument for governments, 
whereas safety net approaches may be costly 
and not necessarily efficient. Most of the ten 
countries introduced price stabilisation policies 
during the 2008 crisis, including food subsidies, 
release of stocks from food security reserves, and 
direct price controls. Countries such as Ethiopia 
and Burkina Faso instituted community-level ‘fair 
price shops’ to distribute subsidised food to poor 
urban households (Woldehanna and Tafere 2015; 
Kibora 2015). 
Most of the ten countries relied on, or 
introduced, a variety of safety net measures, 
but these ranged in scale and scope from the 
comprehensive ‘Raskin’ programme in Indonesia 
to more piecemeal interventions in Kenya 
and Guatemala. Countries such as Bolivia and 
Vietnam, with a stronger commitment to 
more interventionist policies, could not prevent 
domestic food prices from rising during the 
2008 crisis, but were relatively more successful 
at limiting subsequent price rises. Kenya and 
Guatemala used fewer policy levers and, with 
limited safety net systems in place, saw more 
substantial price increases over the time period.
Whatever the mix of policies and their 
effectiveness, the fact that food prices in most 
of the countries continued to rise after global 
prices fell suggests that longer-term forces 
were also present and contributed to possibly 
irreversible changes in the living conditions of 
poor households. In broad terms, as discussed 
elsewhere in this report, there was a trend 
towards increased commodification of the 
relations governing food consumption – i.e. 
increased reliance on market purchases of food, 
 In Kabwata, 
one way to 
adjust to food 
price rises 
was to shift to 
lower-quality 
mealie meal.
Figure 8 Average annual cereal prices (2007=100)
Source: Authors’ own, based on www.fao.org/giews.
Note: FAO GIEWS price tool was not available for Vietnam or Indonesia prior to 2008.
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increased consumption of processed rather than 
home-cooked foods, and a growth in food supply 
chains that resulted in increased margins between 
producer prices and retail prices. This process 
occurred at an uneven pace, with varying impacts 
on people’s wellbeing.
One of the factors determining the extent 
and speed of this process was the growth of 
employment and wages. Many Asian countries 
experienced rapid economic growth, particularly 
in the non-farm sector, often contributing to 
tightening of labour markets and an increase 
in wages. In Bangladesh, for example (see 
Box 1), increased non-farm economic growth 
appears to have contributed to labour shortages 
in agriculture and therefore to increased 
agricultural labour wages, as well as higher 
wages in non-farm sectors. Such wage increases 
enabled some households to cope with higher 
food prices; however, wage increases may have 
also contributed to higher food prices, both 
by adding to costs of production and through 
increased demand. Similar mechanisms were 
likely to have been at play in other Asian 
countries, with the exception of Pakistan, 
where rural wages declined (Wiggins and Keats 
2014). The country also had a particularly poor 
record in terms of gender inequality in wage 
rates and earnings.
There is less evidence of such a rapid increase 
in employment and wages in the sub-Saharan 
African and Latin American countries in this 
Box 1 Agricultural change in coastal Bangladesh
One example of increasing 
rural wages and diversification 
is Bangladesh. Koyra is a rice-
producing village in Khulna 
province, whose farmers gradually 
extended the agrarian frontier 
into the Sundarban mangroves 
during the twentieth century. 
In 2009, Cyclone Aila flooded 
the paddy fields with salt water. 
Farmers, unable to plant their 
salinated land, shifted into a 
range of other activities: shrimp 
cultivation, jungle-fishing, 
migrating to urban areas to pull 
rickshaws or work in factories or 
to other rural areas for seasonal 
agricultural labour. Men took to 
illegal fishing in the forest, braving 
tigers and pirates to do so. 
Women started to work outside 
the home in larger numbers, 
which was relatively new in this 
culturally conservative region. 
Rice production declined 
dramatically, pushing the price up 
and it stayed high. Local people 
felt that the world had never 
noticed them before, but the 
cyclone drew public attention 
to the region. Non-government 
organisations (NGOs) came in with 
recovery programmes, bringing 
cash and temporary employment. 
The year after the cyclone recovery 
programmes finished (2013) was 
tough, rice prices remained high 
and people struggled to eat well. 
A 30-year-old housewife told 
us that: 
If our local rice production were 
possible then every household 
could at least manage their basic 
food. If not, then we have to buy 
from other areas. That is why the 
price is increasing day by day. 
Another reason is transportation 
and labour cost. For this, 
Mohajans (wholesalers) claim 
high prices.
By 2014, rice yields had recovered; 
the good rains had largely washed 
the salt away, and more people 
cultivated rice again. But the 
agrarian economy had changed. 
With many of the villagers 
now involved in market-based 
activities, people in Koyra 
explained how they had shifted 
from basic rice-sufficiency to 
major dependence on imports. 
Some of the lands under shrimp 
cultivation would never be 
returned to paddy because of soil 
depletion or pollution. 
The ‘blue revolution’ played a 
substantial role in this coastal 
area, connecting people to global 
export markets for frozen fish 
(Ahmed, Allison and Muir 2010; 
Deb 1998). New credit channels 
opened with the entry of NGOs. 
Many of those who had migrated 
leased their land out to landless 
farmers with access to credit, and 
spent their own time earning 
wages elsewhere. Agricultural 
wage labourers worked 
increasingly on a group contract 
basis, with improved productivity 
and earnings, albeit only for 
the harvest season. Improved 
communications, both roads and 
mobile telephones, helped people 
to get about. 
These changes in Khulna were 
reflected in the wider rural 
economy, and were credited with 
contributing to relatively robust 
poverty reduction in recent years 
(Sen and Ali 2015). But, by 2014, 
the cost of rice – and the cost of 
living – was significantly higher 
than it was before 2008. For the 
residents of Koyra, the diversity 
of options for making a livelihood 
expanded, reducing the degree 
of their dependence on rice 
cropping, but without reducing 
the precariousness of their 
sources of income.
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study, so wage increases of a type that would 
fully offset exogenous increases in food prices 
were less likely. The effects of higher food 
prices were often more adverse. Nonetheless, 
commoditisation of food consumption was also 
taking place in tandem with urbanisation in these 
regions.
How did global and national price and wage 
movements shape what was happening to 
prices at the local level? Just as global conditions 
transmitted variously to the national context, 
so too, did local price and wage conditions 
vary. This depended on numerous factors: the 
degree of integration into international and 
national food and labour markets; patterns of 
economic diversification, growth and change; 
changing food habits and sources; climatic 
conditions (including the extent of recovery from 
events such as drought in Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Burkina Faso, floods in Pakistan, and a cyclone 
in Bangladesh); and policy developments that 
shaped local prices, production and labour market 
participation. 
However, it was only really in Vietnam that 
there was a sustained and significant decline in 
the national price of staples in the three years 
from 2012, reflected in the prices people were 
paying locally. Elsewhere, and for most staples, 
prices were either stable at the higher level or 
displayed mixed trends, with people adjusting 
between staple sources. People also noted that 
higher-value food items such as meat, fish and 
tofu (in many contexts), vegetables and fruit, and 
fresh spices, oil and sugar also fluctuated but 
were generally more costly depending on what 
was happening regionally or with fuel prices.
The prices that people considered important 
also varied depending on what they were buying 
at the time. Some people reported that they 
made choices about the staples in their shopping 
basket depending on what was available and 
affordable. For instance, in Burkina Faso, people 
talked about the prices of rice and maize as 
important factors, explaining that they grew 
more millet or sorghum than they bought 
(although those were their traditional staples). In 
western Oromia in Ethiopia, people ate maize 
more than teff (a fine grain), whereas in Kolfe 
sub-city in Addis Ababa, people said they were 
preparing their own teff injera (flatbread) but in 
general using teff less, and buying more wheat 
flour (sold at lower cost by the Consumers’ 
Association) to mix in to make the injera go 
further. The prices people were paying also 
depended on where they bought food; even in 
the same research site, people who could travel 
to markets could get better prices than those 
who were less mobile. Where there was a range 
of varieties available it was possible to switch, 
and make savings from relative price changes. 
To understand how people experienced the 
price changes, it is useful to know how they 
understood the reasons behind the changes. 
Commenting on the fact that staple prices had 
been relatively stable in the 2012–15 period, 
farmers and food vendors in rural Burkina Faso 
credited government actions to stabilise prices 
through building grain reserves and subsidising 
food grains. In Ethiopia, ‘model 
farmers’ explained price rises as due 
to growing population and drought. In 
rural Chikwanda, in Zambia’s Northern 
Province, people blamed higher 
maize prices on fertiliser subsidy cuts. 
Although people mentioned exports 
causing domestic shortages as being 
among the causes of higher prices, there was 
generally a stronger tendency to believe that 
domestic factors (mainly population growth and 
local harvests) and public policy were the main 
drivers, while speculative activity was frequently 
understood as the source of spikes. The global 
market was understood to be a factor, as was 
climate change in some areas, particularly 
Bolivia and Guatemala, where public discourse 
appeared to be more focused on these issues. 
But people may have overestimated the power 
of their governments to act to protect them 
against external price shocks specifically, and 
not have appreciated how membership of 
the global system itself produced inflationary 
pressures (Hossain et al. 2014). People’s views 
about the causes of price rises influence how the 
‘moral economy’ (or popular beliefs about the 
responsibilities of public authorities to protect 
against subsistence crises) was articulated, and 
therefore the politics of mass food security, as we 
discuss in more detail in the next section (see also 
Hossain and Kalita 2014).
 Buying pork 
in Nghe An, 
Vietnam.
People who 
could travel to 
markets could 
get better prices.
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Mrs M was 28 when we first started the research, and had 
lived in Mukuru (which means 
‘dumping site’ in Kiswahili) for 
more than 20 years. Mukuru 
is the second biggest informal 
settlement in Nairobi, home to between 500,000 
and 700,000 people. Most people living there had 
jobs in the nearby industrial area, as security guards 
or domestic workers, while others were artisans, 
blacksmiths or mechanics. Some local residents 
were landlords, and petty trading was widespread. 
Mukuru was divided into smaller areas, known as 
villages, and Mrs M lived in Kisii village close to the 
river. Water and sanitation conditions in Kisii were 
inadequate, and the infamous ‘flying toilets’ (plastic 
bags full of urine and faeces) were a health hazard. 
She lived with her husband and their daughter, 
born in 2007. They also looked after their siblings 
and a nephew, making a total of seven teenagers 
and young adults dependent on the couple.
In the first year of this study, Mrs M recalled a time 
when food was cheap and affordable, and the 
economy was stable. In 2002, the cost of living 
began to rise noticeably in Kenya, when the new 
regime embraced the free market and Kenya’s 
economy started to grow. The price of maize, the 
staple food, depended mainly on the local harvest, 
although to meet a growing shortfall the country 
also relied on imports from Tanzania, Uganda and 
beyond. While acknowledging that local prices 
responded to changes in world 
prices, Mrs M believed that 
prices were mainly affected 
by government policies that 
protected larger producers 
and retailers by maintaining 
high prices. Mrs M was among 
those who saw the 2013 VAT 
Act as one of the reasons why 
food prices were high. R
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After the second spike in the price of maize 
meal and other essentials in late 2011, Mrs M’s 
husband – an artist who had previously led a 
youth group making crafts for the tourist trade 
– turned to scavenging for plastics and metals to 
sell to recycling plants. The couple would wake 
very early and, leaving their daughter asleep 
in the house, go and collect plastics together. 
Then Mrs M would walk over to the rock where 
the housewives from the estates came to pick 
domestic helpers for daily house chores. In 
particularly tough times, Mrs M would also spend 
some afternoons working in a hair salon for small 
commissions. During the time of our research, 
she managed to finish secondary school, and got a 
job as a community health worker and mobiliser, 
working for different organisations. She did 
short-term jobs, including distributing condoms 
for a sex workers outreach 
programme, distributing 
food to orphaned children 
and HIV-positive people, 
and volunteering to assess 
referral cases for the Red 
Cross. From time to time, 
she was also paid to attend 
political demonstrations or 
take part in research. Her 
average daily income from 
health work was 200 Kenyan 
Shillings (KSh) (US$1.99). 
In 2013, Mrs M’s husband benefited from the 
government’s Kazi kwa Vijana programme. In 
Mukuru, unemployed young people were paid 
KSh250 per day to clean up pathways and cut 
grass along the road. While the programme only 
offered employment for three months per person, 
many, including Mrs M’s husband, managed to 
be employed throughout the year by assuming 
different identities and borrowing identity cards 
from friends. Mrs M explained that the wage was 
too low for him to be able to support his mother 
back at home.
Summing up her way of making a living, Mrs M 
drew a parallel between people taking on several 
jobs (what she called ‘multi-tasking’) and one 
of the local churches, which rented its building 
during weekdays – effectively becoming a video 
rental shop during the week and a place of 
worship at weekends. Through 2013 and 2014 
her wage remained the same, at KSh200 per day, 
but food and other prices continued to rise. Food 
spending of around KSh350 per day could buy 
maize porridge with some kale, tomato and onion, 
as well as bread and tea with some milk and sugar. 
In 2011, they had been able to afford more variety, 
including rice, spaghetti and 
chapatti, a quarter kilo of 
meat or some dried fish. By 
2014, githeri (a maize bean mix) 
or ugali (maize porridge) were 
the only cheap and readily 
available options. As a health 
worker, Mrs M knows their 
diet is inadequate, but there is 
nothing more she can do.
Making a precarious living in Nairobi
Cooking ingredients were bought 
every day in small quantities, for want 
of ready cash and a place to store 
The nation’s maize 
meal, Kenya
As an informal settlement, 
residents of Mukuru have no 
rights to decent sanitation
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When we met 34-year-old Mr HK, a married man with two children, in Banjar in South Kalimantan, Indonesia, in 
2012, he had been working for a year as a rubber 
tapper in a government-owned plantation. Most 
people in Banjar had some connection to rubber: 
Indonesia is the world’s second largest natural 
rubber exporter. Banjar is one of the country’s 
major rubber-producing areas, and most of the 
population here relied on it, as owners, landless 
tappers, sap transporters or middlemen. Mining 
and quarrying were gaining importance, with a 
new road set to open to provide access to the 
mine. Mr HK had himself worked as a guard for a 
coalmine corporation before he became a rubber 
tapper, until that job ended when the company 
closed due to new government regulations.
After peaking in 2007, the 
price of natural rubber dropped 
to a low of US$1.2/kg during 
the financial crisis. Demand 
shot up again, reaching new 
heights with upwards of 
US$5.75/kg at the start of 2011, 
but bad weather conditions 
and the Japanese earthquake 
of March 2011 lowered 
demand from the Japanese car 
industry for the year. Mr HK 
said that at the rubber price 
peak, his monthly earnings 
were 2.5–3 million Indonesian Rupiahs (IDR) 
(US$187–225). In 2011, during the rainy season, his 
earnings fell to IDR2.25 million per month. In 2012, 
when the dry season was longer than usual and the 
price of rubber plummeted again, Mr HK’s wife, AK, 
started working on the plantation with him, for up 
to four hours every day, in addition to looking after 
the home and their two children. Together, they 
only earned IDR1.05 million 
per month – half what Mr HK 
had earned in the previous 
year. Mr HK said: ‘For the 
standard price of rubber 
nowadays, we cannot do 
anything. We can only hope.’ 
He started to rear ducks.
Speaking to Mr HK in 2013, it seemed their 
situation was worse. While the previous year he 
and his wife could earn IDR150,000 for two days 
incising rubber, now in two days they only received 
IDR80,000, amounting to just IDR1.2million per 
month. The decline in production, another long dry 
season, and ‘mischief tricks’ by rubber middlemen 
were all to blame. He said rubber prices were 
going up and down while prices for essentials in 
the local market only went up. AK now worked 
the same number of hours as her husband. They 
sold some of the ducks for quick money: the 
enterprise had become less lucrative, the price of 
duck feed doubling within a year. 
In 2014, the price of rubber continued to fall, 
apparently because of a decrease in the quality of 
the rubber. Several local coal industry firms shut 
down. AK stopped working at the plantation, and 
took responsibility for the duck rearing. Mr HK 
sold one of his two motorcycles for IDR1.5million. 
Local men were responding to the decline in the 
rubber price by leaving for Central Kalimantan, 
for farm work, carpentry or gold digging. Many 
in Banjar pointed to the increased irregularity of 
the weather, which was affecting the quality and 
quantity of production. In 2014, Mr HK considered 
himself to have finished with rubber tapping.
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 Rubber tapping in Kalimantan
Banjar is a major 
rubber-producing area
The mining company 
built a new road, Banjar
The price of rubber fell 
consistently in Banjar
3  Adjusting to higher 
food prices
 Selling enjera, 
the traditional 
staple in highland 
Ethiopia, in Kolfe.
One of the advantages of the longitudinal 
approach is the ability to observe how people 
adjusted to new economic conditions over time 
and how individual histories interacted with local, 
national and global economic conditions. Over 
the three years (and, in some cases, six years) that 
we researched these communities, people faced 
periods of crisis as subsistence costs first rose 
quickly and excessively, then subsided, and then 
shot up again. The sense of crisis began to recede 
in 2012, even though individuals and families 
continued to face periods of hardship. This does 
not mean that people were no longer squeezed, 
but that they were adjusting to the situation. 
The process of adjustment broadly featured a 
growing dependence on wage and cash incomes, 
along with rising wages, and a change in the way 
of life for many people. Few people felt that the 
new wages were keeping pace with the rising 
cost of living. This was difficult to judge in any 
objective way, because people had changed how 
they worked and ate to accommodate what 
they experienced as a shortfall or pressure on 
household budgets. There was no widespread 
sense that even people whose wages had risen 
were materially better off. Simple measures of 
income and consumption did not capture the 
reported decline in wellbeing that accompanied 
the struggle to earn enough to eat well and care 
for families. The adjustments to higher prices 
involved two main mechanisms across the 23 
different urban and rural sites: finding ways to 
earn more cash, and squeezing what they ate and 
how they cared for the household. The following 
sections will explore the process of adjustment, 
giving examples from different sites.
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Earning more
Earning a wage 
Agrarian communities saw rapid and significant 
economic diversification and growth as they 
adjusted to higher prices. By contrast, city 
folk appeared to be pursuing much the same 
livelihoods they were doing before the food 
crisis, but now they had to simply do more of 
them. There was also considerable fluidity in 
the relations between urban migrants and rural 
homes. In several cases, urban migrants received 
food from their rural families to tide them over 
tough patches or returned to the country for 
periods of agricultural work. 
In many rural and urban areas, wage rates 
(nominal incomes) responded to higher prices 
and had risen by the end of our period of study 
(2014/15). However, the rise in wage rates was 
less positive than it appeared, since people did not 
always find work every day. Many reported that 
their work had become more intermittent and 
less predictable. A common refrain was variations 
on ‘we work [only] to eat’. Most working people 
at the lower end of the income scale felt that 
even when their wages had risen, they barely 
covered subsistence costs, and wage rises did not 
allow workers to keep pace with rises in the cost 
of living. In many households, there was a constant 
search for new income opportunities. If people 
earned more, many did so with much less security 
and considerably more effort than in the past. 
Incomes for the urban poor from informal sector 
self-employment (on which the majority subsisted) 
were also even more precarious than in the past.
Wages adjusted with something of a lag, if at 
all, and often with a struggle (Wiggins and Keats 
2014). An adjustment was only possible if workers 
took on multiple jobs in different locations and 
sectors; few people were able to manage on 
only one income source. So while rates of pay 
increased, the mode of work also changed. 
Conditions for workers joining industries linked 
into global value chains were characterised by 
increased efforts to extract more from workers’ 
time and labour, increasing speed and improving 
quality (Phillips 2011, 2016). Export sector workers 
in the manufacturing zone in Bekasi, near Jakarta 
in Indonesia, reported that the trends had been 
towards more ‘flexible’ contracts and output-
based payment systems, and that while overall 
pressure to raise output was high, job security 
had declined. In Dhaka, in Bangladesh, garments 
export workers earned a higher minimum wage 
but said they were under more pressure to raise 
output and meet rising orders, including through 
more disciplined production processes and more 
overtime. Many knitwear factories employed 
workers seasonally. The work was better paid, but 
more effort went into getting and keeping the 
available jobs. 
Over the study period and in all sites, seasonal and 
temporary migration increased. Ethiopian women 
migrated to the Gulf to find work in growing 
numbers. Vietnamese men migrated to Laos for 
seasonal work. Guatemalans said more people 
were migrating north, including many who had 
gone to Canada for (legal) strawberry picking, and 
returned with useful earnings. By contrast, many 
of those who had gone illegally 
to the United States either 
never returned or returned 
without earnings. Some died 
on the dangerous journey 
north. As the tourist industry 
recovered in Malindi, on the Kenyan coast, people 
from the coastal hinterlands moved to the town 
and looked for work in the restaurants and hotels; 
some young women were said to be making a 
living doing sex work.
The changing business of small-scale 
farming
In most of the rural sites in the study, agricultural 
wage labour rates rose. This was particularly 
marked in places where new technology was 
introduced and where there was high seasonal 
demand during harvests. Nevertheless, this did 
not mean wider appreciation of agriculture as a 
livelihood option: for young people in particular, 
the volatilities in producer prices over the past 
decade confirmed that smallholder farming was 
not only inherently difficult and costly in terms of 
the inputs needed to earn a profit, but also highly 
Few people were able 
to manage on only 
one income source.
 Dinner for 
two: rice, pork 
and vegetables 
in Hanoi.
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unreliable when it came to income, and badly 
timed when it came to provisioning (Leavy and 
Hossain 2014). 
Landowners and larger-scale farmers complained 
of not being able to get labourers, and about 
having to bid up wages and offer meals to secure 
workers at the crucial time. In Bangladesh, a new 
form of wage labour emerged with (higher) fixed 
rate contracts involving groups of labourers. This 
new approach raised productivity, as workers 
did an exhausting season of harvesting before 
returning to other work, such as transporting or 
factory work, once the season was over. New 
farm technology was noted: in Dadu in Sindh 
province, in Pakistan; in north-eastern Naogaon 
and Khulna in southern Bangladesh; and in 
Cianjur in the rice-producing heart of Java in 
Indonesia (where harvesting was done using more 
machinery than in the recent past); in western 
Oromia, in Ethiopia; and in coastal Kenya, where 
irrigation was the important new factor. 
However, this also meant that opportunities for 
agricultural labour were often for shorter time 
periods, and had to be supplemented with other 
work. Men (and, in the South Asian settings, a 
growing number of women) 
were supplementing harvest 
labour with own-account 
farming, whether on leased 
or share-cropped land, and 
in particular with a complex 
and highly flexible pattern 
of seasonal and temporary 
migrations. In western Oromia, migrant workers’ 
wages and food demands were helping grow 
the new local restaurant trade, while labourers 
in Khulna, Bangladesh, were also spending their 
cash in cooked-food outlets in Koyra market. 
Wages had not risen everywhere and for all 
sectors though: in rural Chikwanda, Zambia, 
maize producers had had more bad years, and so 
casual work was in much demand. Some local 
farmers were said to have taken advantage of 
labourers’ plight, pushing wages down. But the 
more typical picture was one of robust growth in 
wage rates of as much as 50 per cent year-on-
year, for particular sectors and seasons.
Agricultural production for the market and 
on- and off-farm food processing activities saw 
higher incomes and new opportunities. In three 
sites – drought-prone Lango Baya in Coastal 
Province in Kenya, western Oromia in Ethiopia, 
and Chikwanda in Zambia’s Northern Province – 
irrigated vegetable production for expanding local 
towns offered opportunities for farmers who 
could find the capital to get started. But there 
were bad years as well as good, including floods 
and bumper crops that felled prices. In Zambia, 
the poultry business expanded particularly fast in 
2013 and 2014, and people who had always been 
maize farmers said they would move into poultry 
production if they could get the capital to do so. 
In the Cochabamba Valley in Bolivia, a farmer and 
head of the local dairy coop noted that apart 
from milk for sale, no other agriculture was 
worth the effort. One vegetable-packing plant 
embodied this rapid turnover in workers: in 2012, 
the young women workers we interviewed were 
mostly from indigenous communities; they had 
moved and taken up jobs because agriculture in 
their home communities no longer earned them 
a living. One teenager had come to stay with her 
aunts, saying that back in her home village they 
‘only produce potatoes’, whereas her aim was to 
raise pigs. The next year, a new cohort of workers 
had come, all local girls in between school and 
other jobs, working as a stopgap until something 
better presented itself. They were mainly ‘working 
to eat’, they said. By the third year, another new 
cohort of young women had arrived. This time, 
the interview had to take place off premises, 
as the new manager was putting pressure on 
workers to be more productive and manage their 
time better. But he was also, they noted, raising 
wages (reported as static over 2012–14) and giving 
them contracts.
Precarious self-employment
More people took up more kinds of 
entrepreneurial work in the aftermath of the 
food price spikes. Women did more trading 
in vegetables and other agricultural produce 
in Burkina Faso, Kenya and Zambia. In rural 
Chugüexá Primero in the highlands in Guatemala, 
women started to raise poultry and other small 
livestock, to supplement their incomes as market 
traders and tailors. Some husbands there denied 
this was happening, feeling that their status as 
breadwinners was under threat. In Cianjur and in 
Informal enterprises 
with low or no set-
up costs saw large 
numbers of entrants.
 Government-
backed irrigation 
schemes are 
helping transform 
farming in Oromia.
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Bekasi, both in Indonesia, women supplemented 
family incomes with small businesses selling 
cooked food. But demand and input prices were 
too unreliable for these to last long. People’s 
accounts of their efforts to turn informal sector 
enterprises into lucrative businesses told a 
common story of a pioneer start-up that did well, 
only to be copied by others, whereupon profits 
dipped. Some informal enterprises with low or 
no set-up costs saw large numbers of entrants. 
Charcoal burning was one example in Kenya and 
Zambia, but the authorities had closed them 
down. In Burkina Faso, after the international 
price of gold rose rapidly between 2007 and 
2012 and food prices also went up, gold mining 
became an important alternative to subsistence 
farming for adventurous young men (see Box 2). 
Credit, connections and mobility
The world people described was a closely 
connected and mobile place. In many countries 
– notably Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and 
Guatemala – international labour migration had 
long been a routine part of the calculus about 
job prospects, into which assumptions about 
grave danger and exploitation were built. At 
home, too, the world became more connected 
and mobile; in rural areas that were until recently 
quite remote, motorcycle transport grew fast, and 
mobile telephones were an important household 
asset (as well as a consumer item). 
However, if the world sounded freer and more 
interesting, it was also a place of greater debt. 
Most people borrowed, lent and pooled risk in 
Box 2 The gold rush in Burkina Faso
In an economy dominated by 
subsistence farming, Burkina 
Faso’s ‘gold rush’ brought with it 
something of a moral panic about 
the fate of young people drawn to it. 
Gold mining started in Burkina 
Faso in 1980 and grew slowly at 
first: in 2006, 200,000 people 
were reportedly working in 200 
non-industrial mines, but by 
2011, this figure had risen to 
700,000 (Werthmann 2009). 
By 2013, gold comprised 71 per 
cent of exports and 16 per cent  
of fiscal revenues. It was also 
evident that far more gold was 
mined outside the formal economy 
(Redifer et al. 2014; Africa 
Research Bulletin 2011, 2015). 
The international price of gold rose 
rapidly between 2007 and 2012, 
at the same time as world food 
prices went up and the cost of 
many staples rose in Burkina Faso, 
where drought had also squeezed 
subsistence food production. Gold 
mining became an important 
alternative to subsistence farming 
for adventurous young men. The 
sector was lucrative, dangerous 
and precarious: mercury-poisoning 
was a key hazard (Tomicic et al. 
2011) and incomes fluctuated with 
the international price of gold.
In Nessemtenga, the agricultural 
community in the north-central 
Sanmatenga province, 40-year-old 
widow Mme Z described the 
social changes wrought by gold: 
‘The young think they can succeed 
in the gold mining… The reason 
is that young people are awake 
now, they have acquired more 
knowledge and they are hungry 
for the money more than their 
parents.’
Previous food crises had 
encouraged some households to 
send sons to the mines (Roncoli, 
Ingram and Kirshen 2001). The 
rapid growth in their participation 
in artisanal mining reflected 
successive waves of subsistence 
shocks through the 2000s and 
the underlying pressures on 
the agro-food system. Many 
families said they were relying 
on remittances from sons in the 
mines during the recent hard 
times. Werthmann (2009) found 
that women were mostly involved 
in providing ‘gendered’ services 
such as cooking and sex, to miners. 
Women who went to the mines 
were suspected of transactional 
sex, among other things. More 
recently, whereas gold-panning 
work had been considered the 
domain of men, women were 
also increasingly taking it up (see 
also Doka, Madougou and Diouf 
2014; Werthmann 2009). Young 
married women in Nessemtenga 
in 2012 reported that they would 
go to work in the mines, not as 
a first line of coping, but if small 
trade and expenditure-conserving 
strategies like gathering wild 
foods were not enough. 
The gold rush brought with it a 
sense of a wider cultural shift. Mr 
ST, a 61-year-old tax collector from 
the town of Kaya, thought people 
flocked to the mines because of 
the easy money. Men were leaving 
in search of work because food 
shortages made it harder to feed 
families – in some instances only 
to be followed by the women. 
People spoke about farming as 
difficult and unreliable, whereas 
gold ensured not only cash 
incomes, but the excitement and 
novel consumer pleasures of the 
mines. The lure of the precious 
metal was associated with a 
growing ‘addiction’ to money 
and spending among younger 
people (Werthmann 2008). But 
the censure of people who chose 
cash incomes over traditional food 
farming noted by Luning (2008) 
in Sanmatenga early in the 2000s 
had become muted by 2012–14.
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recognisably similar ways and for similar reasons 
– because that is what one does when faced by 
a sudden and sustained rise in the cost of living. 
People got into debt during the adjustments 
they made after the food crisis. First, credit was 
fairly essential to any investments that were likely 
to pay off, whether cash crop production or 
paying migration brokers. Credit could be from 
governments, NGOs, the agro-food industry, 
market intermediaries, unions and local groups; 
people were quick to note when one channel 
of credit was drying up, and when others had 
opened up. Second, people also depended a great 
deal on credit to help ‘smooth’ consumption. 
This took a wide range of forms, 
from shop credit to local credit 
and savings groups, moneylender 
or microfinance loans. Customary 
risk-pooling groups sometimes paid 
out for funeral or medical costs, 
and others provided a food basket 
or small cash payments out of 
members’ regular dues. Consumption-smoothing 
credit essentially bought people time to ride 
out or adjust to shocks. Third, some groups got 
caught in webs of debt tying them into further 
loans, as well as the search for regular cash 
incomes to service them, which often involved 
dead-end, dangerous or back-breaking work. 
Poor harvests, broken technology and failed 
migrations all led to crises of loan repayment. 
Rising consumer prices were to some extent 
absorbed by easier credit, but it was clearly no 
long-term solution. From the way people spoke 
about it, debt often brought with it a heavy sense 
of bondage. 
For similar reasons that banks failed in Europe 
and North America, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) that had been tapping into international 
finance markets were particularly vulnerable to 
the financial crisis (Constantinou and Ashta 2011; 
Daher and Le Saout 2015; Wagner 2012; Di Bella 
2011; Wagner and Winkler 2013). But problems 
with bad micro-loans were exacerbated by the 
2008 food price crisis, reflecting borrowers’ 
position at the base of the pyramid. Many low-
income borrowers found they were stuck in webs 
of debt even as their need for consumption loans 
became more urgent. There has been little analysis 
of the effects of the food crisis on microfinance, 
but a survey of 45 major MFIs in 2008 found 
that for more than half, the food spikes were 
increasing the proportion of portfolio-at-risk and 
adversely affecting loan portfolio, while one-third 
reported that default rates were up (Duflos and 
Gähwiler 2008). One lesson from the recent 
microfinance crisis has been the need for better 
inflation prediction, as high inflation changes 
assumptions about the future, and has the 
potential to affect repayment rates (Daher and Le 
Saout 2015; Gonzalez 2011; Lyman et al. 2011). 
Credit featured a great deal in both Ethiopian 
communities involved in this study. In Kolfe sub-city 
in Addis Ababa, state credit for agricultural inputs 
dried up, which some people viewed as partly 
responsible for rising food costs as it drove up 
farmers’ costs, and made it difficult for them to 
Many low-income 
borrowers found 
they were stuck in 
webs of debt.
 Cooking oil 
repackaged into 
small quantities 
in old bottles, 
Kaya.
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sell crops at favourable prices. But there were 
other new sources of credit in the area. Mr E, 
a 37-year-old farmer and head of a credit and 
savings association set up in 2011 with the help 
of a local NGO, was optimistic, but reported 
mixed success for local farmers. Some had done 
very well, particularly by leasing land to cultivate. 
Others had been unable to maintain the working 
capital for the irrigation pumps they had borrowed 
money for in order to purchase; others had 
been forced to sell livestock. Climate change and 
drought, Mr E explained, made farming more 
unreliable. He also noted that when food prices 
were high and farmers could produce more, they 
did well; but when prices were high and they could 
not respond, they suffered disproportionately. 
Technology, transport and telecommunications 
influenced how people changed the work they 
did. People had more invested in making a 
living – servicing debts and living on new income 
streams. They depended on getting around and 
being in contact at higher velocity. People needed 
to travel for work, and to get there as cheaply 
and quickly as possible, to save time for other 
work. In Dadu, in rural Sindh province, Pakistan, 
young men complained that the cost of travelling 
to seek work was sometimes prohibitive. 
Transport became a growing employer in its own 
right in rural areas – the growing number of 
boda boda or motorcycle taxis in rural Kenya and 
Ethiopia was widely commented on. In Indonesia, 
the motorcycle taxi or ojek was an acknowledged 
additional occupation for young men with limited 
skills; it was cheap and speedy, and often financed 
with easy credit. In one of our research visits to 
a single mother in the depressed rubber area of 
Banjar, in Kalimantan, our respondent mounted 
her bike in a bid to leave before she recognised the 
research team. She was behind on her repayments 
for the motorcycle, she explained, but she also 
needed the bike for work (partly to pay the 
instalments). The growing importance of mobility 
for basic subsistence may help to explain why fuel 
subsidies were so politically sensitive, and why fuel 
riots were also common – fuel had become an 
essential element in people’s subsistence strategies. 
New communications technology had also 
become essential. Younger people frequently 
mentioned needing mobile phones to hear about 
work, and households that reported not having a 
mobile phone often said it was because they had 
sold their phone, or could not afford one. Cellular 
subscriptions have risen particularly fast in the 
past decade in the ten countries (see Figure 9).
Figure 9 Cellular subscriptions (per 100 of the population) 1980–2015
Source: Adapted from World Development Indicators (accessed 26 March 2016).
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The mobile phone, cell phone or hand phone 
made it possible to receive and share information 
about work. In Vietnam, agricultural labourers 
were advised of work over the phone, and 
farmers used it to check on market prices. In 
Nairobi, casual work offers were passed over the 
phone, and in Addis Ababa, people spoke of their 
phones as vital. In 2012, in Gulshan-e-Iqbal town 
in Karachi, 50-year-old professional AY explained 
how important the phone had become, in 
particular for the emerging lower middle class:
There used to be a time when there used to be 
only 2–3 landline connections in my neighbourhood… 
I installed a separate phone connection for only the 
people in my neighbourhood over which, too, there 
was a queue of people waiting. This was some 
around 8–9 years ago. Only 4–6 households out 
of 500 had phone connections. Now everyone has 
a mobile phone.
Squeezing more 
Changing food cultures
During the study, talk of novel, strange and 
foreign foods, visible signs that packaged and 
processed foods were providing newly viable 
alternatives to customary items, and growing 
fears about the health and nutrition effects of 
‘bad’ and convenience foods prompted us to ask 
people how their food cultures were 
changing, why, and to what effect. 
The changes people identified were 
consistent with a rapid global nutrition 
transition away from cereal and 
plant-based foods towards fattier, more 
sugary, and in general more ‘Western’-style 
diets, in line with the ‘stuffed and starved’ 
phenomenon associated with food globalisation 
and industrialisation (Patel 2007). We view 
these profound changes as ‘transformation 
mechanisms’, through which individual 
consumption behaviours interacted with new 
modes of food production, supply and marketing 
to create food cultures with new norms and 
ideals. These emerging food cultures were 
significantly influenced not only by price but also 
by the changes in work practices through which 
people attempted to maintain their levels and 
standards of food. 
We found that the role of food as essential 
nourishment competed with the functions played 
by its newer, marketed forms in offering choice 
and sensation, saving time, effort and cost, and 
creating status and identity. It seems counter-
intuitive that people should have been buying 
more of their food just at the time when prices 
had risen, but this reflected the longer and more 
complex production and consumption changes 
set in train by marketisation policy, and to which 
food price rises contributed. People approached 
the problem of what to eat increasingly from 
the point of view of consumers seeking value, 
and that value had many new dimensions. Even 
among people who sometimes faced the prospect 
of hunger, considerations of convenience, novelty, 
taste, safety, nutritional value, status and identity 
influenced what they ate. But this does not mean 
people played a powerful role in food markets by 
acting as agents that chose on the basis of free 
will; markets, large corporations and governments 
powerfully constrained choices via supply, relative 
prices, aggressive marketing, and food system 
tariffs and regulations. 
In all countries and most sites in this study, people 
spoke of ‘traditional’ foods in decline, due to 
changes in availability, cost and preparation time. 
Of staple consumption, there was a move from 
relative diversity in grains (sorghum, millet, teff, 
quinoa) towards the major monoculture crops 
of maize, rice or wheat. Regional diversities in 
staple foods were also said to be declining. In 
Bolivia, children preferred wheat bread to phiry 
(a dish made with toasted flour). In Burkina Faso, 
people ate less bikalgo, a fermented condiment 
made from hibiscus seed. In Guatemala, people 
preferred hilachas, revolcado (traditional tomato/
tomatillo-based beef stew dishes) and beef and 
calves’ broth, but instead bought cheaper and 
more widely available tacos, gringas and burgers. In 
Ethiopia, young people in Addis Ababa said people 
were replacing injera (fermented bread made 
from teff flour) with dabo, or wheat flour bread. 
By contrast, others from the south of the country 
were replacing their traditional foods such as 
chuko, barley preserved with butter, and torosho, 
leavened corn bread, with injera, traditionally the 
food of the Amhara people and Addis Ababa. 
Changes in the reliance on injera might reflect the 
extreme volatilities in the price of teff. Similarly, 
we heard in the early years of this research that 
 Tempting 
processed and 
packaged food 
and other 
household items, 
Cochabamba.
People spoke 
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Bolivian youth were rejecting quinoa in favour of 
processed imports, while adult women worried 
that it was less available than in the past. It may 
be significant that teff had been touted as ‘the 
next superfood’, after quinoa, as another protein- 
and nutrient-rich grain that could satisfy the 
demanding palates and plates of affluent, diet-
conscious Westerners (Provost and Jobson 2014). 
In cities with more developed food markets and 
consumer tastes, a second stage of change was 
a growing preference for more highly processed 
and packaged staples. For instance, in Bangladeshi 
and Indonesian communities, children were 
rejecting rice in favour of noodles or fried foods. 
Women from farming households in rural 
western Oromia in Ethiopia noted that chechebsa 
(a flatbread fried in clarified butter and the spice 
mix berbere), porridge and yogurt had been 
replaced with shiro wat (a pea stew, increasingly 
made with pre-packaged ingredients), biscuits 
and packed juices. Dairy, particularly butter, was 
being replaced in traditional dishes with processed 
vegetable oil of dubious quality. Older people 
connected changing food habits with changes in 
their local economy and society. In Bolivia, a retired 
miner in his seventies described how his family’s 
diet had changed according to what was available 
in the local market and their work patterns: 
traditional boiled maize (mote) and api (a maize-
based drink) were being replaced with chocolate 
and coffee, while quinoa had all but disappeared, 
becoming ‘very expensive’ in the past two years. 
Despite nostalgia about ‘the way we used to 
eat’, cuisines have seldom been fixed in time or 
place. Strong drivers of change in food cultures 
have long marked economic development and 
global market integration (for example, see Goody 
1997; Mwangi et al. 2001; Raschke and Cheema 
2008; McCann 2001). Imperial and colonial rulers 
changed food systems (see, for instance, Fraser and 
Rimas 2010), as did major conflicts (Collingham 
2012) and food crises. Wheat was introduced into 
the staunchly rice-eating regions of Bengal as 
famine relief (Robson 1976), and institutionalised 
through US food aid (Ahmed, Haggblade and 
Chowdhury 2000; Atwood et al. 2000). Some 
attempts to change food cultures and create new 
markets have been deliberately introduced after 
food crises, as with genetically modified grains to 
drought-stricken southern Africa during the 2002 
food crisis (Zerbe 2004; see also Clapp 2012). 
But as food historian Rachel Laudan (2001: 38) 
points out, local foods were historically ‘the lot of 
the poor’, while the rich ate a more varied and 
palatable diet drawing on foods from elsewhere. 
Given local preferences and a biologically founded 
suspicion of foreign fare, it is interesting how easily 
new influences and products appear to have been 
absorbed. The influence of the post-war wave 
of global food system integration showed in the 
varieties of staples (maize, wheat, rice). But earlier 
waves of internationalisation were also apparent 
– for instance, in the popularity of samosa (pastry 
with savoury fillings, probably originating in 
Central Asia) in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Pakistan and Zambia. Aji-no-moto® (a Japanese 
‘umami seasoning’ of monosodium glutamate) 
was mentioned in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, and across Indonesia. Ingredients in 
customary meals might have been cooked from 
imported onions or newly 
introduced cabbages, or 
oils or fish sauces produced 
far from home. Everyday 
eating was already a fairly 
cosmopolitan matter. Many 
people were ambivalent 
about these changes because customary cuisines 
were seen to be healthy and nutritious (when 
affordable and available). In a focus group 
discussion about young people in Lusaka, Zambia, 
one view was that fast food was the food of the 
rich, such that people were getting sick from 
eating burgers, pizzas and the like: ‘Foods like 
chips and pizza are causing funny diseases like 
diabetes and high blood pressure. We say these 
are rich people’s diseases as poor people don’t get 
such diseases because they can’t afford such type 
of food.’ 
Class, gender and generation
Unsurprisingly, disposable income was a key factor 
in what kinds of food people bought. Some 
purchased food was cheaper, in money and time, 
than home cooking. But quality was often very 
low, as retailers struggled to make profits. In 
Kami, an urban neighbourhood of Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, a schoolteacher argued, ‘It’s people with 
less money who are eating these… sausages, 
because in some cases, incredible though it may 
seem, they’re cheaper than meat on the bone.’ 
‘Foods like chips and 
pizza are causing funny 
diseases like diabetes 
and high blood pressure.’
 Milk producers, 
Pirhuas.
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In a focus group discussion with retired miners in 
Bolivia in 2014, one man explained that: 
Buying food in the street is no longer a matter 
of class. The difference is that people with more 
money eat in the sit-down restaurants and those 
who don’t have much money eat at those places 
where you crouch down on the ground… Both rich 
and poor eat in the street. The difference is that the 
food safety office goes and checks up on the good 
restaurants. Here, in contrast, the food safety officer 
is just for decoration, you never see her working.
Many migrant workers and day labourers were 
relying on cheap, high-calorie street food. Men 
in Kabwata in Lusaka ate fritters, as they were 
cheaper than bread and more filling; in the 
Mukuru informal settlement in Nairobi, it was 
cheaper for people on their way to work to buy 
mandazi, deep-fried doughnuts, than bread. For 
those living hand-to-mouth and who lacked the 
equipment to cook or the means for fuel, street 
food made sense. 
Relative price changes greatly influenced whether 
people ate out and what they bought. In Vietnam, 
poorer people were increasingly finding that 
they could do better at home than patronising 
street stalls and low-cost restaurants. But buying 
processed food was also a sign of status and 
wealth in many places. In urban Guatemala, having 
a ‘mega’ (three-litre bottle of soda) on your table 
showed that you were eating well (‘as in the TV 
advertisements’, one respondent explained). Eating 
chicken was ‘prestigious’ in Kabwata, Zambia. And 
traditional foods were sometimes looked down 
on, as in Kami, in Bolivia, where ‘if a child takes 
boiled or toasted grains to school people might say 
he’s eating Indian food or that he’s an Indian’. 
When people talked about eating out, they 
were mainly referring to men eating away from 
home. Male agricultural wage workers, non-farm 
labourers and market traders in rural areas, urban 
transport workers, security guards, factory workers, 
traders and farmers selling produce, construction 
workers and others were typically away from 
home, doing strenuous labour, with cash in their 
pockets and access to a growing range and 
number of restaurants and eateries. Many young 
men in urban areas had no kitchen facilities, and 
the cost and effort of cooking single meals far 
outweighed the ease of buying a simple dish of the 
local staple. In Mukuru, Nairobi, for example, githeri 
– a mix of maize kernels and kidney beans that 
takes a long time to cook, now often with flavour 
enhancers from a packet – was always popular, 
but sales in recent years had rocketed. One githeri 
vendor was said to have increased her sales fivefold 
in the past year to serve the increasing numbers of 
people demanding a quick meal, with some cash in 
their pockets and no one at home to cook. 
In many rural sites, new outlets had sprung up to 
serve hungry working men. Farmers who went 
to market in Nessemtenga, in Burkina Faso, 
might eat rice once they got there, or roasted 
and grilled meats when they went to town, after 
having eaten the traditional staple Tô (pounded 
millet or sorghum in a vegetable sauce) for their 
morning meal at home. In the rural Ethiopian 
community in western Oromia, rising agricultural 
wages attracted a growing number of agricultural 
workers to new restaurants that appeared in the 
village during the study period. Business was brisk 
and the restaurants already served the kinds of 
food once only found in towns. 
One reason more men than women ate out, we 
heard, was that women had less time to cook for 
them than in the past. Most notable among the 
changes in women’s consumption patterns was 
a growing tendency to buy ready-made sauces 
or additives such as stock cubes. These were not 
staple foods, but they replaced traditional spices 
and condiments, mimicking the flavour of meat 
and other expensive ingredients. This shift was 
noticeable in Indonesia and increasingly in Burkina 
Faso, Kenya and Guatemala. Other quick fixes 
include partly prepared meals, particularly poultry 
and meat, and quick-cook or instant noodles. 
Getting foods from outside was, in some cases, a 
social necessity, as explained by Mrs A in Dhaka:
When a guest comes to your house, you cannot 
let him/her go without entertaining him/her with 
some food first. But it is not always possible to 
cook because sometimes there are no ingredients 
to cook with. In such cases, buying foods from 
these shops can save your face. 
Cost was crucial to women on low incomes, and 
home preparation, although time-consuming, 
was often the cheapest way to feed the family. 
Women consumed less and ate out less than 
men, either on the street or in restaurants, and 
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generally demonstrated a more comprehensive 
understanding of the economics of meal preparation. 
This highlighted the fact that cooking – a form of 
unpaid care – requires not only time and effort, 
but also knowledge and strategy.
The most profound changes were observed 
among young people. Children and young people 
in all settings were said to be eating more snacks 
and replacing usual meals with fast foods – often 
highly processed and packaged products with 
concentrations of fat, sugars and additives 
marketed specifically to the young. While often 
mass-produced by large domestic or multinational 
corporations, in many places local producers also 
did a good trade in local delicacies. Not all of 
these foods were unhealthy, but they represented 
a loss of control for parents. Parents worried that 
they did not know what children were eating, 
and about food safety and the longer-term 
nutrition implications. In several places, we were 
told how children tended to eat at odd times and 
the habit of eating together was being lost. Adult 
men thought that this meant fewer opportunities 
to teach children social norms and discipline. In a 
focus group of rural Burkinabe in their sixties, in 
the final year of the research, one man explained:
In the past, people used to say that someone who 
eats outside cannot take good care of his family. 
At that period, parents could punish children when 
they were mistaken, but today they cannot do it 
anymore. If they do so, the children will go out of 
the house and eat these outside foods.
Unsurprisingly, snacking at school is a major feature 
of children’s food habits. During breaks and after 
school, vendors appear to have a captive market. In 
Indonesia and Bangladesh, parents complained of 
having to provide pocket money so their children 
could keep up with their friends and buy snacks 
for the playground. In some cases, these amounts 
were non-negligible proportions of a family’s daily 
spending. The big global brands as well as more 
local brands of drinks, chocolates and sweets, 
chips and fried preparations were widely popular 
with children. Television advertising and marketing 
targeted at children were powerful factors, which 
parents recognised they had limited influence over. 
In communities like these, in which processed and 
purchased foods were relatively new, advertising to 
children was powerful. In many of these settings, 
giving children snacks was understandably seen as a 
sign of indulgence and affection.
Changing production and social 
reproduction
The choices people made were as much 
influenced by need as by opportunities and 
challenges arising from rapid urbanisation and 
the globalisation of the food system (Clapp 2009, 
2014; van der Ploeg 2010). Many of the changes in 
local food cultures, such as new markets in cooked 
food or loss of access to old staples, can be dated 
to the time of the food price spikes. Changes in 
the way many people (especially young people) 
began to work and eat after the food crisis are 
indicative of transformed modes of wellbeing and 
of ill-being. Waged life is precarious; it squeezes 
the time available for care, but offers possibilities. 
Growing towns are good places to sell produce 
if local farmers can compete with foreign and 
supermarket foods. Packaged foods may be 
dangerous to health, but they are tasty and time-
saving. The people we talked to were profoundly 
ambivalent about these new modalities of life, 
reflecting and reinforcing their sense of what is 
right and what is good – that is, the right thing to 
do and the right way to be treated in relation to 
food and the work required to get it. We turn to 
this question in the next section.
 A wide variety 
of packaged 
snacks were 
popular with 
children in Cianjur.
0In Chikwanda, northern Zambia, casual agricultural labour or ‘piecework’ is the fallback for very poor rural people. One 20-year-old study participant, 
MN, already a mother of one and guardian for her 
two sisters, subsisted on a mix of piecework and 
charity, and was, she said, willing to ‘do anything’ 
to bring in the money needed to look after her 
child and sisters. MN had inherited some land from 
her father, but in 2012 she 
had not farmed in two years, 
as she had been unable to 
afford the fertiliser.
I never wanted to be do 
piecework, it’s just that 
life is difficult. I can’t farm 
because of lack of fertiliser 
and seed… I still can’t 
afford these things. I work 
in gardens – for example, 
weeding or plucking 
tomatoes, then I’m paid either cash or given some 
vegetables. When it’s farming season I work in the 
fields cultivating, planting, weeding and harvesting. 
Sometimes I’m paid cash and at times I’m given 
maize. 
MN was the only income-earner in her house: 
her sisters were still at school. In 2012, she made 
5–10 Zambian Kwacha (ZMW) (US$0.51–1.01) if 
paid by the day, but she preferred to work for 
food, mainly maize and vegetables. Wages varied 
widely; for example, pay for weeding half a lima 
(1/4 hectare) ranged from ZMW15–30. ‘When you 
try to negotiate’, MN said, those that pay less say 
that’s all they have and so it’s up to you to take it 
or leave it and if you don’t 
take it someone else will. So 
when you are desperate, you 
take it.’ 
MN pinned her hopes on 
farming: ‘If I have everything 
I need for farming, things 
will change and we will live 
better.’ But in 2013, conditions had not improved: 
she had tried to get fertiliser but was told the 
scheme was full and to come back next year. Her 
piecework was sometimes earning ZMW20 per 
day, but the family was eating less, surviving entirely 
on one or at most two meals of nshima maize meal 
and cassava or vegetables, sometimes beans if there 
was enough money or if a neighbour gave them 
some. The community was helpful, she said, and 
although she never got any official assistance, she 
could rely on neighbours when there was nothing 
to eat. But even then, the children and MN were 
often ill, because (she thought) of their generally 
poor diet. She said, ‘Despite the hardships I make 
sure that everyone has at least eaten something.’
R
E
A
L 
LI
V
E
S
ZAMBIA
38
Agricultural ‘piecework’ in Chikwanda
Daga dried fish was a cheaper 
alternative to kapenta, but 
people in Chikwanda said it 
caused serious health problems
Dried foods, Mpika market
Tomato prices rose repeatedly, 
Kabwata market
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Volatile rice prices were a problem for rice farmers in 
major producing areas. 
The recent uncertainty 
appeared to be driving 
a series of changes in 
how farmers managed 
their integration into 
rice markets, including 
how they use credit and 
technology, relations 
with intermediaries, 
and expectations of 
protective policies. Mr 
HCD, a 45-year-old 
rice farmer and local 
official in his commune 
in An Giang province, 
started growing rice in 
2009 to take advantage 
of the rising rice price, 
and made a substantial 
profit in 2011. But the 
price plunged in 2012 and his earnings halved. He 
borrowed money to build a dyke and to invest in 
an electric irrigation pump, replacing his old diesel 
pump. In 2014, fertiliser and pesticide prices were 
lower, and the cost of labour was stable at 100,000 
Vietnamese Dong (VND) (US$4.45) per day, 
VND200,000 if spraying pesticide. He explained 
that he mainly hired seasonal migrant labourers 
from the Khmer minority group.
In 2012, Mr HCD  sold the winter-spring crop from 
his 12 hectares to rice traders and the summer 
crop to a seed company, earning VND10 million 
(US$450) for each hectare over the year. He 
observed that the following year (2013-14) the rice 
price would decline further, because of ‘branding 
issues and market demand’. He had not chosen to 
shift towards Japanese paddy because he knew 
the crop to be vulnerable and the grains expensive 
to process and transport. In the past few years 
he had stopped selling to traders, who gave good 
prices in good years but very low prices in bad, and 
started selling to seed companies through a crop 
contract system. 
There had been no local authority support to poor 
farmers when the rice price dropped, but under 
a new rule, Resolution 42, rice farmers were to 
receive VND250,000 per hectare (US$11) and the 
commune was preparing guidelines for farmers to 
register their land. In his view, farmers with less 
than 10 hectares could only just break even; they 
needed more land to make a decent living.R
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Hedging against rice price fluctuations in An Giang province 
TV advertising can influence 
children’s tastes, An Giang
Harvesting machine, 
An Giang
Material achievements of 
an older couple, An Giang 
Transformational mechanisms
Of course I’ve noticed, the price of everything has 
risen. The price goes up gradually, and one day 
you realise your income does not allow you to 
buy everything you bought [before]… The price 
of food, toiletries, detergents, clothes, lights, 
everything goes up. 
(Mr SG, 42-year-old production manager in a 
nursery, Pirhuas, Bolivia, 2013)
As each person in our study reacted to food 
prices and made adjustments within their 
household, family, community, 
city or village and region, their 
responses aggregated into 
larger effects. Between 2007 
and 2014, almost every one of 
the households we studied had 
had to squeeze more value out 
of what they consumed and 
seek new sources of income 
to make up a cash deficit in their household. 
These two mechanisms – to squeeze more and 
to earn more – proved crucial to the changes 
that emerged for people on low incomes. This 
was the case in each polity and economy, with 
different particularities, yet with an unsettling 
sense of inevitability and similarity. Across all our 
study sites, we saw how the price spikes created 
pressure to adapt and how the adaptations were 
channelled by options presented by the market 
and governments. In this section, we consider 
the aggregate effects, drawing on what people 
told us and on the literature that analyses the 
nature of contemporary commoditisation and 
precariousness. 
The wider conditions that gave shape to 
people’s adaptations included private sector 
configurations, prices, policies, political processes 
and technologies (for basic country-by-country 
detail, see Section 6). Many of the market policies 
(regulations, subsidies, tariffs) had been in the 
making over long periods of time, making way 
for a commodity system characterised by trading 
blocs, large-scale subsidised agriculture, urban-
based employment, state social welfare systems, 
Most people were 
already on a trajectory 
that involved paying 
for an increasing 
range of essentials.
4  Aggregate effects 
40
 People 
worried that 
fritters in 
Kabwata market 
may be unsafe 
because the oil 
is black.
41
PRECARIOUS LIVES : FOOD, WORK AND CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AGGREGATE EFFECTS
and progress measured in dollar terms (Araghi 
2009). Likewise, social policies in many countries 
had embraced commoditised services, including 
in education (Ashley et al. 2014), health (Bennett, 
McPake and Mills 1997; Twagirumukiza et al. 2010), 
utilities (Prasad 2007) and welfare (Devereux 
and Lund 2010). Most people were already on a 
trajectory that involved paying for an increasing 
range of essentials including food, water, shelter, 
sanitation, health and education when the price 
hikes kicked in. Mr HH, a 40-year-old farmer in 
western Oromia, Ethiopia, spoke for many rural 
dwellers in 2012 when he said:
The farmer is forced to sell his food crops since the 
money is needed for different purposes during that 
time [after the harvest]. School materials, clothes, 
social contributions, taxes, payment for inputs and 
so on have to be paid. 
The price hikes appear to have accelerated 
and consolidated the marketisation of social 
reproduction. If all that had happened when 
food prices doubled was that people had cut 
down on food quantity and quality and cut out 
more expensive foods, we would have expected 
work and food to return to ‘normal’ after the 
crisis subsided. But initial moves to cut down 
were compounded by less reversible decisions 
to find ways of earning more. In 2013, speaking 
about the changes she had seen in Mukuru, 
Kenya, Mrs RK, a 39-year-old water seller, 
explained: ‘Life is no longer the same as ten or 
even five years ago… Our economy is no longer 
agricultural; people have shifted into transport, 
fishing and real estate.’ 
Decisions for new kinds of work propelled 
many people into a new relationship with the 
labour economy. As we have seen, they took 
on more casual work in the informal sector or 
increased their hours in low-paid jobs, migrated 
to new places to find work, or tried out new 
ways of adding cash value to existing production, 
distribution or service chains. They took loans 
to start up small businesses, seeking credit 
from official and unofficial sources, becoming 
increasingly bound into webs of cash-based debt. 
Mrs M, a 35-year-old rubber tapper and mother 
of five in Indonesia, observed in 2014:  
We call it ‘dig a hole and cover the other hole’. 
We cover our daily needs for things such as 
cigarettes, sugar, cooking oil by borrowing from 
kiosk. Usually the loan is up to Rp20,000, and we 
pay it directly to the kiosk, and then borrow again 
for daily needs. 
People spoke of new levels of stress. According to 
Mr OI, a 56-year-old farmer and tax collector in 
Nessemtenga, Burkina Faso, in 2014: ‘Household 
members are less and less happy because of the 
high cost of life. They fear the future. They do not 
know what is going to happen next.’
Similarly, in a focus group discussion in Dadu, 
Pakistan, in 2014, one man expressed his anxiety 
as a breadwinner:
One has to arrange for feeding ten people, 
and together with rising prices and the lack of 
employment opportunities, things have become 
difficult… Even though one is trying to hide these 
issues but they start suffocating the person from 
the inside.
The profound adjustments people made to work, 
food and care were constrained by processes of 
social and economic change already long in the 
making. The locus and quality of social welfare had 
already changed, land and housing markets had 
already been deregulated, and the small producer 
could already feel the competition with subsidised 
transnational corporations and 
highly capitalised local businesses. 
Araghi (2009) calls these 
conditions ‘the visible foot’ of the 
market in the sense that they 
are uncaring forces that tend to 
promote inequality and stress; this 
is in contrast with Adam Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’, whereby millions 
of individual actions in the market produce social 
good. Araghi notes that contemporary capital 
did little to prevent the exponential growth of 
a new arena of informality, which included both 
de-formalisation for workers in the industrialised 
global North, and expanding entry for millions to 
unregulated labour markets in the global South. 
This new arena of informality is characterised by 
‘slavish conditions of employment (involving forced 
under-consumption and under-reproduction 
strategies) without visible enslavement…’ (ibid: 60). It 
is built on an unquenchable hunger for paid work 
from a growing informal working class, estimated 
in 2006 to number more than a billion people 
(Davis 2006). 
‘Our economy is no 
longer agricultural; 
people have shifted 
into transport, fishing 
and real estate.’
 Investing in 
a motorbike 
was a common 
way for young 
men to get a 
foothold in the 
market, Bekasi.
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Precariousness
The aftermath of the food price spikes coincided 
with an increased rate of migration towards 
paid work, in particular into rapidly growing, 
intensely populated informal settlements in cities 
and towns in the countries studied. This move to 
the market left many people 
in a precarious position. The 
education they could afford 
was low quality, the jobs they 
could access were informal 
and insecure, they were 
uninsured, their social care was 
uncompensated and stressed, 
and their networks of support 
depended on mobility and money. A group of 
men in Dhaka, in a focus group discussion in 2012, 
agreed with one observation that:
Since there are few work opportunities in the rural 
areas, people are migrating into the city in search 
of better livelihoods… These people had borrowed 
money while they were staying in the rural areas, 
and they come to the city in order to earn money 
to be able to repay their debts. 
New urban residents without powerful 
connections were confronted with numerous 
barriers to accessing the resources needed to 
participate in the market on equitable terms. 
As explained earlier, wages did respond, but 
for those at the base of the economic pyramid, 
wages did not quite keep pace with prices, nor 
keep up with pressures to spend on a growing 
set of necessities in changing economies. In 2014, 
Mrs JB, a 41-year-old domestic worker who also 
rents out houses in Dhaka, explained:
Most of the garment factories have started 
retrenching, which resulted in the unemployment 
of a lot... Nowadays, people are truly working 
hard to survive; most of the people now are 
involved in side professions beside the main one to 
generate more income.
The work that poor people found was precarious 
in a different way from the precariousness of the 
agricultural livelihoods that many were leaving 
behind, forming a relatively new pattern of 
contingent and often high-risk work with unstable 
pay and low margins. The word ‘precarity’ signifies 
not only insecure work but also a new state of 
insecure existence for the people who suffer it 
(Arnold and Bongiovi 2013: 298–300; Standing 
2011). Widespread precariousness came about 
in part because of changes in how work was 
contracted within global value chains – notably 
a shift from contracted employment to sub-
contracted and agency labour (Phillips 2011, 2016; 
Phillips et al. 2014). Unfettered economic growth 
has also been promoted in many policy circles 
as the answer to reducing poverty and securing 
national development. Thus even local value 
chains were able to follow suit in approaches to 
contracting labour. This has resulted in a process 
that has been labelled ‘adverse incorporation’, 
whereby people may be employed or earning, 
but on very poor terms (Hickey and du Toit 2007). 
The price hikes accelerated the arrival of masses 
of new cheap labour into the informal economy, 
helping consolidate a new labour regime: each 
person was competing with thousands, even 
millions, of others for access to work, accepting 
low remuneration and often high costs to their 
personal health and time. In the final year of 
research, pointing to the increased precariousness 
of work in Dhaka, Mr SH, a 50-year-old rickshaw 
puller, recounted how:
Earlier we used to spend a lot of leisure period 
but now it isn’t possible. Now I run away as 
quick as I can if I get any news of even any 
simple work, because if I don’t go there then 
other person will have the money by getting the 
work done. Now there is no paucity of working 
people at Dhaka city and people like me can do 
any odd job. 
This mass of need anchored the informal economy 
as a huge source of economic growth, both in 
terms of cheap production and mass consumption, 
but it also depressed other areas of the economy. 
The multitude of initiatives people undertook 
to find paid work had the effect of reducing or 
squeezing unpaid work. Many adult householders, 
especially women, spent less time at home 
cooking or caring for family members. We might 
expect that these pressures on care would be 
compensated, after a while, with increased 
income from the new forms of paid work, 
allowing for more care to be paid for, and more 
care to be supplied – and this did turn out to be 
the case for many. But people’s ability to pay for 
care was as variable and precarious as their own 
employment. Thus many continued to squeeze 
care – reducing the time they spent on it and the 
The price hikes 
accelerated the arrival 
of masses of new 
cheap labour into the 
informal economy.
 Urban 
growth offered 
opportunities 
for casual labour 
on construction 
sites, Dadu.
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quality of care they were providing. Children were 
supposed to find their care at school (their parents 
hoped), the elderly had to get back to work, and 
cooking had to be done in less time. 
Working harder and in more geographically 
dispersed work environments, people who were 
typically in a hurry and on the move changed their 
diets, opting for faster, easier and in some ways 
tastier (but often less nourishing) foods. These 
individual changes consolidated at aggregate levels 
into new food cultures and new cultures of care. 
As Mrs H, a 37-year-old tailor and mother of 
three, told the researchers:
After coming back from work the body gives in 
and you don’t feel like working, you feel like lying 
down and closing your eyes but you can’t because 
of your responsibilities... Because of my job I 
cannot take a look if they [my children] are eating 
properly or not. Because of my work I cannot take 
care of my son like I used to. 
Commoditisation of food
The adjustments people made in response to the 
food crisis constituted mechanisms of accelerated 
economic and social change, expanding informality 
at a rapid rate and commoditising diets and social 
arrangements. New (usually insecure) work, 
cramped places to live, less time, new foods, less 
time to care for family members, and new things 
to pay for – all these engendered material and 
cultural transformations. 
When food prices eventually stabilised between 
2012 and 2014 – in most countries at a higher 
level – adjustments to eating, care and work did 
not go back to the status quo ante, even though 
people might have originally seen the changes 
they made as temporary measures. It was 
through these mechanisms that the price hikes 
heralded a profound shift in the valuation of social 
reproduction on the one hand and labour on the 
other. On the labour side, the food price crisis 
accelerated a transition towards precariousness; 
unlike past social transitions (for instance. 
nineteenth century industrial transformations in 
Europe), the lurch into the market was almost 
universally informal – stressful, unregulated and 
un-unionised or, depending on your point of view 
and individual experience, exciting, innovative 
and politically meaningful. On the consumption 
side, people shifted towards foods, ways of 
caring and cooking, and other essentials of social 
reproduction that were supplied through the 
market, often in commoditised, non-localised 
forms that were of poorer quality for those 
with limited means. The liberating aspects of 
commoditisation were legion, but the impacts 
for people on the lowest and most precarious 
incomes were not always positive, precisely 
because of their subordinate position in the 
economic system: 
Commoditisation occurs to the extent 
that each household is severed from direct 
reciprocal ties, both horizontal and vertical, 
for renewal of means of production and of 
subsistence, and comes to depend increasingly 
on commodity relations for reproduction. 
The process of commoditisation ultimately 
implies the individual status of each household. 
It becomes an enterprise, whose relations 
to outsiders progressively take the forms of 
buying, selling, and competition. 
(Friedmann 1980: 162–3)
A commodity is a product, good or service 
offered for sale that is not specialised by where 
it comes from or who made it (for example, 
maize, fish, iron, vitamin C, water). As such, a 
commodity may come from anywhere and go 
anywhere it is wanted, all other things being 
equal. Commoditisation is the process by which 
individuals, families and larger units of 
human organisation turn to the market 
for supplying goods essential to social 
reproduction. 
Commoditisation changes people’s 
relations with one another and how they value 
the essential goods of life. When basic items for 
consumption – once derived from local non-
market sources (food from local farms or family 
connections, land from communities, houses from 
local builders and communal forests) – become 
commodities, their production, distribution and 
sale begin to be distanced from the consumer’s 
influence. In relation to food, people are required 
to make more or less conscious choices between 
food from somewhere (traceable, creating local 
relationships and often costing more money) 
Many continued 
to squeeze care.
 Restaurant at 
Mpika market 
serving traditional 
food to busy 
market buyers and 
sellers.
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or ‘food from nowhere’ (untraceable, creating 
obscure relationships and often costing less money) 
(Bové and Dufour 2001; McMichael 2009b). In 
2014, Ibu Y, a 34-year-old mother of four, who ran 
a small kiosk in Bekasi, Indonesia, selling eggs, oil, 
soaps and other necessities, explained: 
When cooking ourselves we knew what 
ingredients should be used; when buying snacks 
we did not know what they had been cooked 
with, what food colouring had been used, or 
whether they had used food preservative.
The commoditisation of people’s relationships 
to food, while apparently emancipating their 
choice of what to eat and how to cook, also 
circumscribed their choices. 
Despite the wide array of 
packaged and commercially 
processed foods that could be 
bought, people were aware 
that the ingredients tended to 
be high in calories and salt and 
often low in micronutrients, while the diversity 
of staples had declined (Hossain, King, Kelbert, 
Scott-Villiers and Chisholm 2015). A similar 
process was reported with regard to protein-rich 
foods (cheap factory-farmed chicken, in particular) 
and oils (commercial vegetable oil preparations 
replacing traditional pressed oils from nuts and 
seeds). Seasonal and regional dishes, knowledge 
about food production and processing, customary 
recipes and cooking practices (and with them 
cultural meaning) were all being lost (Olivet López 
2015). Advances in taste and convenience seemed 
to be offset by losses in nourishment, both 
physical and cultural.
Resistance to adopting new foods was 
widespread, but not always obvious. It was most 
commonly found in the ways people bent the 
new food regime to their own local preferences 
and sense of what was right. The new moral 
economies among most people in most of the 
world were not only about ‘food security’, as it 
was termed in international circles, but about 
having control over what they ate. This was 
particularly the case in Latin America, where many 
people across the urban and rural sites studied 
talked about the need to preserve local foods. 
For example, in a school in Kami, Bolivia, teachers 
organised a food fair to promote traditional dishes. 
They explained that they hoped to emulate an 
initiative in La Paz where stallholders and street 
vendors around a particular school are asked to 
sell fruits once a week.
The effect on social reproduction
Commoditisation also changes how labour is 
valued, shifting value from the labour itself (its 
energy, generosity, skilfulness or productivity) to 
the amount of monetary consumption that it 
can command. With commoditisation, money 
easily becomes the measure of value of material 
things or services, and consumption of purchased 
items becomes increasingly important in defining 
identity and status (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2001). The result after the move to the market 
was new pressures on human relations – locally, 
in terms of who had most money, and globally, 
in terms of the way labour was valued almost 
exclusively in financial terms. 
In several of the research sites, householders 
explained work in terms of the money it raised. 
Mr CL, a 22-year-old man who sold mobile 
phones and phone accessories in Lusaka, talked 
about people’s increased dependency on money: 
‘I value money. Money speaks in a language 
everyone understands. To get an education, to 
be in good health, to eat well and to live in a 
good home, you need money.’ Furthermore, 
people indicated that unpaid work had come 
to be less valuable in their own eyes and in 
the social imaginary more broadly. In none of 
the ten countries was unpaid care a measured 
item of national production, and many of the 
national rubrics of progress were expressed in 
Advances in taste and 
convenience seemed 
to be offset by losses 
in nourishment.
 Parents and 
teachers made 
efforts to 
educate their 
children in 
healthy eating, 
Banjar.
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monetary terms, such as gross national income. 
Unpaid work – such as subsistence farming, 
caring for children, the sick and the elderly, or 
environmental services – had been devalued 
unless they were paid for. It appeared to confirm 
Marx’s analysis that reproductive work must have 
a low or negative monetary value in relation 
to production, since profits are derived from 
the difference between the cost of keeping a 
worker and his or her dependants alive (social 
reproduction) and the cost of the products that 
she or he makes (Araghi 2003). Since the era of 
unpaid social reproduction seems to be coming to 
an end, it may be that the only way it will remain 
low cost is if it is devalued.
Political subjectivity and rights 
Although adaptation took place within a narrow 
band of possibility defined by global market 
forces and national policies and histories, people’s 
embrace of informal work, commoditised 
food, paid care and risky migration seemed to 
confirm the desirability and good sense of the 
transformation. In part, this was because people 
had little option, but the shift also offered 
appreciable compensations, as we have seen 
above (also see Hossain, King, Kelbert, Scott-
Villiers and Chisholm 2015). Not only was the new 
work and social environment exciting in many 
ways, and not only were new levels of access to 
markets offering labour-saving options for food 
and other essentials, but there was an element 
of possibility in people’s move to the market. The 
hope of money offered a hope of power – as 
illustrated in this quote in 2014 from Mrs JB, a 
domestic worker and landlady in Dhaka: ‘Those 
who have money hold power in the slum. Those 
who do not have money can hardly lead a life.’
Right to work
The data indicated that people facing hunger or 
livelihood stress turned to the market because 
such a turn fitted with their notions of what 
it meant to fulfil their self-image as providers. 
They felt responsible for creating a future for 
themselves and their families. Finding not just 
food, but work was key to most people’s sense 
of moral obligation in tackling the problem of a 
good life. People hoped their governments would 
intervene in making work available, though few 
of them imagined that governments might take 
action to make labour conditions fairer, safer or 
better remunerated. In 2013, a district leader in 
Addis Ababa argued: ‘I think hungry people have 
both the right and duty to get food. Hungry 
people have the right to get food through their 
participation in job opportunities.’ 
The market offered the possibility of emancipation 
– in particular to young people – affording a degree 
of liberation from dependence on patronage or 
on eroded rural assets whose earning potential 
was in decline. It offered the prospect of being a 
provider for oneself and one’s family, worthy of 
being provided for in the contemporary politics 
of provision (Bohstedt 2014). While the value 
of such a shift was questioned by older people 
in many communities, it was a move that fitted 
squarely within global norms that gave primacy 
to economic growth for status and power, and 
which had ushered in a ‘corporate food regime’ 
by which food ‘from nowhere’ was (and still is) 
valorised in a process that has 
included dispossession of small 
farmers, fisherfolk and pastoralists 
(McMichael 2009a: 147). We found 
young people leaving small-scale 
agriculture in droves (Leavy and 
Hossain 2014; also see White 2012), 
some to new work in the towns, 
others to small local industries 
including in food sectors such as 
poultry-raising. Remaining part of production and 
consumption systems that were neither market- 
nor profit-oriented was widely painted by people 
on low incomes as an unimpressive life choice. This 
was in no small part the result of the devaluation 
of such ways of life by governments, educational 
curricula, media and middle-class discourses (see, 
for example, a study on education and pastoralists, 
Scott-Villiers et al. 2016).
While our data show that, by and large, the people 
we were talking to did not regret the moves they 
had made in this process of adjustment, few found 
their lives easier as a result. The stresses of a high 
cost of living, risky work and an uncertain future 
remained acute by the end of the study. People’s 
ability to claim support from kin, neighbours, 
the village, the mosque or temple was reduced. 
However, a widespread belief in the locus of 
responsibility lying as much, if not more, with the 
individual, parent or householder, than with the 
social system of which she or he was a part, meant 
that people largely accepted that the market 
offered what it offered and they had to survive 
within it. For example, Mrs P left Naogaon in 2011 
to work in the garment sector in Dhaka. During a 
visit in 2012 to see her family, she explained:
I do not like the environment of Dhaka city 
because it’s unhygienic and it’s hard to find a good 
place to live. But I don’t have any other choice, 
because the income that my family can generate 
in Dhaka is not possible in my village.
Nonetheless, workers and consumers in our 23 
sites also did not generally accept the market 
as separate from the state; there was an 
understanding of a moral economy in relation 
to market behaviour and food prices, rights of 
People largely 
accepted that the 
market offered 
what it offered and 
they had to survive 
within it.
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tenure of land and shelter, wages and, to some 
extent, decent work conditions. Over the study 
period, there was a marked reconfiguration of the 
tenets of the moral economy (particularly in urban 
areas) from old patronage to new bureaucratic 
moral relationships. People made claims on 
governments – often via formal and not always 
reliable civil society organisations – rather than on 
local elites to make provisions against hunger and 
to hold the market to account. These claims were 
made clear in protests like the Unga revolution in 
Kenya, the right to food movement in India and 
bread riots in Mozambique (Hossain et al. 2014).
Direct claims on merchants and employers 
were also common, but they were made with 
implicit or explicit calls on the state to make 
good the right to a living wage or reasonably 
priced food. Formal sector workers mobilised for 
pensions in Bolivia and Kenya and for wage rises 
in Bangladesh and Indonesia. Female garment 
workers in Bangladesh were particularly vociferous 
and effective in their claims. Agricultural workers 
in Bangladesh found new approaches to collective 
bargaining with employers, while dairy farmers 
in Bolivia created more powerful cooperatives. 
With few exceptions, people in all our 23 study 
sites believed that it was the responsibility of the 
state to curb local speculation, tackle regulatory 
failures and expand the generosity, quality and 
responsiveness of social protection (Hossain et al. 
2013). Mrs MC, a 48-year-old weaver and single 
mother in Chichicastenango, Guatemala, simply 
argued: ‘There should be job opportunities so we 
are able to eat.’
Right to food
Government therefore has the responsibility to 
make food available and affordable, even if it 
means buying food from other countries. 
(Mr HC, 54-year-old community leader, Lango 
Baya, Kenya, 2013)
Very few countries had unequivocally declared the 
right of citizens, or those under their protection, 
not to be hungry, even though a number had 
made significant and systematic advances in 
social protection (including welfare and subsidy) 
during the study period. Most communities 
in our study had some kind of programme or 
scheme affording occasional protection against 
hunger, but they were criticised as discriminatory, 
discretionary, demeaning, unreliable and divisive 
(King et al. 2014). Between 2009 and 2014, 
we noted a visible increase in such schemes. 
Despite the scale of these changes, the provision 
was neither systematic nor did it amount to 
inalienable rights. Vernacular rights still remained 
important therefore, even as they appeared 
to decline with the rise of commoditisation. 
Householders on low and precarious incomes 
expressed a general sense of insecurity in relation 
to hunger, despite a general picture of rising 
wages, falling global commodity prices and 
increased government efforts to provide welfare 
for vulnerable groups. 
While people in many study sites were aware 
that the global food and energy markets had 
effects on local prices, very few saw the global 
arena as a site of protest or control, and few 
had any connection with a supra-national social 
movement. Rightly or wrongly, it was the 
national state that needed to be embarrassed, 
cajoled or threatened into action on access to 
food and work. Many farmers and local grain 
merchants – for example, farmers in Zambia living 
near the border with Tanzania – were well aware 
of differentials in prices of grains, and processes 
by which cheaper processed foods were flooding 
local markets. They saw it as the responsibility of 
their own government to reduce taxes, protect 
local producers or promote free trade. They were 
aware of both the inherent dilemmas in these 
demands and the degree of state mismanagement 
of these international arrangements. 
While the price of oil or the behaviour of 
multinational agri-businesses were also 
understood as factors in determining the costs 
of food, fertiliser and transport, very few people 
were able to come up with a way in which 
they could hold anyone accountable, except 
through the protections afforded by their own 
 Governments are expected to protect citizens from extreme 
hunger, by providing relief and controlling markets.
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government. Affecting the morality of global 
processes seemed beyond the imagination of the 
ordinary person at risk of hunger, except through 
the mediation of governments, which citizens felt 
bore the responsibility for effective negotiation 
of their rights within a global regime. Among our 
respondents there was remarkably little reference 
to any possibility that powerful religious bodies or 
civil society might exert an influence that would 
make a difference at a global scale. 
In discussions about the meaning of the right 
to food – often after expressing incredulity 
that it might be a legal reality, which it is, for 
example, in Kenya – most people explained that 
the responsibility for providing adequate and 
good-quality food lay with the householder and 
parent, but where that provision came under 
stress, there were obligations from authorities 
and elites. In most versions, elites should have 
been assuring that the system made access to 
earned income and food possible for all of those 
over whom they held sway, just as at all times 
a parent or adult should be doing the same for 
a child. In every different culture and polity, the 
forms taken by these beliefs and expectations 
were different. Where there was a legal right and 
a degree of systematic government response, as 
in India, the common sense right had a dimension 
of citizenship. Where there was no law, but there 
was systematic welfare provision by the state, as 
in Bangladesh, the belief was in providence and 
the concomitant moral responsibility accepted 
by government. In many places, especially where 
price volatility had been strongest, people were 
resigned about state performance – the state 
claimed responsibility, failed to take it and yet 
could not be held accountable (Jahan, Mamun-ur 
and Wahab 2015). 
Popular conceptions of food rights tended to 
reflect people’s lived experiences of hunger 
risks. Being in the market gave people a sense 
of gaining standing as citizens and voters – an 
improvement on their standing as subsistence 
farmers or housewives. But in general, people 
felt they had gained little or no influence over 
authorities and elites during times of crisis. During 
a focus group discussion with men in Karachi, Mr 
ZA, a 24-year-old day labourer, argued that:
People can do nothing. People can do nothing to 
the government; even if there is a population of 
16 crore [160 million] over here. These things are 
in the hands of the government, not in the hands 
of the people. The government has weapons and 
arsenals. 
Most people’s conception of a food right had 
remained more of a morally based economic 
and political hope than a belief that the law 
was on their side. The moral economy is an 
idea popularised by EP Thompson in a history 
of popular protest against rising food prices 
and aggressive market behaviours in eighteenth 
century Britain. It suggests that ordinary people 
hold an unspoken agreement on what is 
tolerable when it comes to the behaviour of the 
rich in relation to the poor in the functioning 
of the economy (Thompson 1971). At times of 
fundamental economic transition on a global 
scale – as in the eighteenth century and, arguably, 
during our study period – the moral economy 
comes into view. When the behaviour of elites or 
richer members of society fails to conform to the 
expectations of people who are hungry or at risk 
of hunger, the politics of provision are provoked 
into reaction and there will be widespread 
complaints and protests (Bohstedt 
2014; Scott 1977; Edelman 2005; 
Hossain and Kalita 2014). 
Though many popular conceptions 
of a moral economy may be 
based on apparently antiquated 
ideas of feudal patrons preventing 
extreme hardship among their peasants or 
of prices of staple foods being held steady by 
paternal governments, breaches within marketised 
democracies can still fuel popular uprisings, shifts 
in political alignment or widespread subaltern 
resistance. Conversely, if the unspoken agreement 
between those at risk and those who are 
understood to have powers of provision is not 
breached, it is possible for the food system to 
change substantially with only occasional outbreaks 
of resistance and nostalgia. From 2007 to 2014, 
although people suffered high stress and often 
quite significant hunger, which sometimes led to 
riots, there was also a great deal of acceptance, 
because people felt that much of the responsibility 
lay with them and the market’s invisible hand. It 
seems that in accepting the global market as the 
prime site of achieving food and other rights, 
people no longer hold the state to account for 
delivering a moral economy. 
Ordinary people 
hold an unspoken 
agreement on what 
is tolerable.
 Demonstration 
in Nairobi 
protesting the 
price of maize 
meal, July 2011.
0Mr GM, a 33-year-old official on a Community Councils of Urban and Rural Development (COCODE) committee in 
Chugüexá Primero, in the mountainous west 
of Guatemala, explained how rising food prices 
led him to try to migrate to the United States. 
Interviewed in 2013, he noted that: 
Prices of everything are going up; people cannot 
buy anything anymore… The ones working as 
labourers earn 40.00 Quetzals (Q) (US$5) daily. 
Imagine, for a whole week of work it is only Q200 
(US$25). It is not enough money 
to buy anything. Here in the 
community many of us buy corn 
and beans every week. 
People were looking for new ways 
to make a living and many were 
going to the USA. Mr GM had 
himself tried twice in what was 
plainly an act of desperation, but 
was caught both times: 
What many people do is that they leave to go far 
away to see how they can take care and provide 
for their families. They look for another job, they 
change their job. I left but I spent Q25,000 
(US$3,125). Those Q25,000 were not mine; they 
were a loan and I had to pay interest for them. 
After his second failed attempt to enter the 
USA, he was jailed for four months before being 
deported back to Guatemala. 
When he phoned his wife 
to tell her the bad news, he 
found she was in hospital. He 
reflected, sadly: 
When a person goes to the 
United States it is not because 
they have the money in their pockets, we are 
always in debt and anything could happen. We 
leave… because we are preoccupied and need to 
make money, not because we want to go there. 
Imagine if we had around Q40,000 (US$5,000) 
– with that money we could open a store; but 
because we want to have a better life, we go and 
get in debt. 
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Mr R was 34 when we first met him in 2012. He lived with his wife and his daughter, born in 2002, in Kalyanpur Notun Bazaar, a slum 
area in Dhaka. Most of the residents in Kalyanpur 
were small traders, rickshaw drivers, waste recyclers, 
general daily-wage workers, or workers in garment 
factories. People had access to basic water and 
electricity through informal arrangements, including 
arrangements with politicians in the ruling party. 
Most people in Kalyanpur were ‘from the broken 
river’ – migrants from rural areas who had suffered 
from climate-related land erosion. Both Mr R and 
his wife went to school until class five.
Mr R contracted tuberculosis a few years before 
the study. When we first met him, one of his 
children was living with his grandparents in their 
home village because Mr R and his wife were 
unable to provide for him. When we first met Mr 
R, he had recently started work, supplying items to 
garment shops, while his wife worked in a garment 
factory. Bouts of bad health meant he could no 
longer get jobs in factories, where the working 
hours were longer and more physically demanding. 
In 2012, Mr R’s monthly salary 
was 4,000 Bangladesh Taka (BDT), 
while his wife earned BDT4,500. 
‘My wife also earns around 
BDT1,500 by doing overtime each 
month. Therefore, altogether both 
of our income comes to around 
BDT10,000 each month (US$128).’
In April 2013, more than 1,110 
workers died and several 
thousands were injured in the 
collapse of the Rana Plaza building 
in Dhaka. The collapse put the spotlight on the 
poor working conditions and high risk attached to 
working in the garments industry. 
Bangladesh is the world’s 
second largest exporter of 
garments, after China, and 
the textile export industry 
accounts for 80 per cent of 
the country’s export income 
(ILO 2016). Low-cost labour in Bangladesh helps to 
keep the costs of production low. In the aftermath 
of the Rana Plaza collapse, there was unrest in the 
capital throughout 2013. In November, six months 
after the collapse, the minimum wage almost 
doubled, from BDT2,972 to BDT5,319  per month 
(Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, in 2013 many of the study’s 
participants in Dhaka, including Mr R, mentioned 
the worrying situation of the garments industry. 
The minimum wage increase meant that Mr R’s 
salary rose from BDT4,000 to BDT7,000, and his 
wife’s salary increased from BDT4,500 to 4,700, 
with BDT1,500 for overtime remaining constant. 
The present condition of the industry is still not 
good. Garment fires happen regularly. The politics, 
meetings and processions are happening all across 
the industry. It would be better if the government 
fixed the pay scale of the garment workers. 
Though the salary is increasing, it’s nothing. 
The way expenditure is rising, salary is not rising 
in the same way.
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5  Conclusions and 
implications
 Women 
held strong 
views on the 
aspects of life 
and livelihood 
that needed to 
be protected, 
Dhaka.
Another ‘Great Transformation’
What does the analysis presented here tell 
us that is new? Its value, and the original 
contribution it makes, is that it offers a ground-
level analysis of the risks and transformations 
involved in the process of adjustment to 
economic globalisation, studied through 
snapshots of everyday life around the world 
as people responded to global food price 
inflation. Contradicting the view that rapid 
recent reductions in income poverty signal 
development success, this study suggests that 
higher costs of living have been offset by more 
precarious means of work – whether people 
are employed or self-employed – and by fast 
changes in eating habits. In other words, the 
costs of resilience to food crisis have gone 
uncounted. 
Beyond reference to rising rural wages, the 
catalytic influence of the food crisis on social and 
economic change has largely gone unnoticed. 
It is not only the poorest people and rural 
communities that are vulnerable to price spikes 
or food shortages; the recent food crisis brought 
lasting changes to the relationship between 
the work people do and the food they eat, 
particularly among the ‘nearly poor’ – those 
who are just a job or a crisis away from steep 
descent into great hardship. This group of people 
may not go hungry often, but meeting basic 
living costs occupies much of their daily life 
and their responses to food price shocks have 
been changing society as well as markets. This 
report is a reminder of the particular risks that 
globalisation poses to the relationship between 
labour and food, and raises questions about our 
choices as to how to respond.
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We can see this recent period of adjustment 
to the global food crisis as a latter-day Great 
Transformation – a period of particularly rapid 
and disruptive social and economic change when 
more domains of human life and effort are being 
drawn into markets, adjusting to new patterns 
of work, life and diet. In Polanyi’s classic account 
of the late nineteenth-century transformation, 
the rapid entry into labour and food markets was 
a process of commoditisation that left people 
exposed to all manner of shocks (Polanyi 1957). 
The drive to manage this new social risk triggered a 
second movement, a push for social protection. The 
arrangements that arose in response – through 
political decisions, class alliances, philanthropy 
and the rise of labour unions – involved a mix of 
paternalist social insurance, hard-fought worker 
protections, and financial market regulations. The 
relationship between the free market and social 
protection was not one of complementarity, 
but of opposition and tension; a tension which, 
according to Polanyi, exploded into the cataclysms 
of the 1930s when wild currency fluctuations 
contributed to the mass unemployment of the 
Great Depression. The failure of democratic 
politics to confront this unprecedented turbulence 
underpinned the rise of fascism. 
Although Polanyi’s story ends in the 1930s, his 
ideas about the Double Movement were revisited 
during the recent global economic crisis (Fraser 
2012, 2013; Sandbrook 2011; Kuttner 2014). 
Adjustments after the crisis mark a moment of 
particularly concentrated transformation, a new 
point in the Great Transformation at which more 
human effort is directed into market-means 
of securing basic subsistence. Can we read a 
compressed ‘Double Movement’ in contemporary 
signs that social protection is a rising concern in 
developing countries (McCord 2010)? It is perhaps 
too early to detect patterns of change, and too 
easy to credit them to the fears provoked by 
the global food price rises. Indeed, what still 
passes for social protection in many of the places 
reported here is a typical residualist patchwork 
of provision, at times distributed as patronage, 
at other times to those in greatest need. This 
leaves a gap between the shared need for broad 
protection against crises of basic subsistence, and 
the extreme poverty-targeted social assistance 
schemes mandated and favoured by international 
aid (Lavers and Hickey 2015). 
Social protection 
reconceptualised for a time 
of food crisis 
Insights into how crises of basic subsistence 
mutate into increased precariousness of labour, 
squeezing out of care, and changing food habits 
indicate a need for a different conception of 
social protection – one that balances protecting 
labour against exploitation and high risk, and 
protecting subsistence, so that dangerous 
and demeaning occupations 
are unnecessary. A broader 
conception of social protection 
would recognise that for very 
large sections of populations in 
many countries – not only the 
poorest targeted by social safety nets but also 
those who are vulnerable because they live close 
to the ‘poverty line’ – a sudden food price hike or 
crop failure may be catastrophic. 
It should be clear from this research that social 
protection can only be meaningful in more 
volatile times if people and society as a whole are 
protected against the downsides of globalisation. 
This is the central logic of food security as a 
national policy priority; particularly since the 
2008 food crisis, many countries have increased 
investment in national grain reserves and 
storage facilities, agricultural production, market 
development and price regulatory frameworks (as 
well as creating conditions for land-grabbing and 
industrialised production of low-quality food). The 
centrality of global and related price shocks to 
people’s wellbeing means that insulation against 
food price shocks must provide a tough first outer 
layer of protection. 
When people who are doing their best just to get 
by have no protection against inflation, they have 
to find work that pays better – often work that 
is dangerous or insecure, or even illegal. Here, 
social protection needs to provide a second line 
of defence, ensuring that at the very least, the 
coping strategies commonly used to manage a 
crisis – selling more labour, borrowing, migrating 
– are managed so that jobs and loans are safe 
and fair, and that desperation does not lead to 
A sudden food price 
hike or crop failure 
may be catastrophic.
 Bolivia saw a rapid decline in hunger between 2009 and 
2014 with initiatives such as EMAPA, a state-run food agency 
guaranteeing access to affordable enriched food.
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exploitation. The global nature of the failure, 
to date, to address the common roots of such 
problems is clear: witness the ‘microcredit crisis’ 
centred on over-lending, and the Mediterranean 
and Asian migrant crises – both failures to protect 
people against bad or desperate decisions. 
Protecting labour and livelihoods provides a 
second layer of insulation against 
shocks, among other advantages. 
Social protection also entails 
protection of ‘the social’ – the 
parts of life not reducible to, yet 
greatly influenced by, market 
prices and values. There are growing reasons 
to argue that the wider social benefits of the 
informal sector can be harnessed in a ‘hybrid 
economy’ model of social protection that tackles 
the needs of informal workers in a meaningful way 
(Chen 2016; Ferguson 2015). In relation to food 
security specifically, this means supporting the 
vital unpaid work of nourishing families by making 
women’s paid work both possible and productive 
through adequate pay and conditions bolstered by 
quality public services. This means (at a minimum) 
clean water and sanitation, well-regulated food 
and fuel markets, and effective health and care 
services, and more direct support and help at 
times of price rises, shortages or disasters. 
Support is particularly vital at moments when 
regular subsistence is most at threat. This has 
implications for how we understand the economic 
‘empowerment’ of women and young people 
if reallocation of their labour changes the food 
choices people make. A nutritionally sensitive 
approach to social protection would take into 
account the trade-offs between paid and unpaid 
work, reflecting an understanding of how the 
social processes of nourishment may be affected 
by crises, price changes and new patterns of 
work. There is, for example, a clear case for 
provision of school meals on grounds that they 
reallocate part of the domestic work of feeding 
children onto programme or school authorities – 
a benefit parents particularly value in lean times.
This vision of social protection as resting on a 
balance between work and food, or between 
the economic and the social spheres of life, is 
fuller and more replenishing than a vision based 
on a safety net (Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas 2010). 
It suggests a more robust framework for building 
resilience against crises than simply reliance on 
the market (Heltberg, Hossain, Reva and Turk 
2012; Heltberg, Hossain and Reva 2012). This is 
partly because protecting ‘the social’ encompasses 
protecting social values around food, and the 
social arrangements of nourishment. As the food 
sovereignty movement and other food justice 
campaigns have demonstrated, the fast changes in 
and growing complexity of the food systems on 
which many people increasingly rely imply a loss 
of control, or sovereignty, over the food they eat 
and the environment they live in. 
Many income-generating programmes speak to 
this longstanding concern for rural livelihoods 
to encourage small-scale local production and 
consumption, with attention to quality and 
nutrition. But these efforts face the onrush of 
agricultural industrialisation and the growth 
of marketing and sales by big food interests, 
national and multinational. As we have seen, 
new markets for industrialised and processed 
foods are interacting with new work patterns to 
induce changes in food habits and nutrition. To 
guard against a global epidemic of unbalanced 
nutrition and obesity, governments will need to 
pay attention to the mechanisms by which rapid 
changes in market-driven diets have emerged and 
are still evolving. 
There is a clear case for action to protect children 
from the advertising and marketing strategies that 
encourage poor eating habits from the earliest 
years. An emphasis on food quality also implies 
stronger regulation and implementation of food 
safety regimes: concerns about food safety are of 
immense importance to many people, and create 
deep anxieties about the short- and longer-term 
implications of eating bad food. We have seen 
how concerns about food safety can also push 
people towards branded products that may be of 
dubious or no nutritional value, in the belief that 
heavily marketed and advertised goods may be 
safer. People also express a desire to protect and 
promote positive aspects of traditional cuisines, 
to protect intangible cultural heritage, and to 
preserve the food knowledge and cultures that 
have evolved over centuries. However, local and 
indigenous food knowledge may be quickly and 
easily lost with the advance of industrialised food 
systems, in the push for better-value food. 
Social protection also 
entails protection of 
‘the social’.
 ‘Life is 
becoming more 
difficult – prices 
often go up, but 
they rarely come 
down’, Mukuru.
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Struggles to protect the 
social: food sovereignty, fair 
prices and basic incomes
History suggests that any success in extending the 
scope and mandate of social protection will depend 
on active efforts to build and make the case for 
scaling up. It will involve a vigorous debate about 
which groups of people are vulnerable, and how, 
and about how to optimise resources. The debate 
will need to be informed by evidence to help 
understand the effects of such global developments. 
Extending the scope and mandate of social 
protection will also depend fundamentally on 
political energies. But we know that the nature 
of precarious work leaves little scope for trade 
unionism, the form of worker organisation that 
dominated in early twentieth-century Europe. 
Precariousness disperses and conceals workers’ 
concerns; their key common characteristics – 
occasional, temporary, mobile – mean they lack 
the voice and capacity of established worker 
groups to make claims against poor conditions 
or unjust regulations. So where are these claims 
being made? And how? 
Claims for protection against a volatile global system 
have notably been made through a range of popular 
political struggles, including unruly episodes and 
actual food riots, which dramatised political themes 
of ‘fair prices’ for food and labour during the global 
food crisis period. Similar ideas influence organised 
labour’s struggles over wages and conditions, 
and they strongly suggest a moral economic 
justification for intervention in food and labour 
markets (Hossain et al. 2014). The food sovereignty 
movement, for example, emphasises local control 
of farming in connection with the land and people, 
against the financialisation and industrialisation of 
food, pushing back against commoditisation and 
emphasising collective action and solidarity around 
matters of agriculture and food systems. 
In a leading example of how informal workers 
are organised and are articulating claims against a 
global audience, the WIEGO (Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing) network 
brings together women worker organisations 
to advocate for the wider benefits of informal 
enterprises. They organise themselves and share 
the lessons of doing so, offering ample insights 
into how a broader social protection agenda might 
incorporate self-organised groups with a strong 
view of ‘the social’ aspects of life and livelihood 
that need to be protected against markets and 
their crises and failures. 
In this conception of protecting 
‘the social’ in a time of food 
insecurity, Right to Food activism 
and advocacy has much ground 
to cover to make a strong case 
for a broader, food crisis-proofed 
version of social protection. Many countries now 
have provisions to protect people against major 
food crises, but fewer have strong support for a 
right to good food in the wider sense we are using 
here, even though nutrition is widely recognised 
as a priority. Commitments to protect vulnerable 
people from food price rises by establishing it as a 
point of state law or principle are also rare, even if, 
in practice, some states strive to achieve this. 
Our research found that people had much to 
say about what the right to food meant – what 
it is reasonable to claim and argue for, from 
The food sovereignty 
movement 
emphasises local 
control of farming.
 Candy floss 
seller in Dadu.
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whom, and how – but few knew about its status 
under international human rights law (Hossain, 
te Lintelo and Kelbert 2015). There is a grand 
opportunity here to start a global conversation 
about what a good food system means – what is 
a fair, sustainable and nourishing way of feeding 
the world, and why is it worth struggling for. 
Right to Food struggles can do much to unearth 
the parts of food systems that need protecting 
from the downsides of global markets, offering 
concrete examples of how a meaningful right 
to food may be realised and what it would 
contribute in terms of social good. 
Since the financial crisis there has been rising 
interest in the idea of a universal basic income, 
a system by which all members of a society are 
provided with income by the state (Ferguson 
2015; Standing 2002). Could this radical big idea 
help balance the relationship between fairly 
rewarded work (whether formal or informal) 
and control over the food that people produce, 
procure, prepare and eat? Critics have pointed to 
its potential to create laziness, while advocates 
highlight its potential to liberate innovation. Our 
doubts are somewhat different in nature; we do 
not believe that all elements of social protection 
can be bought, since our research shows that – at 
least in the domain of food – they cannot. And 
people depending on the basic income would not 
gain more power to influence the continuity of 
income support, nor be able to use it to demand 
fair conditions for their labour or to take control 
of the food they eat. It seems unlikely that the 
total commoditisation of the means of everyday 
life will protect the moral economy. Nonetheless, 
the idea does offer something beyond the 
residualist patchwork of safety nets, suggesting as 
it does a notion of redistributive justice (Ferguson 
2015; Fraser 1997). 
What we need to know
All of the above challenges imply the need for 
different or new data and evidence, because 
they rest on a really robust understanding of 
the relationship between labour and food. Most 
responses to food crises take place beneath the 
radar of governments and the international 
community, in the space where people change 
how they work and what they eat. Our research 
is not the first to show this, nor will it be the last. 
As things stand, international statistical systems are 
designed to measure the price of everything and 
the value of nothing. Life in a Time of Food Price 
Volatility was designed to ‘blow up’ localised and 
individualised findings using nationally representative 
data. This proved difficult because most of the 
changes that people reported as important in their 
lives – other than prices – were not measured by 
national statistics. We know that people are shifting 
into the informal economy, but there is little hard 
data to support this. People work longer hours in 
more precarious occupations, but they are precisely 
the people that are not represented in official 
statistics. More women enter the workforce, but 
as they are mostly engaged in informal work, 
their activities are poorly captured. There is less 
time for capable adults to care for children and 
elderly people, including producing, procuring and 
preparing nourishing food. But as unpaid care work 
is rarely measured in any serious way, we cannot 
estimate the extent of the decline and/or the 
squeeze on everyday life, or its likely effects – years 
down the line – on nutritional outcomes. 
Until data are available to join up these dots in a 
meaningful way, policymakers may not know how 
to address these issues. Our research adds support 
to the argument that better data are needed on 
three foundational domains of human development: 
unpaid care work, human wellbeing and informal 
labour. Without data and evidence on these issues, 
we cannot adequately measure how development 
– with all the crises that often accompany it – is 
changing people’s lives. This research strongly indicates, 
as others have also done, that these crises merit 
a thorough and timely reconceptualisation of the 
‘protection of the social’ so that all people can 
work and eat well, even in times of price volatility.
 Women who 
go out to work 
still have to care 
for the family 
and the house, 
Dhaka.
6  National food prices 
and wages
 The Luong An 
Tra commune in 
An Giang province, 
located in the 
Mekong Delta, 
is the biggest 
rice producer 
in Vietnam. At 
the time of this 
study, agriculture 
accounted for 
nearly 80 per cent 
of the economy 
of the commune. 
When the price 
of rice fell many 
farmers made a loss. 
Households with 
less land and capital 
accumulated debt.
To make sense of different price movements 
and their effects at national level, it is useful to 
use Baltzer’s (2013) classification of a country’s 
exposure to the food crisis, based on relative 
exposure to international prices and the potential 
impact of food price policies (Figure 7). None 
of the low-income or lower-middle-income 
countries in Figure 7 were large, self-reliant food 
exporters with influence over regional or global 
market prices. Applying Baltzer’s schema to those 
ten countries, none also counted as ‘free traders’ – 
countries well integrated into global cereal markets 
and using few food price policies to influence 
prices. One (Vietnam) was an ‘exporting stabiliser’, 
a net exporter of cereals (particularly rice) with 
strong food price policies. Six countries fell into 
the category of importers: Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya and Pakistan. The 
remaining countries – Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and 
Zambia – all fell into the ‘isolated’ category, and 
all three had ‘severe’ levels of undernourishment 
within the population. 
The ‘exporting stabiliser’: 
Vietnam
Exporting stabilisers should be able to insulate 
domestic prices from international price shocks. 
China and India did so with export controls, 
but despite being a major rice exporter with 
significant state involvement in the export market, 
Vietnam did not. Export restrictions (not an 
outright ban) were imposed in 2008, but did not 
dampen domestic prices (Baltzer 2013), partly due 
to ‘panicked hoarding behaviour’ of millions of 
rice market actors, inducing a spike in prices in 
response to the initial price shock (Timmer 2010). 
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However, prices came down rapidly when market 
psychology changed, initially because of sales of 
surplus rice stock by the Japanese government. 
Around 50 per cent of the change in 
international rice prices was transmitted through 
to domestic rice prices in Vietnam (Robles 2011). 
Trends in the wholesale price of rice over the 
period 2008–15 reflect the twin spikes, but 
after 2011 prices declined and were relatively 
stable (see Figure 10). Zezza et al. (2008) note 
that the relatively egalitarian distribution of land 
in Vietnam means that most rice-producing 
households gain from increased prices. The 
impact on low-income net consumers (marginal 
farmers, landless, low-income urban workers) also 
depends on trends in wages, as to some extent 
wage increases offset the impact of higher retail 
prices (see Table 2). Average monthly earnings 
of employees trebled between 2007 and 2013. 
Female wage rates were 90 per cent of male 
rates in 2013.
Average wages in the agricultural and natural 
resources sector also show growth (Wiggins and 
Keats 2014): real wages in the state agricultural 
sector increased on average 113 per cent over 
the period 2005–12 (although the rate of 
increase was less in later years), while average 
real incomes of rural wage workers increased 
by 34 per cent over the period 2007–12. These 
increases in real wages appear to be partly driven 
by rapid growth in the manufacturing sector, 
and by increases in agricultural productivity; 
increases in real rural wages in other countries 
in Asia (most notably China) also reflect the 
decline in the absolute number of rural workers 
due to out-migration, but this is not yet true of 
Vietnam. 
The ‘importers’: Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Kenya and Pakistan
Six of the ten countries – Bangladesh, Indonesia 
and Pakistan in Asia, Bolivia and Guatemala in 
Latin America and Kenya in Africa – were classed 
as ‘importers’.6 These countries consistently 
depended on imports of the main staple crops 
and so were exposed to international price 
volatility. In these countries, domestic prices 
would be expected to track international prices 
quite closely. 
In fact, the evidence is mixed, and while all of 
these countries experienced the 2008 price 
shock (and most experienced the 2011 shock), 
differences in policy, production and consumption 
factors influenced the relationship between the 
national and the global market. For example, 
Bangladesh was able to attenuate the 2008 
impact to some extent through a combination 
of pre-shock imports from India and a bumper 
harvest; conversely, the 2011 shock in Kenya was 
worse than signalled by international prices, 
because the country depended largely on imports 
from Tanzania and Uganda and prices were 
affected by the severe drought in the region 
in 2011–12. It is also notable that there were 
additional sharp price increases in some of the 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 1,399,000 2,106,100 2,519,000 3,105,000 3,757,000 4,120,470
Male 1,464,000 2,247,400 2,668,000 3,277,000 3,923,000 4,286,660
Female 1,280,000 1,893,500 2,297,000 2,848,000 3,515,000 3,884,040
Source: Vietnam Labour Force Survey (downloaded from ILOSTAT, accessed 18 January 2016).
Table 2 Mean nominal monthly earnings of employees, Vietnam, 2007 and 2009–2013 (Vietnamese Dong)
Source: Adapted from FAO GIEWS (accessed 2 March 2016).
Figure 10 Rice, wholesale price, January 2008 – December 2015, An Giang
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importing countries after 2011 – for example, 
Bangladesh in 2013–14, Bolivia in 2013, Kenya 
in 2015, Pakistan in 2014 – and that in many of 
these countries, retail prices were still rising at 
the end of the study period, despite the decline 
of international prices. This is particularly evident 
in Guatemala and Indonesia.
Bangladesh
At the time of the study, Bangladesh was the 
world’s fourth largest rice-eating nation and 
the price of rice had long been a matter of 
great policy and political significance (Raihan 
2013). In 2012, rice accounted for 40 per cent 
of consumption among the poorest fifth of 
the country’s population (World Bank 2013). 
Impressive agricultural growth had all but closed 
the food deficit before the global food crisis, but 
the country’s exposure to natural disasters meant 
that the domestic rice shortfall had been known 
to reach as high as 10 per cent (Hossain 2010). 
The country experienced major cyclones in 2007 
and 2009, which affected production. 
Figure 11 shows that prices rose fairly steadily 
from the early years of the decade, rising sharply 
at the start of the first price spike in 2007–08 
and again in 2011 and 2013–14. However, the 
price spike in 2008 was less severe than the 
spike in the ‘world’ (i.e. Thai) rice price, probably 
due to imports from India and a bumper rice 
harvest in 2008 (Baltzer 2013). Given the harvest, 
Bangladesh could have taken advantage of higher 
world prices and exported its surplus, but lacked 
the quality assurance to do so. Prices reduced 
during 2015, but from a longer-term perspective 
retail rice prices appear to have adjusted to a new 
and higher level (generally between BDT30–35/kg, 
or US$380–450/tonne).7 
Wages in Bangladesh increased substantially 
between 2005 and 2015, and real wages also 
increased over most of that time. Agricultural wages 
increased due to increased productivity, the growth 
of the non-farm rural economy, and the growth of 
labour-intensive manufacturing, particularly the 
garments industry (Wiggins and Keats 2014). Zhang 
et al. (2013) suggest that Bangladesh reached the 
‘Lewis turning point’, where ‘surplus’ rural labour is 
absorbed and rural wages start to rise. Significant 
international migration from rural areas further 
tightened the labour market. 
Poverty levels fell markedly, from 49 per cent in 
2000 to 32 per cent in 2010, but rural poverty 
rates remained high and many households 
were vulnerable to shocks. Balagtas et al. (2014) 
calculated that rural poverty, which had fallen 
from 48 per cent in 2000 to 44 per cent in 
2004, rose again to 56 per cent in 2008 as a 
result of the food price crisis. Agricultural wage 
rates rose considerably after 2008, but there 
was a considerable gender gap: the nominal 
daily wage rate for a sample of male agricultural 
labourers in July 2015 was BDT304 per day, 
compared to only BDT226 for female labourers 
(WFP 2015d). Zhang et al. also calculated that 
urban real wages, if deflated by a Cost of Basic 
Needs Index (representative of the consumption 
profiles of poor households), fell between 2005 
and 2010. This partially reflected the increase in 
rice prices.
Source: Author’s own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 17 February 2016).
Figure 11 Wholesale coarse rice prices, July 1998 – January 2016, Dhaka
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Pakistan
After the initial food price shock in 2008, the 
price of both staples (wheat and rice) declined, 
but from 2009 prices moved upwards until 
early-mid 2014, after which there was again 
a downward trend until this was reversed in 
late 2015. At that time, wheat flour prices 
remained (in nominal terms) well above the 
2008 peak, but rice prices had dropped below 
that peak (see Figure 12). Pakistan produced 
most of its own wheat and rice requirements, 
generally exporting over half of the rice it grew. 
Movements in domestic prices were therefore 
more influenced by domestic supply and demand 
factors, and therefore also by oil prices, as well as 
by government intervention such as the minimum 
support price for wheat producers to encourage 
production and support farm incomes (WFP 
2015d). During this volatile period, the floods of 
2010 engulfed one-fifth of Pakistan’s land mass, 
destroying an estimated US$500 million of 
wheat crops. 
Wheat was by far the most important cereal, 
providing about 75 per cent of all calorific 
energy. Net food consumers on low incomes 
were likely to suffer from high wheat prices 
if wages remained static. In fact, Wiggins and 
Keats (2014) showed that real agricultural wage 
rates in Pakistan actually fell by about 12–13 
per cent over the period 2005–12, in contrast 
to most other Asian countries, with women 
agricultural labourers paid only 50 per cent of 
what men were paid. Relatively low rates of 
economic growth and high rates of population 
growth, in conjunction with stagnant agricultural 
productivity, appear to have contributed to 
the fall in real wages, while the gender wage 
disparity reflects the subordinate status of poor 
rural women.
WFP data for urban wage labourers indicate 
relatively little change in the terms of trade 
between urban wage rates and the retail price 
of wheat flour over the period.8 In November 
2011, one day’s wage purchased 12.7kg of wheat 
flour; this fell to 11.3kg in November 2013 and 
rose to 13.65kg in November 2015. In overall 
terms, there were few signs of sustained 
livelihood improvement among either the rural 
or urban poor in Pakistan. The prevalence of 
undernourishment appears to have remained 
unchanged at 22 per cent (about 40 million 
people), and under-five stunting rates were very 
high (45 per cent) and even increased (Haddad 
et al. 2015). 
Analysis of successive Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (HIES) by Gazdar (n.d.) 
largely supports the view that there had been 
little sustained improvement in livelihoods over 
the period. Based on a recommended daily 
minimum energy requirement of 2,150 kcal per 
adult equivalent, the proportion of the HIES 
sample below this minimum was 48 per cent in 
2007–08, and 51 per cent in 2011–12. The urban 
population showed higher prevalence rates of 
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 17 February 2016).
Note: Price data not available for wheat flour, June–December 2005, included by extrapolation.
Figure 12 Retail prices of wheat flour (January 2004 – January 2016) and rice 
(January 2006 – January 2016), Karachi
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inadequate energy intake: 62 per cent of the 
urban sample was below the recommended 
minimum in 2011–12, compared to 45 per cent of 
the rural sample. Slightly over half of all energy 
intake was derived from cereals, and 80 per cent 
of the total value of food consumption was 
purchased from the market; among the rural 
poor, this figure was 83 per cent. These data 
again indicate the vulnerability of poor households 
to price increases of basic food staples.
Bolivia
Bolivia was more or less self-sufficient in maize 
and rice, but imported the majority (often over 
67 per cent) of its wheat requirements (Maletta 
and Balbi 2014). Wheat, particularly in the form 
of bread and pasta, has become a major basic 
consumption item. The general trends in wheat 
prices displayed a high degree of conformity 
with each other (although there was a widening 
margin between wholesale local and imported 
prices from early 2014) (see Figure 13). However, 
as noted by Maletta and Balbi (2014), bread and 
pasta prices approximately doubled in price during 
2007–08, and then stayed at that level, despite 
subsequent declines in the price of wheat flour. 
Figure 13 also shows the very substantial gap 
between retail and wholesale wheat flour prices 
at all times.
At the onset of the food price crisis in 2008, the 
Bolivian government attempted to moderate the 
increase in food prices with reduced import tariffs 
and new subsidies on wheat flour, and monetary 
policy promoting currency appreciation to 
make imports cheaper. These policy instruments 
worked in 2008, but (partly because the currency 
remained stable after 2008) not in 2011. The price 
stabilisation worked, but at a cost. 
If the government wanted to stabilise the price 
of bread and pasta, it evidently succeeded, but 
the stabilisation occurred at rather high prices. 
In practice, by increasing retail prices in 2008 to 
this new level, bakers and noodle-makers have 
provided themselves with a price cushion thick 
enough to withstand subsequent fluctuations 
in the price of flour (and other inputs) while at 
the same time widening their profit margin – all 
at the expense of consumers (Maletta and 
Balbi 2014: 45). Maletta and Balbi attribute this 
price trend to a ‘tacit agreement’ between the 
processing industry to maintain consumer prices 
at higher levels. This tendency towards higher 
bread and pasta prices was probably exacerbated 
by the sharp increase in wheat flour prices in 
2013, when prices returned to the peak levels of 
2008. This appears to have been mostly due to 
poor production conditions and tight supplies in 
the region.
Data on wage rates are not readily available, 
but macro data on poverty and food security 
indicate steady improvements throughout the 
time period, notwithstanding the significant price 
increases. The national poverty rate fell from 
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 18 February 2016).
Figure 13 Wheat flour prices: (local wholesale, January 2006 – January 2016; imported 
wholesale December 2010 – January 2016, retail, February 2009 – January 2016), La Paz
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60 per cent in 2007 to 45 per cent in 2011 
(World Bank 2016), while the child stunting 
rate fell from 27 per cent in 2008 to 18 per 
cent in 2012 (Haddad et al. 2015). Prevalence of 
undernourishment has also declined markedly, 
from 28 per cent in 2007–09 to 16 per cent 
in 2014–16 (FAO, Food Security indicators). 
Considerable public investment and generally 
pro-poor investments by the state, facilitated by 
growth in the mining and other sectors, are likely 
to have contributed to these positive trends.
Bolivia’s economic growth in the years before and 
after the 2008 crisis was relatively rapid (between 
4–6 per cent per annum) (Alcaraz 2015b); 
minimum wages and employment grew, and the 
state actively intervened to attempt to cushion 
the effects of food price increases – although not 
with complete success. Nonetheless, poverty and 
low-wage employment remain widespread.
Guatemala
Guatemala was the most import-dependent of 
the ten countries9 (see Figure 7). The wholesale 
price of white maize (the main variety consumed 
in the country) fluctuated but the retail price 
of tortillas – the main food product made 
from white maize and a centrepiece of the 
Guatemalan diet – saw a steady upward trend 
since the 2000s (Figure 14). Guatemala produced 
Year Minimum wage* Income earned**
Non- 
agricultural 
(Quetzal/month)
Agricultural 
 
(Quetzal/month)
Maquila and 
export sector 
(Quetzal/month)
Total* 
 
(Quetzal/month)
Urban 
 
(Quetzal/month)
Rural 
 
(Quetzal/month)
2006 1,577.38 1,541.49 N/A N/A N/A
2007 1,643.69 1,605.98 N/A N/A N/A
2008 1,725.21 1,679.58 1,702.40 N/A N/A N/A
2009 1,831.67 1,831.67 1,702.40 N/A N/A N/A
2010 1,953.33 1,953.33 1,824.06 1,680 2,109 1,133
2011 2,187.54 2,187.54 2,058.27 1,685 2,113 1,223
2012 2,318.33 2,318.33 2,151 .04 1,734 2,154 1,258
2013 (Q1) 2,421.75 2,421.75 2,246.25 1,917 2,274 1,499
Source: Alcaraz (2015a).
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 22 February 2016).
Table 3  Average personal monthly income from work in Guatemala
Figure 14 White maize wholesale price (January 2000 – January 2016), and maize tortilla retail price 
(January 2001 – November 2015) 
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most of the white maize consumed in the 
country but imported some quantities, mostly 
from neighbouring countries, particularly during 
production shortfalls. Figure 14 shows a clear 
spike in wholesale prices in 2011 followed by a 
decline back towards the price levels attained in 
the first 2007–08 crisis; within-year fluctuations 
appear to reflect seasonal variations in food 
availability linked to harvests.
However, the retail price of maize tortillas rose 
steadily, with an acceleration of the rate of 
increase during 2011; lower wholesale prices 
were not reflected in the retail price. This increase 
has continued in subsequent years. Analyses by 
Iannotti and Robles (2011), Iannotti et al. (2012) 
and by Alcaraz (2015a, 2015b) provide detail on 
the impact of increasing food prices. Iannotti and 
Robles (cited in Alcaraz) simulated the impact of 
the 2007–08 price increases on food consumption 
and calorie intake; they found that the poorest 
40 per cent of the population, particularly in 
urban areas, took the greatest hit, cutting calorie 
and micro-nutrient intake when prices increased. 
Alcaraz provides national-level data which suggest 
that income levels have not fully adjusted to price 
increases. The national poverty rate was 56 per 
cent in 2000, it fell to 51 per cent in 2006 but 
rose again to 53.7 per cent in 2011; the urban 
poverty rate rose consistently, reaching 35 per 
cent by 2011. The minimum wage was raised 
every year over this time period, but actual wages 
appear to be below the advertised minimum 
(see Table 3). From 2008–14, the minimum wage 
increased by about 50 per cent, but the price of 
maize tortillas almost doubled.
Economic growth rates fell significantly during the 
crisis, and subsequent natural disasters further 
contributed to contraction, resulting in increased 
unemployment and lower household income. 
Furthermore, Guatemala is highly import-dependent 
in terms of major food staples (Figure 7) but the 
government did not approve direct interventions 
to stabilise prices, instead developing time-limited 
conditional cash transfer programmes (Alcaraz 2015a).
Indonesia
Indonesia experienced three price spikes in 
less than a decade: the first, in 2005–06, was 
triggered by a government decision to reduce 
fuel subsidies, resulting in increased fuel and food 
costs; the second, in 2008, coincided with the 
global food price crisis; the third, in 2011, again 
conformed to global patterns (see Figure 15). In 
addition to this volatility, the underlying trend 
in food prices was upwards. Retail prices of the 
main staple, rice, more than doubled in nominal 
terms between early 2008 and early 2016. All of 
Indonesia’s wheat was imported, but retail prices 
rose from mid-2012 onwards and do not reflect 
declining international prices over the period.
Indonesia has active food security policies 
addressing both availability and access issues, 
and introduced a Food Law in 2012 based on 
the principles of food self-sufficiency and food 
sovereignty (Government of Indonesia and WFP 
2015). Rice production increased by an average 
3.2 per cent per annum between 2004 and 2013 
and maize production increased by 6 per cent 
per annum over the same period. Indonesia was 
self-sufficient in rice production and produced a 
surplus of 8 million tonnes in 2013 (Government 
Figure 15 Indonesia food price trends, 2003–2011
Source: Adapted from Government of Indonesia and World Food Programme (2015).
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of Indonesia and WFP 2015). There is growing 
urban demand for wheat and wheat products, 
which can only be met by imports; in 2013, 
Indonesia imported about 6.7 million tonnes.
Rising wage rates have partially mitigated the 
impact of food price rises. Wiggins and Keats 
(2014) reported that real rural wages increased 
from the mid-2000s, and although they fell as a 
result of the 2008 food price rise, in 2009 they 
were still about 50 per cent higher than earlier 
in the decade. Growth in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors, resulting in higher demand 
for non-farm labour as well as investments in 
education and rural infrastructure, appears to 
explain growth in rural wages.
Poverty rates declined (to about 11 per cent in 
2014) but almost 28 million people are still below 
the national poverty line and significant problems 
of food and nutrition security remain. The Gini 
coefficient of income inequality increased from 
0.36 in 2007 to 0.41 in 2013. Child stunting 
rates were persistently high, at 37 per cent 
in 2013. More than half of Indonesians were 
employed in the informal sector,10 where wage 
and overall employment conditions were poor 
and productivity low. Households that primarily 
depended on crop production as their main 
source of income were increasingly vulnerable 
(Government of Indonesia and WFP 2015).
The Indonesian government developed a number 
of policy measures to address poverty and lack of 
access to food, the best-known being the Raskin 
programme, which provided subsidised rice to 
low-income households. In 2013, 15.5 million 
households were eligible for the programme 
(Government of Indonesia and WFP 2015). It was 
restricted to providing rice and did not directly 
lead to improved dietary diversity or quality, which 
continue to be major problems, as reflected in 
high child stunting rates.
Kenya
Maize prices fluctuated significantly over the study 
period: the price shock in 2011 was substantially 
greater than that in 2008, and was linked to the 
major drought that occurred in the region during 
2011–12. Prices fell subsequently – particularly 
from late 2014 to early 2015 – as a result of the 
Kenyan government importing large quantities of 
maize from neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda; 
prices then rose again through most of 2015. For 
most of the post-2011 period, maize prices were 
(in nominal terms) at or above the peak 2008 
price, and are at least double pre-2008 levels. 
Bean prices have shown significant fluctuations 
over the period, primarily related to domestic 
production conditions (see Figure 17).
Kenya has considerable agro-ecological diversity, 
and levels of food insecurity vary substantially 
across the country. In late 2015, it was estimated 
that some 1.1 million people were acutely 
food insecure and in need of immediate 
food assistance, particularly in pastoralist and 
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 23 February 2016).
Figure 16 Retail price of rice (February 2008 – January 2016) and wheat flour 
(September 2010 – January 2016)
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agro-pastoralist north-eastern areas, which had 
experienced rainfall deficits in three consecutive 
seasons (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 
2015). The majority of pastoralist households 
across north-west and north-east Kenya were 
categorised as being in ‘stress’11 in mid-2015 and 
likely to remain in that situation in 2016. WFP 
sample surveys in late 2015 found that 39 per 
cent of sample households were food insecure, 
and 43–49 per cent could not afford a minimum 
healthy food basket (WFP 2015a). Low-income 
urban households directly bore the brunt of 
high food prices. In 2011, Schofield et al. (2013) 
found food insecurity rates in Nairobi’s informal 
settlements at 60–70 per cent in Korogocho, 
compared to 30–40 per cent in Viwandani. More 
than 70 per cent of households had engaged in 
at least one negative coping strategy to make 
ends meet, including ‘removing a child from 
school, reducing food intake, stealing, sending 
family members away or begging’. 
In 2010, Kenya voted for constitutional reform, 
including a bill of rights. For the first time 
Kenyans were entitled, among other economic 
and social rights, to progressive realisation of 
a right to be ‘free from hunger, and to have 
adequate food of acceptable quality’ (Article 
43 (1)(c)). Government policy responses to food 
insecurity took a number of forms, including 
direct food assistance, piecemeal and narrowly 
targeted social protection programmes, maize 
imports from neighbouring countries to enhance 
supply and mitigate price rises and, in the longer 
term, investing in agriculture to increase domestic 
production. After the 2011 price spike, the 
government introduced a short-term three-
month subsidy for maize meal to support urban 
consumers. However, the bulk of the cheap 
maize was soon bought up by entrepreneurs, 
repackaged and sold on at high prices. 
In 2013 there was a political battle following the 
proposed revision of the Value Added Tax (VAT) 
Act to apply the full rate of VAT (16 per cent) 
on products (including basic processed food 
commodities) that had previously been either 
zero-rated or exempted. The proposal sparked 
noisy protests from citizens and civil society, 
until in June 2013 it was agreed that essential 
food items, some medical supplies, and 
agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, maize seed 
and pest control products would remain exempt 
(Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2015). 
The various measures may have been partially 
successful, but high levels of chronic food 
insecurity remained at the end of the period. 
Other factors need to be taken into account 
in assessing the long-term prospects for food 
security among poor households in Kenya 
(Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2015). They include 
seasonal variations in food availability and access, 
a continued low wage environment, and the 
strong influence on food availability and prices of 
well-resourced private maize traders. 
Figure 17 Wholesale price of maize (January 2006 – January 2016) and beans 
(January 2006 – October 2015), Nairobi
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 25 February 2016).
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The ‘isolated’: Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia and Zambia
Three of the study countries were categorised as 
‘isolated’ in relation to cereal import dependency. 
They were poorly integrated into global cereal 
markets and, to a large extent, self-sufficient in 
their main staple, which implies that domestic 
prices should have been primarily determined 
by local supply and demand factors. In reality, 
though, the ‘isolated’ countries were also strongly 
affected by the shocks in international prices.
Burkina Faso
At the time of the study, cereal consumption 
in Burkina Faso was dominated by coarse 
grains (particularly millet), most of which were 
produced domestically or in the region; but rice 
consumption was also important, half or more of 
which was generally imported (FAO 2015a). The 
price of imported rice almost doubled during the 
2008 food price crisis, reflecting international 
trends (see Figure 18). Kibora (2015) notes that 
the rapid food price rises in 2008 resulted in food 
riots in many of Burkina’s towns and cities; the 
state responded (both in 2008 and in 2011) by 
introducing price controls on rice and some other 
basic food items (FAO 2014). 
These price controls are partially reflected in the 
rice price trends shown in Figure 18. Post-2008 
prices declined from the 2008 peak, but not to 
the extent that reductions in international prices 
might have suggested: Thai rice prices in early 
2016 were almost 60 per cent below their 2008 
peak, but rice prices in Burkina were about 22 per 
cent less. The muted transmission of price changes 
may partly reflect the effect of high transport 
costs, since most of Burkina’s rice imports came 
from Asia. It is also notable that millet prices rose 
substantially over much of the period, at similar 
magnitudes to prices of internationally traded 
cereals, despite Burkina being practically self-
sufficient in millet production. For instance, FAO 
data show that imports of millet in 2013 were 
estimated at 256 tonnes, whereas imports of rice 
were estimated at 439,080 tonnes in the same 
year (FAOSTAT 2016).
In 2008 there may have been cross-substitution 
between cereal products – i.e. as rice prices rose, 
consumer demand may have switched more 
towards millet, resulting in higher millet prices. 
In 2012, millet prices rose even further. This has 
been attributed to drought, civil unrest and locust 
damage (International Food Policy Research 
Institute 2013), but other factors – including 
stockpiling by traders and the impact of increased 
demand in Nigeria – may also have played a role 
(IRIN News 2012). However, millet prices fell 
quite significantly in 2013 and have remained 
well below their 2011–12 peak. 
Figure 18 Millet and imported rice wholesale prices, January 2006 – January 2016, Ouagadougou
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 18 February 2016).
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Poverty data for Burkina Faso indicate that more 
people were living in poverty after the 2008 price 
spike than before it, although the headcount ratio 
was marginally reduced. There were 8.4 million 
people in PPP$12 poverty in 2009, compared to 
7.2 million in 2003; using the national poverty 
line, the respective figures were 7 million and 
6 million (World Bank 2016). Food security and 
nutritional indicators showed small improvements 
over the time period.
Ethiopia
Staple prices spiked in 2008 and 2011, following 
the pattern of international prices, but teff 
and wheat prices mostly continued to rise 
thereafter, as did maize prices until early 2014 
(Figure 19). Although commercial imports of 
wheat and maize were limited and teff was 
exclusively produced in Ethiopia, domestic price 
increases in 2008 were at least as large as the 
increase in international prices (Baltzer 2013). 
Admassie (2013) states that domestic food 
price increases started in 2004 due to domestic 
factors: improved purchasing power in rural 
areas, expansionary monetary policy, relatively 
slow expansion of marketed supply, and localised 
drought. The spike in food prices in 2008 was, 
according to Admassie, linked to rapidly increasing 
global energy prices, which led to foreign 
exchange shortages. 
The Ethiopian government responded by 
rationing foreign currency and tightening money 
supply and credit availability. However, in late 
2010, the currency was devalued by 20 per cent 
and this, among other factors, caused prices 
to start to rise again. The drought of 2011–12 
exacerbated this renewed trend towards higher 
food prices. The current (2015–16) drought, linked 
to El Niño, could be expected to lead to further 
significant cereal price increases. So far, only 
the price of teff is continuing to rise; however, 
the price of wheat remains substantially above 
2011–12 levels. Maize prices are about 25 per cent 
below the three-year average, which may reflect 
government investments in boosting productivity 
(Abate et al. 2015).13  
Headey et al. (2012) analysed the degree of 
responsiveness of urban wages of casual labourers 
(who were likely to be among the urban poor) 
to price increases, and found that, at least in 
the short run, wages did not significantly adjust 
to price increases (both food and non-food). In 
2007–08, the food purchasing power of wages 
fell by about 20 per cent, and overall by about 
10 per cent. The adverse welfare impact was 
greater in 2010–11 due to more rapid non-food 
price inflation. These findings suggest the 
importance of appropriate urban-based food 
security interventions in periods of food price 
crisis (Headey et al. 2012).
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 19 February 2016).
Figure 19 Wholesale prices of teff, maize, wheat, January 2000 – January 2016, Addis Ababa
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Zambia
Retail prices of maize, the Zambian staple, 
fluctuated over the period, rising rapidly in 2008 
but not in 2011, unlike elsewhere. However, 
prices in Zambia also spiked in 2005–06, 2014, 
and again between late 2015 and early 2016 
(Figure 20). These trends suggest that domestic 
or regional factors may have influenced price 
movements more than international price 
fluctuations (see also Baltzer 2013). 
However, high global prices may have indirectly 
influenced prices in 2008, when perceived 
shortages of maize led the government to ban 
maize exports, encouraging private hoarding by 
traders (Baltzer 2013). In 2013–14, maize prices 
again increased substantially; this was precipitated 
by a reduced harvest in 2013, allied to the removal 
of maize and fuel subsidies and a reduction in 
fertiliser subsidies during 2013 (Hossain, King, 
Kelbert, Scott-Villiers and Chisholm 2015). 
Although the government banned exports in 
December 2013, prices did not come down until 
the harvest was brought in, in May 2014. Drought 
conditions during the 2014–15 season resulted in a 
reduced maize harvest in 2015 as well as reduced 
food availability in the southern Africa region 
(WFP 2015c), and contributed to the further price 
increases. These various explanations of price 
increases indicate that maize prices were strongly 
influenced by domestic (and, to some extent, 
regional) factors – both production conditions and 
government policy.
As Figure 20 shows, in recent years Zambia 
has switched from being a net cereal importer 
to being a net exporter: most of these exports 
of white maize go to neighbouring countries. 
Drought conditions in late 2015 to early 2016 
in southern Africa caused major production 
shortfalls, particularly in South Africa. This resulted 
in increased demand for imports, and caused 
the price of maize to increase significantly (WFP 
2015c). Zambia therefore increased its exports 
to neighbouring countries, despite reductions in 
its own production in 2015. This appeared to be 
contributing to the increase in domestic maize 
prices since mid-2015.
In aggregate terms, poverty rates in Zambia 
increased over the period (in PPP$ terms, 
from 60.5 per cent in 2006 to 64.4 per cent 
in 2010 (World Bank 2016). Prevalence of 
undernourishment stood at about 48 per cent, 
somewhat reduced from the peak of 53 per cent 
between 2007 and 2010. Child stunting rates 
were high, at 40 per cent, but down from a 
peak of 58 per cent in 1999 (FAO Food Security 
statistics). Analysis by Alcaraz (2015a), comparing 
data from the Living Conditions Monitoring 
Surveys conducted in 2006 and 2010, found 
that households increased the share of total 
expenditure spent on food in 2010 (i.e. after the 
2008 food crisis) and spent more on cheaper, 
less-refined maize flour. In rural areas, there was 
a general trend towards reduced consumption of 
protein-rich foods in favour of cheaper sources of 
calories. In urban areas, richer households were 
able to maintain consumption of protein-rich 
foods by substituting cheaper sources of calories, 
but poorer urban households had low intake of 
protein-rich foods in both years.
Source: Authors’ own, based on FAO GIEWS data (accessed 2 March 2016).
Figure 20 White maize retail price (January 2004 – January 2016) and breakfast maize 
meal retail price (January 2006 – January 2016), Zambia
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 Notes 
1 There is enough controversy about the validity of global poverty 
measures, and indeed their intrinsic value as indicators of human 
wellbeing, to question the big picture story of rapidly declining 
world poverty. Most importantly for the purposes of this report, 
the global poverty estimates appear unable to account for changing 
food prices: the latest purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates 
counter-intuitively suggest that consumer prices are down in 
several big developing countries that have experienced rapid wage 
rises (Ravallion and Chen 2015); in some cases, the PPP estimates 
and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) estimates were at odds. On 
the global poverty estimates, see Ravallion and Chen 2012, and 
Ferreira et al. 2015; also Cruz et al. 2015. Critical views of the uses of 
PPP estimates in attempting comparative global poverty estimates, 
despite their improvements in the 2011 round, include Deaton 
2010, Deaton and Aten 2014, and Edward and Sumner 2015.
2 The extent of integration in food commodity supply chains 
has been amply documented. Burch and Lawrence (2009), 
for instance, provide striking examples of the extent of the 
concentration of control over finance, fertiliser, land and 
machinery in agriculture supply chains in the immediate run-up 
to the global food crisis.
3 For a thorough analysis of the food crisis that takes into account 
its political and global dimensions, see Pinstrup-Andersen (2014). 
4 On the impacts and coping strategies, see, for instance Del 
Ninno, Dorosh, and Smith 2003; Heltberg, Hossain, Reva 
and Turk 2012; Horn 2011; D’Souza and Jolliffe 2010; Wiggins 
and Keats 2014; FAO 2009, 2011; Hossain 2009; Hossain and 
Green 2011; Hossain, Fillaili and Lubaale 2010; Matin et al. 2009; 
Sulaiman, Parveen and Das 2009.
5 The qualitative data were transcribed or written up and 
translated (from 15 languages) in each country. Data management 
was coordinated across the countries, with common metadata 
labels issued to all the teams and the lead country researchers 
responsible for ensuring that data were transcribed, translated, 
and labelled correctly. For the synthesis, the translated qualitative 
data were stored and coded in the data analysis software, NVivo 
10s. Given the high costs of collecting, transcribing, translating, 
storing, and coding qualitative data, the emphasis has been on 
small amounts of high-quality data and on maximising such 
alternative secondary sources that exist.
6 The classification of a country as an ‘importer’ is potentially 
misleading. As Figure 7 shows, Pakistan is actually a net exporter 
of cereals; but Pakistan exports rice, which is less important in 
terms of local consumption, and imports wheat. Even though 
wheat imports comprise a small proportion of domestic 
wheat consumption, they create the potential conditions for 
international price transmission to domestic prices.
7 At the February 2016 exchange rate: Taka 1 = US$0.013.
8 Based on data collected in five major cities: Karachi, Lahore, 
Multan, Peshawar and Quetta.
9 The signing and implementation of the US-Central America 
Free Trade Agreement during the 2000s has also facilitated 
an increase in imports of food and other commodities. Alcaraz 
(2015a) cites Thow and Hawkes (2009) who state that food 
imports from the US to Guatemala grew by 144 per cent 
between 1990 and 2005, particularly chicken meat, corn, 
processed cheese, apples, and French fries.
10 The International Labour Organization (ILO 2014) reports that 
in early 2014 about 53.6 per cent of those employed were in the 
informal economy, while the Government of Indonesia and WFP 
(2015) report a figure of 60 per cent for early 2013.
11 The second stage of the IPC Classification, i.e. they can meet 
basic food needs, but not non-food essential expenditures 
without resorting to irreversible coping mechanisms (Kenya Food 
Security Steering Group 2015).
12 A poverty line measured in PPP$ represents the international 
poverty line (currently $1.90/person/day) used to measure 
global extreme poverty: the poverty line is converted into local 
currencies through PPP exchange rates with the aim of ensuring 
that the poverty line has the same purchasing power in every 
country (Ferreira et al. 2015).
13 These are wholesale prices: the annual retail food inflation rate 
in January 2016 was running at 12.4 per cent, and the index of 
food prices was 146.6 compared to a base in December 2011 of 
100 (FDRE Central Statistical Agency 2016).
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Mukuru is the second biggest informal settlement 
in Nairobi, with an estimated population of between 
500,000 and 700,000 residents. The majority of those in 
work have jobs in the nearby industrial area, as security 
guards or domestic workers, while others are artisans or 
mechanics. Some local residents are landlords, and petty 
trading is widespread. 
Many people choose to eat githeri, a mix of maize kernels 
and kidney beans – a cheap and readily available food.
Lango Baya is approximately 50km from the coastal 
town of Malindi in the east of Kenya. Its 16,000 residents 
depend mainly on rain-fed farming. Over the past few 
years, irrigation projects have helped to improve the 
livelihoods of those with land near the river, whose 
vegetable and maize crops have generated good incomes. 
‘Jipanga’, in Kiswahili, is the term used to describe how 
women ‘organise themselves and their time so that they 
can be able to do all’.
Banjar, South Kalimantan
Banjar is a major rubber-producing area in the province 
of South Kalimantan. Most of the population relies on 
rubber – as landowners, landless rubber tappers, sap 
transporters and middlemen. 
Recently, many have started to move away from the 
rubber industry. Mining and quarrying are gaining 
importance. 
Bekasi 
Bekasi, which is located 16km from the capital city, 
Jakarta, is one of the biggest industrial areas in West 
Java. Its export-oriented economy tends to be greatly 
affected by global financial fluctuations. 
The majority of residents are migrant workers, living 
there temporarily while working in the local factories, 
mostly as contract workers. The poverty rate in Bekasi 
is low, at 5.9 per cent in 2011 – almost half the national 
average of 11.7 per cent. 
Cianjur 
Located 120km from Jakarta and 65km from West Java’s 
provincial capital, Bandung, Cianjur is an important rice 
supplier to the cities. Three-quarters of the inhabitants earn 
their living from agriculture, mostly as farm labourers who do 
not have their own farmland. Many have left to work in the 
Middle East, sending remittances back home. Cash inflows 
have helped the village to develop new infrastructure. 
The local rice variety can only 
be harvested twice a year. Most 
farmers now use a ‘modern’ 
variety, which can produce three 
harvests a year. To do so, they 
use large amounts of chemicals 
to overcome pest attacks. 
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Kenya
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Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi 
Gulshan-e-Iqbal is a low-income area in Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city. 
Most of the residents are internal migrants, self-employed or working 
as daily-wage labourers. Strikes or trouble in the city, which particularly 
affect daily-wage workers, are the biggest sources of shock to households. 
In this conservative neighbourhood we saw women entering the 
labour force for the first time, often to work as maids or beauticians.
Dadu District
Located at the tail end of canals on the right bank of the Indus River, 
villages in Dadu District in Sindh province were greatly affected by the 
floods of 2010, when thousands of people had to leave their homes. 
Today, many households have returned and some benefit from cash 
transfers through the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) and 
from compensation for flood damage. 
Many of the women in the villages in 
Dadu District sew quilts for extremely 
low pay – typically PKR200–300 
(US$2.14–3.21) for a quilt stitched over a 
month, while in 2014, men earned 
between Rs300 and 400 as day labourers.
Kabwata is a residential area in the south-east of Lusaka. While some 
people in Kabwata rely on income from formal employment and trade, 
the majority of households are involved in informal employment 
ranging from petty trade (food and non-food) to welding, carpentry, 
crafts and tourism. Almost half the households are headed by women. 
Between 2014 and 2016, global slides in commodity prices, including 
for copper, led to fluctuations in the value of the kwacha, the Zambian 
national currency. Traders used the price changes to stock up on 
mealie meal, creating artificial shortages of the national staple, maize. 
A number of policy interventions have attempted to resolve the 
ongoing issue. 
Chikwanda in the Northern Province is in the agricultural and gardening belt 
of Mpika District. Most people grow maize, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, 
cassava, beans and soya beans. A few 
are engaged in farm labour, making 
handicrafts or collecting and processing 
minor forest products. 
Mpika is a fast-growing town close to 
Chikwanda village. Many of the farmers 
from Chikwanda go to Mpika market to 
sell their produce.
In Hanoi, the research was conducted in Phu Dien commune (a 
peri-urban area, located 10km from Hanoi) and Quynh Mai ward 
(an urban area). Most of the population of Quynh Mai – which has a 
higher poverty rate than other wards in Hanoi – work in textile and 
garment factories. In Phu Dien, despite agriculture being a major 
source of livelihood, land is gradually being built over. 
The Luong An Tra commune in An Giang province is located in the 
Mekong Delta and is the biggest rice producer in Vietnam. Agriculture 
accounts for nearly 80 per cent of the economy of the commune. The 
decrease in the price of rice in recent years has meant that farmers 
often produce at a loss. Consequently, many households with less land 
and capital accumulate debt. 
Nghi Van commune in Nghe An province is another significant rice-
producing commune. Similarly to Luong An Tra, about 80 per cent of the 
population earn a living from agricultural 
production. Other occupations include 
handicrafts, construction and small-scale 
business. Many young people migrate 
to the cities to seek work in factories, 
while others emigrate to the Republic 
of Korea, Laos or Malaysia, under labour 
export programmes.
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This report is the result of four years of collaboration 
between Oxfam GB, the Institute of Development 
Studies and qualitative and quantitative researchers 
in ten countries. It builds on a prior IDS-Oxfam study 
into the effects of the global food crisis on the lives 
of people on low and uncertain incomes, which 
ran between 2009 and 2011 in four countries. The 
longitudinal study synthesised here was carried out 
between 2012 and 2015 and involved annual visits 
to communities in rural, urban and peri-urban sites, 
along with commissioned reviews of national-level 
prices and policies over the period. With the help of 
the research partners and of Oxfam offices around 
the world, the findings have already begun to be 
disseminated and discussed with communities, 
government representatives and members of civil 
society at multiple levels. The research was funded by 
the UK Department for International Development, 
Irish Aid and Oxfam.
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